C

Chatham House: What's New

http://www.chathamhouse.org/path/whatsnew.xml (RSS订阅地址)

Canada's retaliatory tariffs put Trump's trade strategy to the test

<span>Canada's retaliatory tariffs put Trump's trade strategy to the test</span> <span>Expert comment</span> <span><span>LToremark</span></span> <span><time datetime="2026-09-09T16:25:33+01:00" title="Wednesday, 9 September, 2026">9 September 2026</time> </span> <p>US–Canada trade war will test not only economic strength but also political will. On the latter, Canada may have an advantage.</p> <div class="media media-teaser_landscape_rss media-image"> <img loading="eager" srcset="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/yxDFrVUwZER_1dV5Cw9Isy-UNPeiDMqW4HDLzJaFCFQ/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy9jaGF0X3NvY2lhbF8xMjAwXzYzMC9wdWJsaWMvMjAyNi0wOS8yMDI2LTA5LTA5LWNhbmFkYS10YXJpZmZzLWNhcm5leS0yMjkxMzM5OTA5LmpwZz9pdG9rPVlrdjhiYWhL 1x" width="1200" height="600" src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/zUe7jeT_H_wBFdi2g26eU4hapdZoImboL9jzlp9Se4Q/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy9jaGF0X3NvY2lhbF90d2l0dGVyXzEyMDBfNjAwL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI2LTA5LzIwMjYtMDktMDktY2FuYWRhLXRhcmlmZnMtY2FybmV5LTIyOTEzMzk5MDkuanBnP2l0b2s9NHlSZWptRkU" alt="Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney "> </div> <p>As Canada’s new retaliatory tariffs against the United States came into effect on Tuesday, the Canada–US trade dispute entered a new phase – one that will be closely watched around the world. Apart from China, Canada is the only country that has imposed retaliatory tariffs on the US. The key question now is whether this strategy can succeed.</p><p>The most recent escalation between the two neighbours began in August, when Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney walked away from trade talks with the Trump administration after <a href="https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2026/08/22/prime-minister-carney-delivers-remarks-canada-us-trade-negotiations" data-entity-type="external">describing</a> the US offer as ‘unfair’ and ‘uneconomic’ and saying that US negotiators had sought to limit Canada’s ability to negotiate trade arrangements with third countries.&nbsp;</p><p>The Trump administration then imposed additional tariffs of up to 50 per cent on certain Canadian imports under Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 – an obscure, Great Depression-era provision giving the president broad powers against countries deemed to discriminate against US commerce.&nbsp;</p><p>On Tuesday, Canada imposed ‘dollar-for-dollar’ counter-tariffs on a roughly equivalent amount of US goods. In response, Trump announced that the US would use Section 338 to ban imports of Canadian alcohol, motorcycles and some dairy products starting on 29 September.&nbsp;</p><div data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="8e50f664-283e-48cb-a2a5-2377a6856492" data-embed-button="node" data-entity-embed-display="view_mode:node.teaser_embed" class="align-right embedded-entity embed" data-langcode="en" data-entity-embed-display-settings="[]" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <article class="media media-embed teaser--embed teaser teaser--default"> <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2026-03/bob-rae-canadas-change-heart-about-united-states-profound" class="teaser__link no-external-link-icon"> <div class="teaser__image-container"> <div class="media media-teaser_landscape media-image aspect-ratio-16:9"> <img loading="lazy" srcset="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/gNka8SKJ-ir4PHQSRT9evgcTxZrY33eM7bviirfvtvA/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3RpbnkvcHVibGljLzIwMjYtMDMvMjAyNi0wNi0wMy10d3Qtc3ByaW5nLWJvYi1yYWUtaGVyby0wMS5qcGc_aD0wOGJjMTA0NCZpdG9rPVhVTVphdnFS 400w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/5DiRW9uzXHEK--sPZ-E8b1LwunIozHAdqUpV1707Z60/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3NtYWxsL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI2LTAzLzIwMjYtMDYtMDMtdHd0LXNwcmluZy1ib2ItcmFlLWhlcm8tMDEuanBnP2g9MDhiYzEwNDQmaXRvaz1uSllvOU9YdQ 750w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/ssksx3uG8CGAvwYolRq7P0WX06O--w2Wm-Nkgo-mhZ4/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX21lZGl1bS9wdWJsaWMvMjAyNi0wMy8yMDI2LTA2LTAzLXR3dC1zcHJpbmctYm9iLXJhZS1oZXJvLTAxLmpwZz9oPTA4YmMxMDQ0Jml0b2s9dDlfRUpCTno 1000w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/xYLItGTVhqsJVXW48yGLxBOYAQgha9bXw-v7RgGji3g/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX2xhcmdlL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI2LTAzLzIwMjYtMDYtMDMtdHd0LXNwcmluZy1ib2ItcmFlLWhlcm8tMDEuanBnP2g9MDhiYzEwNDQmaXRvaz1rckFXQzYzUA 1300w" sizes="(min-width:1280px) 33.3vw, 100vw" width="750" height="422" src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/5DiRW9uzXHEK--sPZ-E8b1LwunIozHAdqUpV1707Z60/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3NtYWxsL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI2LTAzLzIwMjYtMDYtMDMtdHd0LXNwcmluZy1ib2ItcmFlLWhlcm8tMDEuanBnP2g9MDhiYzEwNDQmaXRvaz1uSllvOU9YdQ" alt> </div> <div class="teaser__image-watermark"> <span class="visually-hidden">The World Today</span> <svg focusable="false" role="presentation"> <use xlink:href="#twt-watermark" ></use> </svg> </div> </div> <div class="teaser__body"> <header class="teaser__header"> <p class="c-label">Related work </p><h3 class="h5 teaser__title"><span>Bob Rae: ‘Canada’s change of heart about the United States is profound’</span> </h3> </header> </div> </a> </article> </div> <p>Trump has piled on the pressure in recent weeks. He has called on Canadian leaders to <a href="https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/117151799569745572" data-entity-type="external">‘fall in line’</a>, ordered that Lake Ontario – which straddles the Canada – US border – be renamed ‘Lake America’, and posted a map depicting the US as encompassing Canada (as well as Mexico, Greenland and Iceland).</p><p>Trump and members of his administration appear <a href="https://trumpstruth.org/statuses/41496" data-entity-type="external">convinced</a> that Canada will eventually fold under US economic pressure. The imbalance in the relationship might seem to support that calculation. Bilateral trade exceeded <a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/canada" data-entity-type="external">$870 billion</a> in goods and services in 2025. But Canada is far more dependent on the US than vice versa: about <a href="https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/260903/dq260903a-eng.htm" data-entity-type="external">two-thirds</a> of Canadian goods exports go to the US, while Canada accounts for only about <a href="https://www.bea.gov/news/2026/us-international-trade-goods-and-services-july-2026" data-entity-type="external">15 per cent</a> of US goods exports. The US economy is also roughly 13 times larger than Canada’s.</p><p>However, trade wars test not only economic strength but also political resolve – and here Canada may have an advantage. Trump’s trade policies and repeated calls for Canada to become the 51<sup>st</sup> US state have provoked widespread outrage among Canadians, reinforcing the view that the dispute is about sovereignty as well as trade.&nbsp;</p><p>Recent polling suggests Carney has considerable room for manoeuvre at home. <a href="https://nanos.co/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/2026-3115-CTV-News-Globe-and-Mail-August-Populated-Report.pdf" data-entity-type="external">One survey</a> found 85 per cent of Canadians support rejecting the proposed US trade deal, while 80 per cent back retaliatory tariffs even if they result in higher prices. <a href="https://sparkadvocacy.ca/insights/2026/09/liberals-lead-49-29-approval-of-carney-government-climbs-to-new-high" data-entity-type="external">Another</a> put approval of the Carney government at a new high of 70 per cent.</p><p>Whether such high levels of public backing will endure is uncertain. Carney’s standing could weaken as the economic costs start to bite, particularly if tariffs lead to significant job losses despite Ottawa’s financial assistance to affected sectors. And while Trump’s threats have fostered unusual unity in Canada’s often fractious federal politics, longstanding divisions might reassert themselves. Separatist sentiment will be tested in Quebec’s provincial election on 5 October and in Alberta’s 19 October referendum, which includes a question on beginning the process towards a future vote on independence – that Trump-aligned figures have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/03/opinion/canada-alberta-separatists-trump-maga.html?" data-entity-type="external">expressed support</a> for.</p><p>By contrast, Trump’s approval ratings have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/polls/donald-trump-approval-rating-polls.html" data-entity-type="external">fallen sharply</a> and there is little appetite among Americans for an escalating trade war with Canada: nearly <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/facing-trade-dispute-majority-americans-want-us-make-tradeoffs-canada" data-entity-type="external">60 per cent</a> oppose further tariffs on Canadian goods and almost 70 per cent favour compromise with their northern neighbour. Several US sectors and states also rely on trade with Canada, like the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/automakers-thought-canada-was-getting-trade-deal-then-tariffs-doubled-2026-08-26/" data-entity-type="external">automotive sector</a> and the swing states of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/trump-canada-tariffs-senate-2026-campaign-c3d2461184a2b8656abd01376452e0d5" data-entity-type="external">Michigan and Ohio</a>.</p><p>Still, Trump’s enthusiasm for tariffs shows no signs of waning. Even if Democrats were to gain control of Congress after November’s midterm elections, legislation curtailing presidential tariff powers could still face a Trump veto. This requires two-thirds majorities in both chambers to override, which they are unlikely to achieve.</p><p>Nor can <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/regions/americas/canada" data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="8430dc16-37b2-44c9-bdac-4aa188b3d7ce" data-entity-substitution="canonical" title="Canada">Canada</a> count on the US courts for rapid relief. Trump’s novel use of Section 338 will likely face legal challenges, as some of his previous tariffs have, but a final resolution could take months or years.</p><div data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="b908e9e2-f8a9-4c8f-8a6c-7eaaad95e4e7" data-embed-button="node" data-entity-embed-display="view_mode:node.teaser_embed" class="align-left embedded-entity embed" data-langcode="en" data-entity-embed-display-settings="[]"> <article class="media media-embed teaser--embed teaser teaser--default"> <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/members-and-partners/corporate-membership?teaser=" class="teaser__link no-external-link-icon"> <div class="teaser__image-container"> <div class="media media-teaser_landscape media-image aspect-ratio-16:9"> <img loading="lazy" srcset="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/EEq7RJ6bI8HicU1pug9-VvJ6aGbBlEXoh5Gpez9Ue3Q/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3RpbnkvcHVibGljLzIwMjYtMDgvMjAyNi0wOC0wMy1jb3Jwb3JhdGUtbWVtYmVyc2hpcC1hcnRpY2xlLWN0YS5qcGc_aD0xOTlkOGMxZiZpdG9rPU5uazAzbWxU 400w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/lLFuHtwpajfnaZ6Se6kwcpkIUjePfhuZOCwsGDItPbQ/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3NtYWxsL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI2LTA4LzIwMjYtMDgtMDMtY29ycG9yYXRlLW1lbWJlcnNoaXAtYXJ0aWNsZS1jdGEuanBnP2g9MTk5ZDhjMWYmaXRvaz1UakFEaU9CTQ 750w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/BAFzPTLXXPgNiFewi-jQ3PbR1kamdXxRE-ZpdA0WoAE/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX21lZGl1bS9wdWJsaWMvMjAyNi0wOC8yMDI2LTA4LTAzLWNvcnBvcmF0ZS1tZW1iZXJzaGlwLWFydGljbGUtY3RhLmpwZz9oPTE5OWQ4YzFmJml0b2s9VGxfcU5MUlg 1000w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/ZB0i6668-CZbavnTbN4W5USPisoJGgktc9bRj76NPwc/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX2xhcmdlL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI2LTA4LzIwMjYtMDgtMDMtY29ycG9yYXRlLW1lbWJlcnNoaXAtYXJ0aWNsZS1jdGEuanBnP2g9MTk5ZDhjMWYmaXRvaz1DWU81d21JbQ 1300w" sizes="(min-width:1280px) 33.3vw, 100vw" width="750" height="422" src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/lLFuHtwpajfnaZ6Se6kwcpkIUjePfhuZOCwsGDItPbQ/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3NtYWxsL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI2LTA4LzIwMjYtMDgtMDMtY29ycG9yYXRlLW1lbWJlcnNoaXAtYXJ0aWNsZS1jdGEuanBnP2g9MTk5ZDhjMWYmaXRvaz1UakFEaU9CTQ" alt> </div> </div> <div class="teaser__body"> <header class="teaser__header"> <h3 class="h5 teaser__title"><span>Become a corporate member</span> </h3> </header> <div class="teaser__summary"> <p>Join organizations with access to trusted geopolitical analysis, policy insight, and expert networks that help their leaders anticipate risk, navigate business critical issues and inform strategic decision making.</p> </div> </div> </a> </article> </div> <p>For Canada, therefore, neither political change in Washington nor litigation offers a quick solution. But ‘winning’ does not require compelling Trump to back down. Success might instead mean demonstrating sufficient political and economic resolve to improve the terms on which negotiations eventually resume – a more achievable objective, given the depth of Canadian public opposition to US demands.</p><p>At the same time, Canada’s strategy is not limited to managing the confrontation with Washington. Ottawa is pursuing a broader goal of reducing Canada’s economic dependence on the <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/regions/americas/united-states-america" data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="69d1884e-2648-496b-bbcd-570480342f65" data-entity-substitution="canonical" title="United States of America">US</a> by deepening ties with other partners, particularly in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, while investing in the energy, critical minerals and infrastructure needed to reach new markets. Carney has set a goal of doubling Canada’s non-US exports over the next decade and attracting new foreign investment in Canada, drawing on his experience as a former central bank governor and investment banker.</p><p>His strategy will gather momentum this month. On 14–15 September, Carney will host the <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/campaign/canada-investment-summit-2026.html" data-entity-type="external">Canada Investment Summit</a> in Toronto, bringing together major global investors. He will then travel to Strasbourg as a guest of honour for European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s State of the Union speech, where she is <a href="https://financialpost.com/news/eu-canada-plan-far-reaching-alliance-strengthen-partnership" data-entity-type="external">expected to announce</a> a deeper partnership between the <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/topics/european-union-eu" data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="2a761e20-cbdf-4d0b-b365-badbe9555744" data-entity-substitution="canonical" title="European Union (EU)">EU</a> and Canada. Carney will address the European Parliament the following day.</p><p>Whether Canada can resist US pressure while diversifying its economic partnerships – demonstrating a <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2026/09/taking-the-pulse-is-canada-leading-a-third-way" data-entity-type="external">‘third way’</a> for other countries facing similar pressure – will not be clear for some time. Trade relationships can take years to bear fruit, as can the major infrastructure and resource-development investments aimed at bringing more Canadian goods to world markets. Diversification can reduce Canada’s vulnerability, but it cannot quickly replace the economic relationship with its largest trading partner.</p><p>The more immediate test is whether Canada can withstand US pressure long enough to secure better terms when negotiations eventually resume. The Trump administration appears to be betting that the imbalance in economic power will ultimately force Ottawa to concede. The coming months may show that it has underestimated Canadian resolve.</p>

2026/9/9
阅读更多

What to learn from Russia's State Duma elections

<span>What to learn from Russia's State Duma elections</span> 22 September 2026 — 17:00 TO 18:00 BST <span><span>Anonymous (not verified)</span></span> <span><time datetime="2026-09-09T10:52:15+01:00" title="Wednesday, 9 September, 2026">9 September 2026</time> </span> Chatham House and Online <p>Following Russia’s parliamentary vote, experts assess what the results reveal about Russia’s future direction and the durability of President Putin’s system.</p> Following Russia’s parliamentary vote, experts assess what the results reveal about Russia’s future direction and the durability of President Putin’s system. <p>Russia’s September State Duma elections will take place as the war against Ukraine continues to reshape the country’s politics, institutions and elite structures. The elections are unlikely to produce major political change, but they offer a valuable window into the evolution of Vladimir Putin’s system, revealing important trends in regime stability and public attitudes.</p><p>The event discusses:</p><ul><li>What do the election results reveal about the state of Putin’s regime?</li><li>How is the war reshaping Russia’s politics and governance?</li><li>Do the elections signal renewal within Russia’s political elite?</li><li>What role remains for opposition voices in Russian politics?</li><li>What role are war veterans beginning to play in Russia’s political system?</li><li>What do the elections reveal about public attitudes towards the war and governance?</li></ul>

2026/9/9
阅读更多

North Korea’s military partnership with Russia has consequences far beyond Ukraine

<span>North Korea’s military partnership with Russia has consequences far beyond Ukraine</span> <span>Expert comment</span> <span><span>thilton.drupal</span></span> <span><time datetime="2026-09-09T09:28:02+01:00" title="Wednesday, 9 September, 2026">9 September 2026</time> </span> <p>North Korea is emerging as Russia’s reserve arsenal – and potentially its reserve army. This deepening partnership has strengthened Pyongyang’s military capabilities and its strategic position in East Asia.</p> <div class="media media-teaser_landscape_rss media-image"> <img loading="eager" srcset="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/W8J30HAgyhxr08Jwcd5uyK-ZHVWRKvWPwmXLY-2wUto/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy9jaGF0X3NvY2lhbF8xMjAwXzYzMC9wdWJsaWMvMjAyNi0wOS8yMDI2LTA5LTA5LW5vcnRoLWtvcmVhLXJ1c3NpYS1weW9uZ3lhbmcta2ltLXB1dGluLTIxNTc4Mjk0OTguanBnP2l0b2s9eVdNWnV6U0w 1x" width="1200" height="600" src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/wFVjzttGJKk_2PiDFkVOBZwax2ClVaz-4D3tAPZAb4k/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy9jaGF0X3NvY2lhbF90d2l0dGVyXzEyMDBfNjAwL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI2LTA5LzIwMjYtMDktMDktbm9ydGgta29yZWEtcnVzc2lhLXB5b25neWFuZy1raW0tcHV0aW4tMjE1NzgyOTQ5OC5qcGc_aXRvaz15bjdRMVhfbQ" alt="People walk past banners of Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Yong Un in Pyongyang in 2024"> </div> <p>The first road bridge connecting North Korea and Russia opened this week, providing the latest sign of the deepening partnership between the two countries since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.</p><p>North Korea’s military partnership with Russia has moved far beyond the transactional arms supply that developed after the invasion. Pyongyang is increasingly becoming an institutionalized part of Moscow’s war-making capacity – supplying ammunition, ballistic missiles and soldiers. In return, the North Korean regime is gaining economic resources, potential military technology, and extensive experience of modern warfare that it would struggle to acquire elsewhere.</p><h2>Deepening military ties</h2><p>Military cooperation has deepened since the two countries signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty in June 2024.&nbsp;</p><p>South Korea’s Defence Intelligence Agency estimates that North Korea has sent more than <a href="https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260823000600315" data-entity-type="external">16,000 personnel</a> to Russia since October 2024 and supplied more than 15 million artillery rounds. North Korea itself <a href="https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20250428000553315" data-entity-type="external">acknowledged</a> for the first time in April 2025 that it had sent troops to Russia, saying they had fought alongside Russian forces in Kursk. Pyongyang subsequently dispatched approximately <a href="https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/northkorea/20251213/n-korea-welcomes-engineer-troops-return-from-russias-kursk-region" data-entity-type="external">1,000 military engineers</a> for mine-clearance operations.</p><div data-entity-type="media" data-entity-uuid="6aef7940-8fd6-4c2b-bede-a79716788b1e" data-embed-button="other_embed" data-entity-embed-display="view_mode:media.embed" class="align-right embedded-entity embed" data-langcode="en" data-entity-embed-display-settings="[]" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><figure class="media media-embed media-quote"> <blockquote class="media__wrapper"> <div class="media__content"> <svg class="icon icon--open-quote" role="presentation" focusable="false"> <use xlink:href="#icon-open-quote" ></use> </svg> <p><span>North Korea replenishes Russia’s war machine, while Russia improves North Korea’s future ability to wage war.</span></p> </div> </blockquote> </figure> </div> <p>The military relationship continues to evolve. Ukrainian intelligence <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/north-korean-missile-unit-deploys-russia-ukraine-war-kyiv-says-2026-08-05/" data-entity-type="external">reported in August</a> that a North Korean missile unit of around 90 personnel had begun deploying to Russia’s western Voronezh region. It said that Moscow expects the unit eventually to have up to 120 ballistic missiles and six launchers. Pyongyang had already supplied dozens of KN-23 and KN-24 missiles to Russia.</p><p>Much larger numbers may follow. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/ukraines-zelenskiy-says-up-50000-north-korean-troops-be-deployed-russia-2026-08-09/" data-entity-type="external">suggested in August</a> that another 30,000–50,000 North Korean soldiers could eventually be deployed. South Korean intelligence has been more cautious, assessing that Pyongyang is preparing for a potential deployment but finding no signs that one is imminent. Kim Yo Jong, the <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2023-06/review-kim-jong-uns-mysterious-little-sister" data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="f0ade4ee-da3c-4f00-975f-bd9e23fc23d8" data-entity-substitution="canonical" title="Review: Kim Jong Un’s mysterious little sister ">outspoken sister</a> of North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Un, has dismissed the Ukrainian claim as <a href="https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260823000600315" data-entity-type="external">‘completely groundless.’</a></p><h2>Mutually beneficial</h2><p>The possibility of another major deployment is ominous, but North Korea’s emergence as Russia’s reserve arsenal – and potentially reserve army – is already underway. It is likely to continue because it is mutually beneficial.</p><p>Russia receives much-needed ammunition as well as ballistic missiles and <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/11/independent-thinking-why-north-korea-sending-troops-russia" data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="f87e0888-3448-4bda-881b-09b31c52de6b" data-entity-substitution="canonical" title="Independent Thinking: Why is North Korea sending troops to Russia?">manpower</a> that can supplement its own forces. North Korea, meanwhile, receives economic and material compensation.&nbsp;</p><p>A <a href="https://www.ndc.nato.int/trade-off-an-economic-analysis-of-north-korean-russian-relations/" data-entity-type="external">NATO Defense College study</a> estimates that North Korean munitions and rockets supplied between September 2023 and February 2024 alone were worth $4.3–4.8 billion – an enormous sum relative to North Korea’s economy. This does not mean Pyongyang received an equivalent cash payment: the terms remain opaque, and at least some Russian compensation has taken the form of critical provisions like oil, food and other strategic goods.</p><p>There are limits to this cooperation. North Korea cannot indefinitely deplete its own ammunition stocks or manpower without weakening its military posture at home. But North Korea’s totalitarian system allows the Kim regime to tolerate costs, including substantial battlefield casualties, which many governments would find politically difficult to sustain.</p><h2>Battlefield experience</h2><p>More important in the long term is what the Kim regime is learning from the deployment in Ukraine.</p><p>Its soldiers have encountered drones, electronic warfare, artillery coordination, mine warfare, logistics and Western weapons systems in sustained, large-scale combat. Its missile forces have gained valuable experience from repeated battlefield testing.</p><div data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="e36331ad-60eb-4cb8-840b-1e7f473d2452" data-embed-button="node" data-entity-embed-display="view_mode:node.teaser_embed" class="align-right embedded-entity embed" data-langcode="en" data-entity-embed-display-settings="[]"> <article class="media media-embed teaser--embed teaser teaser--default"> <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/12/north-korea-and-russias-dangerous-partnership" class="teaser__link no-external-link-icon"> <div class="teaser__image-container"> <div class="media media-teaser_landscape media-image aspect-ratio-16:9"> <img loading="lazy" srcset="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/z82Q5O-EqGTrpOXJ0uXu6qhfRV7J5puVsncuY0tGX1I/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3RpbnkvcHVibGljLzIwMjQtMTIvMjAyNC0xMi0wNC1ub3J0aC1rb3JlYS1jcm93ZHMtZ3JlZXQtcHV0aW4tanVuZTI0LTIxNTc2NTMxMDguanBnP2g9NmRkNjc3OTgmaXRvaz1rUDhpOFM4bg 400w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/b1xCmGSIf-rHe5ZvSiR_Mxv7tRO3wpwAMu7meHh5-6I/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3NtYWxsL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI0LTEyLzIwMjQtMTItMDQtbm9ydGgta29yZWEtY3Jvd2RzLWdyZWV0LXB1dGluLWp1bmUyNC0yMTU3NjUzMTA4LmpwZz9oPTZkZDY3Nzk4Jml0b2s9eHZSaG9sWkk 750w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/HnvQ_jBaN0-TLs53qliaohG3SwntJ8H6t0nD2TmCZ9g/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX21lZGl1bS9wdWJsaWMvMjAyNC0xMi8yMDI0LTEyLTA0LW5vcnRoLWtvcmVhLWNyb3dkcy1ncmVldC1wdXRpbi1qdW5lMjQtMjE1NzY1MzEwOC5qcGc_aD02ZGQ2Nzc5OCZpdG9rPVVJZThLa0VD 1000w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/PiKoUiJbBqq-sVZehWk7w8rYdwgR4F696wzwFoUAG4s/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX2xhcmdlL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI0LTEyLzIwMjQtMTItMDQtbm9ydGgta29yZWEtY3Jvd2RzLWdyZWV0LXB1dGluLWp1bmUyNC0yMTU3NjUzMTA4LmpwZz9oPTZkZDY3Nzk4Jml0b2s9dml5cVZYZ3M 1300w" sizes="(min-width:1280px) 33.3vw, 100vw" width="750" height="422" src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/b1xCmGSIf-rHe5ZvSiR_Mxv7tRO3wpwAMu7meHh5-6I/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3NtYWxsL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI0LTEyLzIwMjQtMTItMDQtbm9ydGgta29yZWEtY3Jvd2RzLWdyZWV0LXB1dGluLWp1bmUyNC0yMTU3NjUzMTA4LmpwZz9oPTZkZDY3Nzk4Jml0b2s9eHZSaG9sWkk" alt> </div> </div> <div class="teaser__body"> <header class="teaser__header"> <p class="c-label">Related work </p><h3 class="h5 teaser__title"><span>North Korea and Russia’s dangerous partnership</span> </h3> </header> </div> </a> </article> </div> <p>The results may already be visible. Earlier in the war, Ukrainian sources assessed North Korean missile accuracy at 1–3 kilometres. By early 2025, they reported that missiles were landing within <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukraine-sees-marked-improvement-accuracy-russias-north-korean-missiles-2025-02-06/" data-entity-type="external">50–100 metres</a> of their targets. Possible explanations include better targeting data or Russian-supplied guidance components. At the same time, North Korea may also have made improvements based on feedback from the battlefield.&nbsp;</p><p>The result is a circular military economy: North Korea replenishes Russia’s war machine, while Russia improves North Korea’s future ability to wage war.</p><h2>Ramifications for East Asia</h2><p>These dynamics make the <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/12/north-korea-and-russias-dangerous-partnership/revival-north-korea-russia-relationship" data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="e524781d-1ae9-448a-a9aa-d1ea611fae95" data-entity-substitution="canonical" title="The revival of&nbsp;the North Korea–Russia relationship">Russia–North Korea partnership</a> much more than a sole European security issue.&nbsp;</p><p>Any Russian assistance that improves missile reliability, electronic warfare or other military capabilities can ultimately be incorporated into Pyongyang’s forces back home. This could prove valuable for North Korea in any future conflict with South Korea, Japan or the US.&nbsp;</p><p>For example, North Korean missiles fired at Ukraine are being tested against Western-supplied air-defence systems. The resulting data could help Pyongyang improve its tactics against different but technologically related defences operated by US allies in East Asia.&nbsp;</p><p>The partnership also strengthens <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/07/north-koreas-victory-day-takes-place-kim-jong-uns-power-transformed" data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="24cec398-3837-42a6-85da-0cf8afeb2aba" data-entity-substitution="canonical" title="North Korea’s ‘Victory Day’ takes place with Kim Jong Un’s power transformed">Pyongyang’s diplomatic position.</a> Russian support alone does not fully explain North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal or its increasingly sophisticated missile programme. But it reduces Kim’s dependence on improved relations with Washington for sanctions relief, diplomatic recognition or greater international legitimacy.&nbsp;</p><p>The partnership with Moscow also gives Kim greater room for manoeuvre in dealing with China, North Korea’s traditional ally and principal economic partner. Russian money, energy and military cooperation reduce Beijing’s ability to use North Korea’s economic dependence as leverage. But they cannot replace China entirely: geography, trade and long-standing political ties ensure that Beijing remains indispensable to Pyongyang.</p><h2>Impact on US diplomacy</h2><p>All this matters as President Donald Trump again explores diplomacy with Kim Jong Un. In August, Trump ordered the Pentagon to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/08/16/us/trump-news#section-288726403" data-entity-type="external">‘substantially reduce’</a> US-South Korean military exercises, which he said ‘send a signal that is totally inappropriate and hostile’ to North Korea.&nbsp;</p><p>However, Pyongyang offered no corresponding concession. Kim Yo Jong effectively invited Trump to bid higher by declaring that the US’s <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/after-trump-decree-u-s-south-korea-pare-back-drills-that-angered-kim-jong-un-149e3350" data-entity-type="external">‘hostile policy’</a> remained unchanged. Pyongyang launched ballistic missile tests <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/19/world/asia/north-korea-trump-military-drills.html" data-entity-type="external">shortly after</a> her statement.</p><div data-entity-type="media" data-entity-uuid="eb764556-6c3f-4873-b76e-2c2b55628fda" data-embed-button="other_embed" data-entity-embed-display="view_mode:media.embed" class="align-right embedded-entity embed" data-langcode="en" data-entity-embed-display-settings="[]" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><figure class="media media-embed media-quote"> <blockquote class="media__wrapper"> <div class="media__content"> <svg class="icon icon--open-quote" role="presentation" focusable="false"> <use xlink:href="#icon-open-quote" ></use> </svg> <p>Russian support has reduced Kim’s need to accept limited concessions from the US.</p> </div> </blockquote> </figure> </div> <p>Washington is still proceeding with the five-day trilateral Freedom Edge exercise with South Korea and Japan, which began on 7 September. This reflects the limits of Washington’s willingness to accommodate Pyongyang: although Trump has reduced some bilateral US–South Korean exercises, the US remains committed to long-term trilateral deterrence aimed at not just North Korea but also China.</p><p>For now, this leaves little common ground for <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/01/north-korea-2026-will-us-and-south-korea-push-talks-succeed" data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="d1d546af-0c53-4256-bc79-eb65b4eaba84" data-entity-substitution="canonical" title="North Korea in 2026: Will the US and South Korean push for talks succeed?">renewed diplomacy</a> that’s agreeable to all parties. Washington is unwilling to dismantle the regional security architecture that Pyongyang opposes, while Russian support has reduced Kim’s need to accept limited concessions from the US. Moscow therefore gives Kim more freedom to walk away from negotiations and more leverage to demand a higher price for returning to them.</p><h2>An alliance built to outlast the war</h2><p>The institutional infrastructure supporting the Russia-North Korea relationship is also expanding. The completion of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/sep/07/russia-north-korea-open-first-road-bridge-tumen-river" data-entity-type="external">first road bridge</a> across the Tumen River adds a new physical cross-border connection to the existing railway link. Such infrastructure gives the relationship enduring practical foundations beyond the Ukrainian battlefield.</p><p>This month may provide further evidence of the future direction of relations. North Korea’s Foundation Day on 9 September is one of the country’s major political anniversaries and could provide Pyongyang with a natural stage for emphasizing its relationship with Moscow.&nbsp;</p><p>Regardless of any ceremony, the bilateral relationship is no longer a transactional short-term arrangement. It is here to stay, with implications that extend far beyond Ukraine.&nbsp;</p><div data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="24cec398-3837-42a6-85da-0cf8afeb2aba" data-embed-button="node" data-entity-embed-display="view_mode:node.teaser_embed" class="align-right embedded-entity embed" data-langcode="en" data-entity-embed-display-settings="[]"> <article class="media media-embed teaser--embed teaser teaser--default"> <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/07/north-koreas-victory-day-takes-place-kim-jong-uns-power-transformed" class="teaser__link no-external-link-icon"> <div class="teaser__image-container"> <div class="media media-teaser_landscape media-image aspect-ratio-16:9"> <img loading="lazy" srcset="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/ItVfJ_ZDR_LaF-m8aY8_Xb2g0XeL2iG4Hoky9RnFS3Q/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3RpbnkvcHVibGljLzIwMjYtMDcvMjAyNi0wNy0yNy12aWN0b3J5LWRheS1ub3J0aC1rb3JlYS1raW0tam9uZy11bi0yMjU4OTI3NzIxLmpwZz9oPWY5NDUyMTg2Jml0b2s9TU0yaE5Feks 400w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/d7KsAz4-zp1evBb_qWxpJG9ymaGrU7vLCO-n6I0AjZM/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3NtYWxsL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI2LTA3LzIwMjYtMDctMjctdmljdG9yeS1kYXktbm9ydGgta29yZWEta2ltLWpvbmctdW4tMjI1ODkyNzcyMS5qcGc_aD1mOTQ1MjE4NiZpdG9rPWNwSUpMZDMw 750w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/Y5x1ccVhY3ci6jmie6IT7NS6mNJAWA_Xv08wiFks5Vc/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX21lZGl1bS9wdWJsaWMvMjAyNi0wNy8yMDI2LTA3LTI3LXZpY3RvcnktZGF5LW5vcnRoLWtvcmVhLWtpbS1qb25nLXVuLTIyNTg5Mjc3MjEuanBnP2g9Zjk0NTIxODYmaXRvaz1lbHExekUwYQ 1000w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/odY1fA9HAbwEob-hzR3hlCu2O-FE2-sXLit_vWXisQc/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX2xhcmdlL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI2LTA3LzIwMjYtMDctMjctdmljdG9yeS1kYXktbm9ydGgta29yZWEta2ltLWpvbmctdW4tMjI1ODkyNzcyMS5qcGc_aD1mOTQ1MjE4NiZpdG9rPV9ac3hVTHll 1300w" sizes="(min-width:1280px) 33.3vw, 100vw" width="750" height="422" src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/d7KsAz4-zp1evBb_qWxpJG9ymaGrU7vLCO-n6I0AjZM/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3NtYWxsL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI2LTA3LzIwMjYtMDctMjctdmljdG9yeS1kYXktbm9ydGgta29yZWEta2ltLWpvbmctdW4tMjI1ODkyNzcyMS5qcGc_aD1mOTQ1MjE4NiZpdG9rPWNwSUpMZDMw" alt> </div> </div> <div class="teaser__body"> <header class="teaser__header"> <p class="c-label">Related work </p><h3 class="h5 teaser__title"><span>North Korea’s ‘Victory Day’ takes place with Kim Jong Un’s power transformed</span> </h3> </header> </div> </a> </article> </div> <p>A future crisis on the Korean Peninsula – or even a wider East Asian crisis, for example involving the Taiwan Strait – could feature a North Korea with combat-tested weapons and more experienced armed forces.</p><p>The mistake for policymakers would therefore be to assume that any eventual ceasefire in Ukraine will automatically dissolve this partnership. Russia’s war accelerated the relationship, but there are now military, economic and strategic reasons it will outlive the war.&nbsp;</p><p>Washington, Seoul and Tokyo will need a long-term strategy to counter a partnership whose consequences will endure far beyond any summitry. That strategy should include stronger sanctions monitoring and closer intelligence-sharing, while continuing to adapt allied missile and drone defences based on the lessons emerging from Ukraine.&nbsp;</p><p>Fundamentally, any strategy must assume that Pyongyang will retain its battlefield knowledge and much of Russia’s support long after the fighting in Ukraine ends.&nbsp;</p>

2026/9/9
阅读更多

What the US midterms could mean for Trump’s power

<span>What the US midterms could mean for Trump’s power</span> <span>Expert comment</span> <span><span>LToremark</span></span> <span><time datetime="2026-09-08T18:36:06+01:00" title="Tuesday, 8 September, 2026">8 September 2026</time> </span> <p>The Democrats are projected to make big gains in November’s midterm elections. But this will not necessarily constrain President Trump.</p> <div class="media media-teaser_landscape_rss media-image"> <img loading="eager" srcset="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/LDloe9uQlUtxWO3-xcyUYucMfLXoBTjQsB-G5FZ6Hlc/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy9jaGF0X3NvY2lhbF8xMjAwXzYzMC9wdWJsaWMvMjAyNi0wOS8yMDI2LTA5LTA4LXVzLW1pZHRlcm1zLXRydW1wLTIyOTI2NDc3NDIuanBnP2l0b2s9UDdOQnd4NkM 1x" width="1200" height="600" src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/y6ZHg5N2l3dIKeIdIocFIoTRtRUbyb2_bM7LN9L2AmM/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy9jaGF0X3NvY2lhbF90d2l0dGVyXzEyMDBfNjAwL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI2LTA5LzIwMjYtMDktMDgtdXMtbWlkdGVybXMtdHJ1bXAtMjI5MjY0Nzc0Mi5qcGc_aXRvaz1nSEZjZWNQSA" alt="US President Donald Trump responds to questions from the press in the Oval Office."> </div> <p>As President Trump gathers Republicans this week for their first-ever midterm convention, election campaigning is in full swing. The results of the November midterm elections will shape Trump’s remaining tenure and the 2028 presidential cycle. As it stands, Democrats are <a href="https://www.racetothewh.com/house" data-entity-type="external">projected</a> to take the House of Representatives, while the Senate is a <a href="https://www.racetothewh.com/senate/26" data-entity-type="external">closer call</a>. Either way, Republicans will likely lose the governing trifecta – House, Senate and presidency – that has enabled Trump’s agenda and removed constraints on his authority.</p><p>But that will not automatically result in durable guardrails or clear policy shifts. Even with control of one or both congressional chambers, many Democratic efforts to frustrate administration policies or impose oversight will run into structural hurdles. Instances of hard leverage are few, predominantly around funding the government, but they can be used to extract concessions – even as Republicans rally to defang them before the new Congress takes office in January.</p><p>Outside fiscal negotiations – and nominations, if the Democrats also take the Senate – opposition will be more about optics than hard constraints. This is especially true on foreign policy, where Trump enjoys practical, legal and structural advantages that empower him to act.</p><h2>Areas of potential Democratic leverage</h2><p>With a majority in either or both houses, Democrats can block Republican legislative moves. This would likely push the White House to double down on its executive authority claims, including executive orders, emergency declarations and regulatory actions. But the inverse is not true. Even with both chambers, Democrats would struggle to drive policy through legislation. A war powers vote to curtail military engagement in the Gulf or resolution disapproving of a foreign arms sale, for instance, would face presidential vetoes and Democrats would not have the supermajorities needed to overcome them.</p><div data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="45335e4b-3383-4dcc-9a0f-550560dacf4f" data-embed-button="node" data-entity-embed-display="view_mode:node.teaser_embed" class="align-right embedded-entity embed" data-langcode="en" data-entity-embed-display-settings="[]"> <article class="media media-embed teaser--embed teaser teaser--default"> <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/06/trumps-one-big-beautiful-bill-act-mortgages-americas-economic-future" class="teaser__link no-external-link-icon"> <div class="teaser__image-container"> <div class="media media-teaser_landscape media-image aspect-ratio-16:9"> <img loading="lazy" srcset="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/Pw6itz-Gc2SxW4po0FVuC_utOr8fk9yHL7C7OoVnUFI/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3RpbnkvcHVibGljLzIwMjUtMDYvMjAyNS0wNi0xMi10cnVtcC1vYmJiLWFjdC0yMjE3MDMzOTI3LmpwZz9oPTc5MGJlNDk3Jml0b2s9RFczY1V4Rzc 400w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/tbEBFHy22zcoYTDSfBkknDUiqrv2P1rFmir47nssFe4/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3NtYWxsL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI1LTA2LzIwMjUtMDYtMTItdHJ1bXAtb2JiYi1hY3QtMjIxNzAzMzkyNy5qcGc_aD03OTBiZTQ5NyZpdG9rPVk1eHozaGpO 750w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/ogsW-oGWOSZP_X4LYr7jQuMofly5kyKRJE1w06UvtTo/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX21lZGl1bS9wdWJsaWMvMjAyNS0wNi8yMDI1LTA2LTEyLXRydW1wLW9iYmItYWN0LTIyMTcwMzM5MjcuanBnP2g9NzkwYmU0OTcmaXRvaz10eFNBVnR6bg 1000w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/l8mcLYRNDaHGN3XI8zisiP7zvwBhmabAqQuAiqGD-rQ/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX2xhcmdlL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI1LTA2LzIwMjUtMDYtMTItdHJ1bXAtb2JiYi1hY3QtMjIxNzAzMzkyNy5qcGc_aD03OTBiZTQ5NyZpdG9rPVQ0dktZYnRE 1300w" sizes="(min-width:1280px) 33.3vw, 100vw" width="750" height="422" src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/tbEBFHy22zcoYTDSfBkknDUiqrv2P1rFmir47nssFe4/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3NtYWxsL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI1LTA2LzIwMjUtMDYtMTItdHJ1bXAtb2JiYi1hY3QtMjIxNzAzMzkyNy5qcGc_aD03OTBiZTQ5NyZpdG9rPVk1eHozaGpO" alt> </div> </div> <div class="teaser__body"> <header class="teaser__header"> <p class="c-label">Related work </p><h3 class="h5 teaser__title"><span>Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act mortgages America’s economic future&nbsp;</span> </h3> </header> </div> </a> </article> </div> <p>Another area of potential leverage is withholding approval for presidential appointments – especially for a Supreme Court or Federal Reserve vacancy. However, this only works if Democrats retake the Senate, which confirms nominees.</p><p>An area where Democrats have real leverage is fiscal matters – even if they only take the House. President Trump needs congressional action to fund the government and raise the debt ceiling, which limits government borrowing. Congress raised the debt ceiling by $5 trillion in 2025 and the limit is now expected to be reached by mid-2027, after which Treasury Department accounting manoeuvres to avoid default – known as extraordinary measures – could buy an additional <a href="https://bipartisanpolicy.org/article/when-will-we-reach-the-debt-limit-again/" data-entity-type="external">six to nine months</a>. Failure to raise the limit in time to meet the government’s debt obligations could trigger a calamitous market shock. How Republicans navigate the period after the midterms and before the new Congress takes office will determine whether the debt limit remains as a negotiating lever.</p><p>Trump is pushing Republicans to use the budget reconciliation process – which requires only simple majorities in both houses – to lift the debt limit by another $5 trillion through the remainder of his term, and secure funding including $60 billion for defence and $12 billion in aid for farmers hit by tariff retaliation and Hormuz disruption. But time is of the essence, as reconciliation requires a budget resolution adopted by both chambers, so a Democratic House alone would rule it out.</p><p>Ironically, Republicans themselves might provide the most immediate obstacle to Trump’s wishes. Rapid debt accrual – some $2.9 trillion of the $5 trillion added to the debt limit in 2025 had <a href="https://bipartisanpolicy.org/article/when-will-we-reach-the-debt-limit-again/" data-entity-type="external">evaporated</a> by June – has made fiscal hawks like <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/6050623-trump-debt-limit-bond-market-republicans/" data-entity-type="external">Senator Rand Paul</a> unwilling to proceed without spending cuts. Failure to extend the limit would yield a negotiation in 2027 or early 2028, with presidential primaries in sight and little incentive to compromise.</p><p>Unlike the debt limit, reconciliation cannot be used for regular appropriations, the annual bills that fund federal agencies. As it stands, Republicans will need Democratic support to find a solution before funding expires on 11 December. This negotiation will set the timing and parameters for starker confrontations in the new year, including opportunities to attach conditions for how funding is spent. But as the Trump administration asserts unilateral authority over spending, such conditions may have less relevance.</p><p>For their part, Democrats must weigh their negotiation priorities and appetite for a potential government shutdown – during which the federal government withholds services, data and paycheques – which will inevitably raise the question of blame.</p><h2>Investigations and impeachment 3.0?</h2><div data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="901eb1bc-5e47-4259-8718-54b58edcd0dd" data-embed-button="node" data-entity-embed-display="view_mode:node.teaser_embed" class="align-left embedded-entity embed" data-langcode="en" data-entity-embed-display-settings="[]"> <article class="media media-embed teaser--embed teaser teaser--default"> <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/07/trump-presidency-too-powerful-independent-thinking-podcast" class="teaser__link no-external-link-icon"> <div class="teaser__image-container"> <div class="media media-teaser_landscape media-image aspect-ratio-16:9"> <img loading="lazy" srcset="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/DZGRUsOEqjicVGbC8xJWHWkQ5sjBT48qNhRu0qszSXg/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3RpbnkvcHVibGljLzIwMjYtMDcvdHJ1bXAtYW5zd2VyaW5nLXF1ZXN0aW9ucy0yMjYyMTM5NjkwLmpwZz9oPTM4NjY0OWIwJml0b2s9bmdTZVZIeTA 400w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/_SrwykbLg6bvKPv5g52dnWwwoVYLtZYmu-IGa2qiSZc/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3NtYWxsL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI2LTA3L3RydW1wLWFuc3dlcmluZy1xdWVzdGlvbnMtMjI2MjEzOTY5MC5qcGc_aD0zODY2NDliMCZpdG9rPW9FZl9GUW1W 750w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/CP0WHz-ylL4djy8gm9zXd_suFjlwRg5wiNVudmMrCbs/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX21lZGl1bS9wdWJsaWMvMjAyNi0wNy90cnVtcC1hbnN3ZXJpbmctcXVlc3Rpb25zLTIyNjIxMzk2OTAuanBnP2g9Mzg2NjQ5YjAmaXRvaz1yLVdabjlleQ 1000w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/JdbKIhzj8KlZxo2nSu3XhxGloxpnKo-ycH9rPpQMCGY/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX2xhcmdlL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI2LTA3L3RydW1wLWFuc3dlcmluZy1xdWVzdGlvbnMtMjI2MjEzOTY5MC5qcGc_aD0zODY2NDliMCZpdG9rPXJ3c2tvdlNv 1300w" sizes="(min-width:1280px) 33.3vw, 100vw" width="750" height="422" src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/_SrwykbLg6bvKPv5g52dnWwwoVYLtZYmu-IGa2qiSZc/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3NtYWxsL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI2LTA3L3RydW1wLWFuc3dlcmluZy1xdWVzdGlvbnMtMjI2MjEzOTY5MC5qcGc_aD0zODY2NDliMCZpdG9rPW9FZl9GUW1W" alt> </div> </div> <div class="teaser__body"> <header class="teaser__header"> <p class="c-label">Related work </p><h3 class="h5 teaser__title"><span>Has Trump made the presidency too powerful?</span> </h3> </header> </div> </a> </article> </div> <p>Any change of control in the US Congress would also precipitate widespread investigations, including into Trump family business dealings and the <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/regions/middle-east-and-north-africa/iran" data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="74d26c10-5a32-4582-bd5c-fa49804bb579" data-entity-substitution="canonical" title="Iran">Iran</a> war. However, the levers of Congress – for instance, the power to subpoena testimony and documents – will quickly run into enforcement challenges.&nbsp;</p><p>This Trump administration is more capable of resisting scrutiny than the version Democrats confronted after retaking the House in 2018. It has used <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/07/21/trump-court-orders-defy-noncompliance-marshals-judges/" data-entity-type="external">non-compliance</a>, taken advantage of slow-moving court proceedings, and expanded <a href="https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/trump-invokes-presidential-privilege-lawsuit-over-law-firm-orders-2026-08-18/" data-entity-type="external">claims</a> of executive privilege to resist disclosing certain documents and communications. In August, Justice Department lawyers issued a non-binding <a href="https://www.justice.gov/olc/media/1457271/dl" data-entity-type="external">advisory opinion</a> stating that executive privilege extends to presidential communications with private individuals if they relate to his decision-making, which could vastly expand the scope of privileged information. Nevertheless, there are signs that the White House is <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2026/09/01/white-house-prepares-democratic-congress-01060639" data-entity-type="external">preparing</a> for Democratic investigations by hiring lawyers and briefing staff.</p><p>And Americans see ample cause for such investigations. A <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/713933/record-high-say-government-corruption-widespread.aspx" data-entity-type="external">Gallup</a> poll found that 89 per cent of Americans, including lopsided majorities in both parties, believe government corruption is widespread. But the challenges of reaching into the executive branch may change the shape and targets of investigations, with spillover falling onto Trump’s family members, business associates and outsiders who lack similar procedural tools and protections. Some corporate leaders could find themselves squeezed between a White House claiming privilege and Congress demanding cooperation.</p><p>Presidential impeachment is another potential flashpoint likely to resurface. Congressional Democratic leadership may try to resist a third attempt to impeach Trump but pressure from individual members could build. Although any impeachment – whether of Trump or alternative targets like <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/apr/15/democrats-pete-hegseth-impeachment" data-entity-type="external">cabinet secretaries</a> or <a href="https://ocasio-cortez.house.gov/media/press-releases/ocasio-cortez-introduces-articles-impeachment-against-justice-thomas-and" data-entity-type="external">judges</a> – would energize the Democratic base, it could also invite criticism of overreach. Both oversight and impeachment can be costly and time-consuming but may fail to deliver concrete results.</p><p>Ultimately, the most significant constraints on Trump’s remaining tenure may be practical rather than political. In a combative political environment, a crisis would put serious pressure on an outgoing presidency and diminished state capacity. A financial shock or recession would stress already strained fiscal capacity, perhaps alongside contentious negotiations; an additional military operation would draw on waning munitions stocks and a burdened force; and a natural disaster or health emergency would call on a severely depleted civil service to act. This is to say nothing of the disruption stemming from artificial intelligence, which Congress and the White House remain poorly positioned to address.</p><p>For US allies and partners, there is an uncomfortable asymmetry. A president who has made it his business to be a shock to the system retains the capacity to deliver one. Meanwhile, America itself is less capable of repair and resilience. Whatever happens in November will not change that. &nbsp;&nbsp;</p>

2026/9/8
阅读更多

The India–China reset will continue at the BRICS summit

<span>The India–China reset will continue at the BRICS summit</span> <span>Expert comment</span> <span><span>jon.wallace</span></span> <span><time datetime="2026-09-08T10:59:16+01:00" title="Tuesday, 8 September, 2026">8 September 2026</time> </span> <p>So will disagreement over the purpose of BRICS.</p> <div class="media media-teaser_landscape_rss media-image"> <img loading="eager" srcset="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/ZfeB6P-GF7fLnSrQqgT9-im0pAB0wdyzS4yR5KUV6E0/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy9jaGF0X3NvY2lhbF8xMjAwXzYzMC9wdWJsaWMvMjAyNi0wOS8yMDI2LTA5LTA4LUJSSUNTLUluZGlhLU1vZGktMjI5MzM5ODMwOS5qcGc_aXRvaz04RWk0cEppSw 1x" width="1200" height="600" src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/gavZ8LmONc6rs5X08QZmYAErel_5IgHjlVK2Qh0D4t8/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy9jaGF0X3NvY2lhbF90d2l0dGVyXzEyMDBfNjAwL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI2LTA5LzIwMjYtMDktMDgtQlJJQ1MtSW5kaWEtTW9kaS0yMjkzMzk4MzA5LmpwZz9pdG9rPVNmdEIzSkEw" alt="A yellow and green vehicle passes a poster of Prime Minister Modi promoting the 2026 BRICS conference"> </div> <p>India will host the 18th BRICS summit in New Delhi on 12–13 September at a time when the rest of the world is increasingly seeking to emulate its longstanding policy of strategic autonomy.</p><p>The Ukraine and Iran wars, continuing US–China rivalry, and the second administration of President Donald Trump have made New Delhi’s long-held commitment to strategic hedging and <a href="https://www.weforum.org/stories/forum-institutional/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/" data-entity-type="external">middle power diplomacy</a> seem wise, if not urgent underpinnings for modern international relations.</p><p>However, even though the world may better reflect India’s worldview, New Delhi has found it difficult to apply its foreign policy approach to its BRICS chairmanship.&nbsp;</p><h2>Strain with Washington, reengagement with Moscow and Beijing</h2><p>Recent Indian government actions confirm India’s continuing commitment to strategic hedging. New Delhi secured a string of resource deals during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visits to Australia, Indonesia and Uzbekistan. And it has agreed a number of trade deals, with nine in-progress or concluded since 2021 – including with the United Kingdom and European Union.</p><p>Trade negotiations with the United States continue, but <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/02/despite-reset-india-us-relations-new-delhi-retains-commitment-strategic-hedging" data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="35985d1a-0424-4c1c-add0-93c68933e515" data-entity-substitution="canonical" title="Despite reset in India–US relations, New Delhi retains commitment to strategic hedging">relations with the second Trump administration</a> have undoubtedly been strained, causing India to reinvest in other relationships.</p><p>Only a few years ago, India was distancing itself from the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): New Delhi hosted a low-key virtual summit in 2023. And Modi was absent from the summit in 2024. But more recently India has renewed its interest in the grouping and sought to improve relations with China and <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/12/putins-india-visit-aims-reaffirm-new-delhi-moscow-relations-just-trump-applies-pressure" data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="691906ea-e85b-4aa6-a7e3-45fc1aba8820" data-entity-substitution="canonical" title="Putin’s India visit aims to reaffirm New Delhi–Moscow relations – just as Trump applies pressure to downgrade them">Russia</a>. At this year’s SCO summit, Modi joined President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin in signing the Bishkek Declaration, which condemned US-Israeli military attacks on Iran.</p><h2>India’s BRICS agenda</h2><p>India has consistently sought to be <a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/voice-of-global-summit" data-entity-type="external">a ‘voice’ of the Global South</a>, often by using its prominent position in platforms like the G20 (which it chaired in 2023) and the <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/02/do-ai-summits-work" data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="f83e5cf8-da44-4eb3-b43e-19e54b55cb99" data-entity-substitution="canonical" title="Do AI summits work?">AI Impact Summit</a> (which it hosted earlier this year).</p><p>Its BRICS chairmanship has continued these efforts. In August a joint declaration, the ‘<a href="https://d2jiw2zrmmyqt8.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/23162758/CHENNAI-CONSENSUS-BRICS-STI-Ministerial-Joint-Declaration.pdf" data-entity-type="external">Chennai Consensus</a>’ made a commitment to collaborative research and innovation among developing countries on emerging technologies. The same month, BRICS trade ministers advocated preserving and <a href="https://d2jiw2zrmmyqt8.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/18114422/Chairs-statement-and-Outcome-document-7-august-2026.pdf" data-entity-type="external">revitalizing the multilateral trading system</a> – a move likely aimed at the Trump administration’s disruptive tariff policies. And in June, BRICS agriculture ministers issued <a href="https://d2jiw2zrmmyqt8.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/13131357/agriculture-doc.pdf" data-entity-type="external">a food security declaration</a> focused on the needs of developing countries.</p><p>The challenge for New Delhi is that it wishes to promote this worldview in a way that is non-Western but not explicitly anti-Western. To that end, it has sought to downplay some of the more controversial elements of the BRICS agenda. That includes a de-dollarization narrative championed by countries such as Brazil and Russia – an idea which last year caused President Trump to threaten to slap ten per cent tariffs on the BRICS in response.</p><div data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="87429563-83c3-4f11-80ef-e0daa349a9ed" data-embed-button="node" data-entity-embed-display="view_mode:node.teaser_embed" class="align-right embedded-entity embed" data-langcode="en" data-entity-embed-display-settings="[]"> <article class="media media-embed teaser--embed teaser teaser--default"> <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/how-china-india-relations-will-shape-asia-and-global-order" class="teaser__link no-external-link-icon"> <div class="teaser__image-container"> <div class="media media-teaser_landscape media-image aspect-ratio-16:9"> <img loading="lazy" srcset="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/xbJwlfQsYJslp9tjCy2KDfqT-O1WYfx5H3V0-vmaOsg/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3RpbnkvcHVibGljLzIwMjUtMDQvMjAyNS0wNC0yMy1tb2RpLXhpLXhpYW1lbi1icmljcy1zdW1taXQtODQyNTIzOTE2LmpwZz9oPTVhMmU2YmU2Jml0b2s9cHFfNEZPc18 400w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/tDhTqt2l6ssszKYUJbsVp2kTzHDXETIoPdFMJkbsQJ8/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3NtYWxsL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI1LTA0LzIwMjUtMDQtMjMtbW9kaS14aS14aWFtZW4tYnJpY3Mtc3VtbWl0LTg0MjUyMzkxNi5qcGc_aD01YTJlNmJlNiZpdG9rPWQ1Y2lBTU9C 750w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/KbPEpI7iPZiQxZSsAnFdW2_3OcQ1S3IZxoh_5T7lFmk/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX21lZGl1bS9wdWJsaWMvMjAyNS0wNC8yMDI1LTA0LTIzLW1vZGkteGkteGlhbWVuLWJyaWNzLXN1bW1pdC04NDI1MjM5MTYuanBnP2g9NWEyZTZiZTYmaXRvaz1GZXB4eU5MNA 1000w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/gUfbkEJwxFMceazDoXT8oKH0b8wyMMihiJsZq3p-5rQ/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX2xhcmdlL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI1LTA0LzIwMjUtMDQtMjMtbW9kaS14aS14aWFtZW4tYnJpY3Mtc3VtbWl0LTg0MjUyMzkxNi5qcGc_aD01YTJlNmJlNiZpdG9rPUNwZnNxUWw0 1300w" sizes="(min-width:1280px) 33.3vw, 100vw" width="750" height="422" src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/tDhTqt2l6ssszKYUJbsVp2kTzHDXETIoPdFMJkbsQJ8/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3NtYWxsL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI1LTA0LzIwMjUtMDQtMjMtbW9kaS14aS14aWFtZW4tYnJpY3Mtc3VtbWl0LTg0MjUyMzkxNi5qcGc_aD01YTJlNmJlNiZpdG9rPWQ1Y2lBTU9C" alt> </div> </div> <div class="teaser__body"> <header class="teaser__header"> <p class="c-label">Related work </p><h3 class="h5 teaser__title"><span>How China–India relations will shape Asia and the global order</span> </h3> </header> </div> </a> </article> </div> <p>New Delhi emphasized that BRICS is not seeking to create a separate reserve currency to compete with the US dollar. It has instead reframed this as an effort to settle bilateral trade in national currencies and use digital payments to reduce transaction costs for cross-border trade.</p><p>India has also promoted a more benign worldview, reflected in the BRICS slogan of ‘Humanity First’ and the theme of ‘Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability’. But this seems increasingly outdated given recent geopolitical developments, in particular US military action against Venezuela and Iran.</p><p>India’s position can appear out of sync in a forum whose membership includes countries with more overtly anti-Western agendas, including China, Russia and Iran. And two other BRICS countries, South Africa and Brazil, have suffered high profile diplomatic disputes with the US.</p><p>A key watchpoint at this summit will therefore be how New Delhi reconciles its efforts to stay on good terms with Washington with calls by BRICS member states to voice opposition to US actions. As Chair and host of BRICS, India’s actions will be more scrutinized, and it will be reluctant to oversee the production of a statement similar to Bishkek.&nbsp;</p><h2>Multilateral symbolism</h2><p>These tensions are exacerbated by the broader challenges of maintaining cohesion among the 11 BRICS member states. Tensions between Iran and the UAE, for instance, are high as a result of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. Relations between Addis Ababa and Cairo have been strained by Ethiopia’s Nile dam project. Saudi and UAE interests conflict on relations with Israel and other issues. And India has its own longstanding frictions with China to manage, although there have been signs of improvement over the last two years.</p><p>Additionally, among the founding member states – Brazil, Russia, <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/regions/asia-pacific/india" data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="ca15a0de-039f-4522-8cec-935033958212" data-entity-substitution="canonical" title="India">India</a>, and China – there is still no consensus on what the BRICS stands for. Brazil and India see it primarily as an economic-driven initiative. China and Russia see it through more of a geopolitical lens. Beijing in particular is increasingly using forums like the BRICS to promote its own worldviews through its Global Development, Security, Civilization and Governance Initiatives. Meanwhile, Moscow has used the BRICS to seek alignment with the Global South as it is ostracized by the West following its invasion of Ukraine.</p><p>From New Delhi’s perspective, BRICS has been moving in the wrong direction. BRICS was established as a reaction to calls for a greater voice for the Global South in multilateral institutions, with a focus on development and governance. India would like to build on the organization’s earlier achievements, including the establishment of the BRICS New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement in 2015.</p><div data-entity-type="media" data-entity-uuid="d82976f4-1fb2-4a0c-9ba8-558e3cb60282" data-embed-button="other_embed" data-entity-embed-display="view_mode:media.embed" class="align-right embedded-entity embed" data-langcode="en" data-entity-embed-display-settings="[]" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><figure class="media media-embed media-quote"> <blockquote class="media__wrapper"> <div class="media__content"> <svg class="icon icon--open-quote" role="presentation" focusable="false"> <use xlink:href="#icon-open-quote" ></use> </svg> <p><span>The recent accomplishments of BRICS have come from its convening power. It was a Modi–Xi meeting at the 2024 BRICS Summit in Russia that set the ball rolling on resetting the relationship.</span></p> </div> </blockquote> </figure> </div> <p>The difficulties BRICS has speaking with one voice could affect its future. In the two decades since the BRICS was formed, newer groupings have emerged, such as the recent defence pact between Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. There is a possibility that such regional, exclusive groupings may become more important actors than expansive and inclusive groupings like BRICS.</p><p>Such factors mean that BRICS expansion is likely to take a backseat for the foreseeable future. Instead, the focus will probably be on socializing new members into the organization.</p><p>Efforts to expand the BRICS mandate will likely be limited to engagement with other forums in the Global South. However, even this is challenging. Bangladeshi Prime Minister Tarique Rehman – whose country holds the chair of BIMSTEC, a South and Southeast Asian regional forum – has not yet accepted an invitation amid tensions with India.</p><h2>Bilateral substance</h2><p>The real action at the BRICS Summit will take place on its sidelines with a series of bilateral meetings. In particular, the meeting between Modi and Xi is likely to further advance the ongoing reset in bilateral relations and build confidence. A meeting in August between the Chinese foreign minister and Indian national security advisor made notable progress on their longstanding border dispute. And Xi’s upcoming visit to India – his first since 2019 – will reportedly include <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/chinas-xi-jinping-to-visit-india-with-400-member-delegation-for-brics-report/articleshow/133503024.cms?tpcc=south_asia_brief&amp;utm_source=Sailthru&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=South%20Asia%20Brief%2009022026&amp;utm_term=south_asia_brief" data-entity-type="external">a 400-person delegation</a>.</p><p>In this context, the recent accomplishments of BRICS have come from its convening power. It was a Modi–Xi meeting at the 2024 BRICS Summit in Russia that set the ball rolling on resetting the relationship.</p><p>Ultimately, the Global South remains an amorphous concept. There remains little clarity on what advocating its interests actually means, beyond making vague calls for a more equitable distribution of power in a multipolar global order. The BRICS summits needs to move behind platitudes and statements towards more substantive outcomes if it is to be seen as a real contender in global governance.</p><p>At the summit, New Delhi will seek to return BRICS to its original development-focused agenda, as reflected in its <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2296367&amp;lang=1&amp;reg=3&amp;" data-entity-type="external">Economic Partnership Strategy 2030</a>. However, this threatens to be hijacked by fissures among its members and calls for another statement condemning US attacks on Iran. But the group needs more than opposition to the US to define a better vision for the Global South. This entails moving beyond what it stands against to what it stands for.</p>

2026/9/8
阅读更多

The AfD’s victory in Saxony-Anhalt marks a turning point for Germany – but perspective is important

<span>The AfD’s victory in Saxony-Anhalt marks a turning point for Germany – but perspective is important</span> <span>Expert comment</span> <span><span>jon.wallace</span></span> <span><time datetime="2026-09-07T16:46:21+01:00" title="Monday, 7 September, 2026">7 September 2026</time> </span> <p>Ulrich Siegmund’s highly successful campaign points to a more durable AfD electorate and flags the tests ahead for Chancellor Merz’s government, the CDU and the federal institutions that have shaped post-war German democracy.</p> <div class="media media-teaser_landscape_rss media-image"> <img loading="eager" srcset="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/CGC3RHPg4mfzEeSa3VJLsDNf5gTtZhjnOHIUQnYCwrQ/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy9jaGF0X3NvY2lhbF8xMjAwXzYzMC9wdWJsaWMvMjAyNi0wOS8yMDI2LTA5LTA3LWFmZC13aW4tR2VybWFueS0yMjkzMzYyNDM3LmpwZz9pdG9rPTIxUUwtai1r 1x" width="1200" height="600" src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/NFBd4LD3c-o6LuH6NMIXy5D4fQ-mKPPGqMPcraPijmc/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy9jaGF0X3NvY2lhbF90d2l0dGVyXzEyMDBfNjAwL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI2LTA5LzIwMjYtMDktMDctYWZkLXdpbi1HZXJtYW55LTIyOTMzNjI0MzcuanBnP2l0b2s9Z29LUS0tWEk" alt="AfD's main candidate in the Saxony-Anhalt state election, Ulrich Siegmund, and the co-leader of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party Alice Weidel celebrate, a crowd behind them"> </div> <p>The Alternative for Germany (AfD)’s victory in Saxony-Anhalt’s election is a historic breakthrough and, without doubt, a turning point in German democracy. Since 1945 no party labelled extreme right has secured such a win in a state election.&nbsp;</p><p>The party won 43.8 per cent of the vote on 6 September, more than doubling its 2021 result. It now holds 39 of the state Landtag’s 83 seats, though this is three short of an absolute majority. The question of who will govern Magdeburg is therefore <a href="https://wahlergebnisse.sachsen-anhalt.de/wahlen/lt26/erg_land.html" data-entity-type="external">still open</a>.&nbsp;</p><p>BSW, the new party of former Die Linke (‘The Left’) leader Sahra Wagenknecht, succeeded in crossing the 5 per cent threshold. Its positions on migration are not that remote from those of the AfD in some respects. Its entry into the Landtag gives it a potential role in forming a government in Saxony-Anhalt.&nbsp;</p><p>Beyond the political emotion, the result should be treated cautiously. Its main significance clearly lies in the way the AfD has mobilized voters and kindled a more positive political appeal. That may prove more consequential than whether the AfD manages to form a government.&nbsp;</p><p>That said, Saxony-Anhalt is one of Germany’s least populated states, and the AfD’s victory should therefore be considered according to the demographic scale. If not a seismic political event, it can at least be interpreted as the forewarning tremor of an approaching earthquake – if the appeal of mainstream parties keeps eroding. The CDU, Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s party, saw its share of the vote fall to 17.2 per cent.</p><h2>A state shaped by decline</h2><p>For its low demographics, Saxony-Anhalt is a useful laboratory to analyse the political transformation at work in <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/regions/europe/germany" data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="bc533414-116d-4f09-954e-15353ec779e3" data-entity-substitution="canonical" title="Germany">Germany</a> and Europe. Depopulation has left many smaller communities ageing and struggling to sustain local services. Saxony-Anhalt experienced <a href="https://statistik.sachsen-anhalt.de/themen/bevoelkerung-mikrozensus-freiwillige-haushaltserhebungen/bevoelkerung#c345752" data-entity-type="external">a substantial decline since reunification</a> to around 2.12 million inhabitants today. The accompanying closure of public services has reinforced residents’ belief that the region is neglected by mainstream parties.</p><p>The state has also been hit by industrial restructuring. The chemical industry is central to the region’s socioeconomic identity, but high energy costs and weak demand have heightened pressure on the sector. Pharmaceutical giant Bayer is one of the last major employers in a region whose <a href="https://www.arbeitsagentur.de/vor-ort/rd-sat/presse/2026-55-sachsen-anhalt-flaute-auf-dem-arbeitsmarkt-halt-an" data-entity-type="external">unemployment rate</a> stood at 8.2 per cent in August 2026, compared with 6.5 per cent nationally.&nbsp;</p><p>Insolvencies should not be mistaken with factory closures, but the figures are telling: <a href="https://statistik.sachsen-anhalt.de/fileadmin/Bibliothek/Landesaemter/StaLa/startseite/Daten_und_Veroeffentlichungen/Pressemitteilungen/2026/c_M%C3%A4rz/079_Insolvenzen_2025.pdf" data-entity-type="external">corporate insolvency filings</a> rose by 23.9 per cent in the state in 2025, more than twice the national increase of 10.3 per cent. The prospect of further plant closures made the future of skilled employment a sensitive political concern in the campaign.</p><p>The figures on <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/topics/refugees-and-migration" data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="6cd8a4f3-41e8-4bc1-a23b-ca837340ffdd" data-entity-substitution="canonical" title="Refugees and migration">migration</a> present a paradox here. Saxony-Anhalt has a <a href="https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung/Bevoelkerungsstand/Tabellen/bevoelkerung-nichtdeutsch-laender-basis-2022.html" data-entity-type="external">comparatively low foreign-national share</a>. Approximately 7.9 per cent of the population were immigrants at the end of 2025, compared with around 14.9 per cent nationally – yet the issue has consistently topped voters’ concerns for over a decade, a paradox familiar from <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414020957675" data-entity-type="external">research on Eastern Germany</a>.&nbsp;</p><p>In Saxony-Anhalt, the AfD has shaped its narratives around anxieties about public services, security and industrial decline, presenting migration as a contributing factor.</p><h2>From rejection to adhesion</h2><p>Analysing the rise of the National Rally (RN), French political scientists speak of the shift from a passive protest vote (‘vote de protestation’) to an active support vote (‘vote d’adhésion’).</p><p>Saxony-Anhalt suggests that such a shift has occurred. In July, <a href="https://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bundeslaender/sachsen-anhalt/laendertrend/2026/juli/" data-entity-type="external">36 per cent of voters trusted the AfD</a> most to solve the state’s problems, compared with just 9 per cent before the 2021 election. 44 per cent preferred an AfD-led government. The electorate’s motivation has clearly shifted from punishing the CDU to granting the AfD power. Why?</p><div data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="b908e9e2-f8a9-4c8f-8a6c-7eaaad95e4e7" data-embed-button="node" data-entity-embed-display="view_mode:node.teaser_embed" class="align-right embedded-entity embed" data-langcode="en" data-entity-embed-display-settings="[]"> <article class="media media-embed teaser--embed teaser teaser--default"> <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/members-and-partners/corporate-membership?teaser=" class="teaser__link no-external-link-icon"> <div class="teaser__image-container"> <div class="media media-teaser_landscape media-image aspect-ratio-16:9"> <img loading="lazy" srcset="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/EEq7RJ6bI8HicU1pug9-VvJ6aGbBlEXoh5Gpez9Ue3Q/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3RpbnkvcHVibGljLzIwMjYtMDgvMjAyNi0wOC0wMy1jb3Jwb3JhdGUtbWVtYmVyc2hpcC1hcnRpY2xlLWN0YS5qcGc_aD0xOTlkOGMxZiZpdG9rPU5uazAzbWxU 400w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/lLFuHtwpajfnaZ6Se6kwcpkIUjePfhuZOCwsGDItPbQ/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3NtYWxsL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI2LTA4LzIwMjYtMDgtMDMtY29ycG9yYXRlLW1lbWJlcnNoaXAtYXJ0aWNsZS1jdGEuanBnP2g9MTk5ZDhjMWYmaXRvaz1UakFEaU9CTQ 750w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/BAFzPTLXXPgNiFewi-jQ3PbR1kamdXxRE-ZpdA0WoAE/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX21lZGl1bS9wdWJsaWMvMjAyNi0wOC8yMDI2LTA4LTAzLWNvcnBvcmF0ZS1tZW1iZXJzaGlwLWFydGljbGUtY3RhLmpwZz9oPTE5OWQ4YzFmJml0b2s9VGxfcU5MUlg 1000w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/ZB0i6668-CZbavnTbN4W5USPisoJGgktc9bRj76NPwc/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX2xhcmdlL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI2LTA4LzIwMjYtMDgtMDMtY29ycG9yYXRlLW1lbWJlcnNoaXAtYXJ0aWNsZS1jdGEuanBnP2g9MTk5ZDhjMWYmaXRvaz1DWU81d21JbQ 1300w" sizes="(min-width:1280px) 33.3vw, 100vw" width="750" height="422" src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/lLFuHtwpajfnaZ6Se6kwcpkIUjePfhuZOCwsGDItPbQ/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3NtYWxsL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI2LTA4LzIwMjYtMDgtMDMtY29ycG9yYXRlLW1lbWJlcnNoaXAtYXJ0aWNsZS1jdGEuanBnP2g9MTk5ZDhjMWYmaXRvaz1UakFEaU9CTQ" alt> </div> </div> <div class="teaser__body"> <header class="teaser__header"> <h3 class="h5 teaser__title"><span>Become a corporate member</span> </h3> </header> <div class="teaser__summary"> <p>Join organizations with access to trusted geopolitical analysis, policy insight, and expert networks that help their leaders anticipate risk, navigate business critical issues and inform strategic decision making.</p> </div> </div> </a> </article> </div> <p>AfD candidate Ulrich Siegmund’s campaign adopted an upbeat, personalized style, combining large public events with a forceful social media presence. The slogan ‘Alles ist möglich’ (‘Everything is possible’) was launched in June, replacing the old negative slogan ‘enough is enough’.&nbsp;</p><p>This strategy paid off. Mobilization was quite exceptional. <a href="https://www.n-tv.de/politik/Bisherige-Nichtwaehler-verpassen-AfD-kraeftigen-Schub-id31275525.html" data-entity-type="external">Preliminary voter-flow analysis</a> estimates that the AfD gained 157,000 former non-voters and 83,000 former CDU voters. Digital campaigning cannot alone explain the AfD’s electoral success. But established parties showed far less inventiveness in reaching disengaged voters.&nbsp;</p><p>Logically, mainstream parties throughout Europe should respond by reconsidering their strategies. France’s experience with the RN shows the limits of relying on political stigma to combat the hard right. Germany’s ‘Brandmauer’ (‘firewall’) around hard right parties has also ceased to contain the AfD electorally. New thinking is needed.</p><h2>Three seats short: an opportunity for the AfD?</h2><p>The AfD’s near-majority may itself become a political advantage. Three additional MPs would be enough to give it an absolute majority. Siegmund can therefore pressure CDU representatives to defect to his party or vote for his election as minister-president. Even unsuccessful approaches could expose divisions within the CDU and weaken the credibility of an alternative government.&nbsp;</p><p>BSW has rejected joining a ‘firewall’ and expressed willingness to cooperate with the AfD on individual policies, particularly on Russia and energy. But it has ruled out electing Siegmund as minister-president.</p><p>The CDU, SPD and Greens hold only 31 seats together, rendering a majority against the AfD impossible without support from the Left Party or the BSW. But the CDU’s refusal to cooperate with either the AfD or the Left complicates this picture – and could lead to a prolonged impasse.&nbsp;</p><p>That could work to Siegmund’s advantage, allowing him to argue that the other parties are playing an undemocratic game by preventing the largest party from governing.</p><h2>The consequences beyond Magdeburg</h2><p>The AfD’s victory also piles pressure on German Chancellor Merz, whose unpopularity is already <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/51afa87f-7452-4c5c-8beb-7eed624f6f22?syn-25a6b1a6=1" data-entity-type="external">a significant problem</a>. The state election in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern on 20 September will present another immediate test, with the AfD leading in recent polls.&nbsp;</p><p>A further defeat could intensify demands within the CDU for a change of strategy or even leadership. Any attempt to replace Merz as chancellor would, however, require a parliamentary majority through Germany’s constructive vote of no confidence. There is no indication at this point that the SPD, the CDU’s coalition partner, would support a move against the chancellor.</p><div data-entity-type="media" data-entity-uuid="b1ad17fd-5d6a-4db9-9843-b697df26b8b3" data-embed-button="other_embed" data-entity-embed-display="view_mode:media.embed" class="align-right embedded-entity embed" data-langcode="en" data-entity-embed-display-settings="[]" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><figure class="media media-embed media-quote"> <blockquote class="media__wrapper"> <div class="media__content"> <svg class="icon icon--open-quote" role="presentation" focusable="false"> <use xlink:href="#icon-open-quote" ></use> </svg> <p>The AfD’s near-majority may itself become a political advantage…Siegmund can pressure CDU representatives to defect to his party or vote for his election as minister-president.</p> </div> </blockquote> </figure> </div> <p>The most significant repercussion will surely be on the Bundesrat, the upper chamber of the German parliament. Saxony-Anhalt’s government has four votes in the federal chamber and could use them to oppose federal legislation, especially on state finances or administration. Four votes cannot obstruct federal bills, but they may become decisive in close motions and lend the party strategic weight.&nbsp;</p><p>An AfD-led state government would also amplify the party’s calls for an end to sanctions on Russia and military support for Ukraine. But it would remain very much rhetorical for now: foreign policy is a federal responsibility and the Land’s four votes would offer only limited scope for obstruction.</p><p>Saxony-Anhalt’s AfD was classified as a right-wing extremist endeavour by the state intelligence service in November 2023. That does not prohibit the party from governing. But should it take control, its implementation of its proposals concerning education, migration, policing and cultural institutions will be closely watched, particularly measures that may violate constitutional rights or federal law.</p><p>Challenges would mostly arise through Saxony-Anhalt’s constitutional court, ordinary administrative courts and, where relevant, the Federal Constitutional Court. Judicial scrutiny depends on concrete acts and the relevant procedures, not a government’s programme as such. The appointment of officials and the control of state institutions will therefore deserve as much attention as legislation itself.</p><p>Much will be written about this vote. But some perspective is important. The AfD received 576,037 second votes in a state with 1.71 million eligible voters. That is roughly 1 per cent of Germany’s 59.2 million strong electorate. The breakthrough is very localized for now.&nbsp;</p><p>Whether it remains so depends on how far Siegmund’s campaign recipe can be replicated – and if the AfD can now turn electoral backing into durable governing power.</p>

2026/9/7
阅读更多

The Lake Chad Basin: Restoring regional security cooperation

<span>The Lake Chad Basin: Restoring regional security cooperation</span> 28 September 2026 — 15:00 TO 16:00 BST <span><span>Anonymous (not verified)</span></span> <span><time datetime="2026-09-07T14:37:14+01:00" title="Monday, 7 September, 2026">7 September 2026</time> </span> Online <p>Why regional cooperation matters in addressing the convergence of insurgency, displacement, and climate stress.</p> Why regional cooperation matters in addressing the convergence of insurgency, displacement, and climate stress. <p>The Lake Chad Basin faces the mutually reinforcing pressure of insurgent violence, displacement and climate stress. These pressures have tested cooperation between the countries affected: Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. Regional political tensions have weakened cross-border counterterrorism cooperation, creating greater operational space for Boko Haram and ISWAP. Recent United States military cooperation with Nigeria adds context to the debate over security, local dynamics and multilateral peacebuilding.</p><p>This event discusses:</p><ul><li>How have political frictions affected multilateral cooperation in the Lake Chad Basin?</li><li>What does rising insurgent sophistication mean for regional security?</li><li>How has United States military cooperation with Nigeria affected local dynamics?</li><li>What is the future of intergovernmental cooperation after targeted strikes?</li><li>Where do current counter-insurgency approaches fall short?</li><li>Can climate adaptation become a pillar of peacebuilding in the Lake Chad Basin?</li></ul>

2026/9/7
阅读更多

Banning UK trade with illegal Israeli settlements is long overdue

<span>Banning UK trade with illegal Israeli settlements is long overdue</span> <span>Expert comment</span> <span><span>sfarrell.drupa…</span></span> <span><time datetime="2026-09-04T17:08:37+01:00" title="Friday, 4 September, 2026">4 September 2026</time> </span> <p>It would be a natural extension of current UK positions, and parliament’s cross-party Foreign Affairs Committee has recommended a formal ban for over a year.</p> <div class="media media-teaser_landscape_rss media-image"> <img loading="eager" srcset="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/5fMmS0O_cFhLuBOJ65zLbgbmM2PqP3pRRPzlReyiWMI/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy9jaGF0X3NvY2lhbF8xMjAwXzYzMC9wdWJsaWMvMjAyNi0wOS9HZXR0eUltYWdlcy0yMjgyMjQ5NjU3LmpwZz9pdG9rPTlWZk9HX2JB 1x" width="1200" height="600" src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/ly0NpHOHCvyTJsExubBwQUUmFS18gL787kyesuEYydg/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy9jaGF0X3NvY2lhbF90d2l0dGVyXzEyMDBfNjAwL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI2LTA5L0dldHR5SW1hZ2VzLTIyODIyNDk2NTcuanBnP2l0b2s9MFUtUm92Y28" alt="Israeli settlement and flag"> </div> <p>Israeli settlement expansion, land appropriation, and escalating settler violence in the occupied West Bank represent some of the most outstanding obstacles to realizing a sovereign Palestinian state alongside a secure Israel, a long-standing pillar of the UK’s Middle East policy.</p><p>As such, the new Labour government under Prime Minister Andy Burnham should <a href="https://www.thetimes.com/uk/politics/article/uk-trade-ban-west-bank-israel-gmx2ztcxq" data-entity-type="external">prohibit </a>UK trade with Israel’s illegal settlements. This step would align UK trade with international law, uphold the UK’s recognition of Palestinian statehood, and stop sustaining the worsening situation in the West Bank – which I witnessed first-hand during a fieldwork visit this summer.</p><p>The rationale for such a move is clear. As successive UK governments have long acknowledged, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, are illegal under international law. They violate Article 49 of the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/geneva-convention-relative-protection-civilian-persons-time-war" data-entity-type="external">Fourth Geneva Convention,</a> which holds that an ‘occupying power shall not transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.’</p><div data-entity-type="media" data-entity-uuid="f1c3b006-3182-4dda-8007-233f249cde0a" data-embed-button="other_embed" data-entity-embed-display="view_mode:media.embed" class="align-right embedded-entity embed" data-langcode="en" data-entity-embed-display-settings="[]" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><figure class="media media-embed media-quote"> <blockquote class="media__wrapper"> <div class="media__content"> <svg class="icon icon--open-quote" role="presentation" focusable="false"> <use xlink:href="#icon-open-quote" ></use> </svg> <p>Settlements represent one of the most significant barriers to realizing a contiguous Palestinian state</p> </div> </blockquote> </figure> </div> <p>A decade ago United Nations Security Council <a href="https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2334(2016)" data-entity-type="external">Resolution 2334 </a>(2016), which the UK supported, affirmed that settlements have no legal validity, and a landmark 2024 Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice obliged states to ‘take steps to prevent trade or investment relations’ that help sustain illegal settlements.</p><p>Such advisory opinions are not binding, but settlements represent one of the most significant barriers to realizing a contiguous Palestinian state. Since Israel captured the West Bank from Jordan in the 1967 war, it &nbsp;has constructed more than <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c2lq5g4dedpo" data-entity-type="external">160 settlements </a>that are now home to over 700,000 Israelis in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, according to <a href="https://peacenow.org.il/en/category/settlements" data-entity-type="external">Peace Now,</a> an Israeli human rights organization that monitors settlement activity.<br><br>Israel’s justification for settlement construction has varied through the years – from security strategy to economic interest to religious ideology, citing biblical and historical ties to the land. But as Israeli ministers have recently <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ckgdzxpkdd7o" data-entity-type="external">stated</a>, at least part of the aim of the current settlement project is to ‘bury the idea of a Palestinian state.’</p><h4>E1</h4><p>This intention has been most evident in the opening of tenders for the controversial <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2026/08/20/middleeast/israel-e1-settlement-bids-intl" data-entity-type="external">E1 development.</a>&nbsp;</p><div data-entity-type="media" data-entity-uuid="b68e465d-b212-4976-a57e-07d312b5d89a" data-embed-button="other_embed" data-entity-embed-display="view_mode:media.embed" class="align-left embedded-entity embed" data-langcode="en" data-entity-embed-display-settings="[]" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><figure class="media media-embed media-quote"> <blockquote class="media__wrapper"> <div class="media__content"> <svg class="icon icon--open-quote" role="presentation" focusable="false"> <use xlink:href="#icon-open-quote" ></use> </svg> <p>E1 is particularly contentious due to its location</p> </div> </blockquote> </figure> </div> <p>E1 would link Jerusalem and the large settlement of Ma’ale Adumim, thus preventing Palestinian sovereignty in the central corridor connecting Ramallah, Bethlehem, and East Jerusalem, effectively bisecting the West Bank. E1 is particularly contentious due to its location, and the UK, along with France, Germany, Italy, and Canada, have condemned it.</p><p>But nearly all settlements create so-called ‘facts on the ground’ by appropriating Palestinian land and constructing infrastructure to serve settlers, including a network of bypass roads that are off limits to Palestinians. This infrastructure is accompanied by a system of more than 900 <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/movement-and-access-west-bank-april-2026" data-entity-type="external">checkpoints, gates, barriers</a>, and roadblocks.</p><p>The Israeli justification is that they are for settlers’ security, but they severely restrict Palestinian movement within the West Bank. For example, a 36-km journey from Ramallah to Nablus now requires a 73-km route to skirt around settlements – and can take hours due to checkpoints and closures. On shared roads, settlers have lined the pavement with Israeli flags, blacked out the Arabic writing on road signs with spray paint, and erected billboards reading ‘There is no future in Palestine.’</p><p>As a young woman in Nablus told me in July, ‘It emphasizes the idea that you are not getting out of this.’ She and many other young people I met no longer travel to Ramallah for work, school, or socializing as they would have done in the past for fear of being detained at checkpoints or harassed by settlers.</p><p>Additionally, 390 <a href="https://peacenow.org.il/en/settlements-watch/settlements-data/population" data-entity-type="external">Israeli farms and outposts </a>have been developed without state permission throughout the West Bank, with <a href="https://peacenow.org.il/en/settlements-watch/settlements-data/population" data-entity-type="external">250</a> established in the past three years. These settlements are technically considered illegal under Israeli law, but only two have been evicted, and over 80 have been legalized. Settler leaders have openly stated that the outposts aim to give them a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/aug/21/israeli-settler-attacks-shift-to-heart-of-territory-earmarked-for-palestinian-state" data-entity-type="external">foothold</a> in strategic Palestinian locations, increasingly in <a href="https://www.yesh-din.org/en/the-next-frontier_eng/" data-entity-type="external">Areas A and B</a>, which would constitute the core population centres in a future Palestinian state.</p><div data-entity-type="media" data-entity-uuid="38ee6569-736c-442d-906e-3c7d90be12c4" data-embed-button="other_embed" data-entity-embed-display="view_mode:media.embed" class="align-right embedded-entity embed" data-langcode="en" data-entity-embed-display-settings="[]" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><figure class="media media-embed media-quote"> <blockquote class="media__wrapper"> <div class="media__content"> <svg class="icon icon--open-quote" role="presentation" focusable="false"> <use xlink:href="#icon-open-quote" ></use> </svg> <p>Spain, Ireland, Belgium, and the Netherlands have already approved similar bans</p> </div> </blockquote> </figure> </div> <p>Meanwhile, over <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/08/20/west-bank-israel-backed-settler-violence-drives-displacement" data-entity-type="external">100 </a>Palestinian communities have been partially or fully displaced by violent settler attacks since 2023, with over <a href="https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/opt-humanitarian-situation-report-23-july-2026" data-entity-type="external">1,330 incidents</a> documented in 2026 alone. I visited the sites of several villages in the Jordan Valley that have been destroyed. In Hamamat al-Maleh, all that remains of a school built with EU-donor funding is a pile of rubble, with children’s workbooks still visible in the dirt.</p><p>With the current Israeli government either <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/14/world/middleeast/israel-west-bank-settler-violence-military-police.html" data-entity-type="external">minimizing</a> or <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-israeli-authorities-are-encouraging-settler-violence-against-palestinians" data-entity-type="external">enabling</a> the violence,&nbsp;there is near- total impunity for such attacks; of the few incidents investigated, less than <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/nov/18/west-bank-surge-settler-violence-israel-palestine" data-entity-type="external">5 per cent</a> result in charges or convictions. <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2026/09/01/miliband-pledge-reset-relations-israel-netanyahu-trump/" data-entity-type="external">Settler terrorism</a> is not new, but the acceleration of attacks over the past three years has been unprecedented. It has had the intended effect of pushing rural Palestinian residents into towns and villages, largely emptying the surrounding areas, and further imperiling the realization of a Palestinian state.</p><p>Given these ever-worsening realities, the time is ripe to prohibit trade with settlements. Spain, Ireland, Belgium, and the Netherlands have already approved <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/europeans-dont-need-consensus-to-challenge-israel-and-its-settlements/" data-entity-type="external">similar bans</a>, and France has <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/france-calls-for-end-to-eu-imports-of-products-from-illegal-settlements-/4004000" data-entity-type="external">called for </a>the EU to end imports of settlement goods.</p><p>Moreover, the proposed policy is a natural extension of current UK positions. The British government already denies preferential tariffs to settlement goods and strongly advises against business deals with settlements, and Parliament’s cross-party Foreign Affairs Committee has recommended a formal ban for over a year. Public opinion polls also suggest widespread <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/49995/documents/269208/default/" data-entity-type="external">support </a>for the policy.</p><h4>‘Siege mentality’</h4><p>Nevertheless, there are concerns that should be taken seriously. Labour Friends of Israel (LFI), argues that the trade ban could result in a ‘de facto boycott’ of all of Israel because many Israeli companies are inextricably linked to settlements via financial integration or supply chains.</p><p>But under the existing UK-Israel Free Trade Agreement, the UK and Israel are already <a href="https://media.amnesty.org.uk/documents/AIUK_Briefing_-_the_practicalities_of_a_settlement_trade_ban.pdf" data-entity-type="external">required</a> to differentiate between goods produced in settlements and those produced within Israel.&nbsp;</p><p>LFI has also expressed concern that a ban could hurt opposition parties in Israel’s upcoming elections by contributing to a ‘siege mentality’ encouraged by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.</p><div data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="40eca7bb-cefd-4889-a346-42b465a4fd5e" data-embed-button="node" data-entity-embed-display="view_mode:node.teaser_embed" class="align-right embedded-entity embed" data-langcode="en" data-entity-embed-display-settings="[]"> <article class="media media-embed teaser--embed teaser teaser--default"> <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/07/israels-general-election-will-be-no-other" class="teaser__link no-external-link-icon"> <div class="teaser__image-container"> <div class="media media-teaser_landscape media-image aspect-ratio-16:9"> <img loading="lazy" srcset="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/2VYDihnawVAXzra_bnwJnYY0Tu8hfPTrXPIq1NaR28g/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3RpbnkvcHVibGljLzIwMjYtMDcvMjAyNi0wNy0yMi1pc3JhZWwtZWxlY3Rpb24tMjI4MzA5MDcyNi5qcGc_aD1hY2JiZTRiYyZpdG9rPTZLSVRvRlRo 400w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/tlylEUMONSToSyNU3DNGlf8jg4POAVxTeUo3TE1slGA/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3NtYWxsL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI2LTA3LzIwMjYtMDctMjItaXNyYWVsLWVsZWN0aW9uLTIyODMwOTA3MjYuanBnP2g9YWNiYmU0YmMmaXRvaz1YcGNEUTV0aQ 750w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/MemUdgOx4_wJsSOpvVWWoySQYIHn4jtPdNrp1SyLxWk/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX21lZGl1bS9wdWJsaWMvMjAyNi0wNy8yMDI2LTA3LTIyLWlzcmFlbC1lbGVjdGlvbi0yMjgzMDkwNzI2LmpwZz9oPWFjYmJlNGJjJml0b2s9aFJ0aGRkeEk 1000w, https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/ISEoj_0Ay7OTyabiqyFQ_cgiQ2dHEYo-akCAsDFD7Uk/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX2xhcmdlL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI2LTA3LzIwMjYtMDctMjItaXNyYWVsLWVsZWN0aW9uLTIyODMwOTA3MjYuanBnP2g9YWNiYmU0YmMmaXRvaz1WWGM2R1FrQQ 1300w" sizes="(min-width:1280px) 33.3vw, 100vw" width="750" height="422" src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/tlylEUMONSToSyNU3DNGlf8jg4POAVxTeUo3TE1slGA/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2hhdGhhbWhvdXNlLm9yZy9zaXRlcy9kZWZhdWx0L2ZpbGVzL3N0eWxlcy8xNl85X21lZGlhX3NtYWxsL3B1YmxpYy8yMDI2LTA3LzIwMjYtMDctMjItaXNyYWVsLWVsZWN0aW9uLTIyODMwOTA3MjYuanBnP2g9YWNiYmU0YmMmaXRvaz1YcGNEUTV0aQ" alt="Demonstrators&nbsp;in West Jerusalem hold a placard reading 'we are not our government'"> </div> </div> <div class="teaser__body"> <header class="teaser__header"> <p class="c-label">Related work </p><h3 class="h5 teaser__title"><span>Israel’s general election will be like no other before</span> </h3> </header> </div> </a> </article> </div> <p>It is true that a ban on services (such as banking, insurance, telecommunications, technology, tourism, and consulting) would be harder to regulate. But, despite the wishes of some advocates, it is likely that the initial policy will be limited to goods. Moreover, if services are included, the onus will be on Israeli firms to extricate themselves from entanglements that directly or indirectly support settlements.</p><p>Other advocacy groups worry that the policy could increase <a href="https://www.uklfi.com/uklfi-warns-over-proposed-settlement-trade-ban" data-entity-type="external">antisemitism&nbsp;</a>against British Jews. There has been an alarming <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c4gd240eelmo" data-entity-type="external">rise</a> in antisemitic incidents in the UK in the past year, and these should be fully condemned.&nbsp;</p><p>But taking a stance against settlement trade is neither antisemitic nor anti-Israel – even if the current Israeli government tries to portray it as such. The focus on settlements is targeted and specific, and in no way delegitimizes the state of Israel as it is recognized along pre-1967 borders.</p><h4>Reprisals</h4><p>There are also political repercussions to consider. Israel is already considering the removal of British and European officials from the US-led coordination center for Gaza, and some fear the move could spark economic retaliation from US President Donald Trump. Those concerns are warranted, but Burnham should not be cowed by threats of reprisals.</p><p>One of the toughest challenges in international relations is balancing between interests and values. Prohibiting UK trade with Israeli settlements does not fall into that category. The UK has a strategic interest, a legal obligation, and a moral duty to stop supporting unlawful settlements that undermine efforts for future peace and security in the region.</p>

2026/9/4
阅读更多

What is the United Nations for?

<span>What is the United Nations for? </span> <span>Audio</span> <span><span>sseth.drupal@c…</span></span> <span><time datetime="2026-09-03T16:27:02+01:00" title="Thursday, 3 September, 2026">3 September 2026</time> </span> <p>On this week’s episode of Independent Thinking, our experts discuss the issues facing the United Nations ahead of the 81st General Assembly.</p> <div data-entity-type="media" data-entity-uuid="070baeac-cc13-4c42-a3fe-29be49d16a6c" data-embed-button="other_embed" data-entity-embed-display="view_mode:media.embed" data-langcode="en" data-entity-embed-display-settings="[]" class="embedded-entity embed"> <figure class="media media-embed media-soundcloud"> <iframe class="soundcloud-widget" width="100%" height="166" scrolling="no" frameborder="no" src="https://w.soundcloud.com/player/?url=https%3A//api.soundcloud.com/tracks/2394288210&amp;visual=&amp;auto_play=false&amp;hide_related=false&amp;show_comments=false&amp;show_user=false&amp;show_reposts=false&amp;color=%23ff5500" title="What is the United Nations for? "></iframe> </figure> </div> <p>The United Nations convenes for its 81st General Assembly next week amid turmoil around the world that it seeks to bring together. The conflicts in Iran, Ukraine and Gaza, and the US, China and Russia’s undermining of the rules-based international order cast a shadow over UNGA. Can the organization renew itself for a dangerous multipolar world? Or is it doomed to the same fate as the League of Nations?</p><p>Bronwen Maddox discusses the UN’s present and future with Heather Hurlburt, associate fellow with our US and North America Programme; Marc Weller, head of our Global Governance and Security Centre; and Zizette Darkazally, associate fellow with our Middle East and North Africa Programme.&nbsp;</p><h2>About Independent Thinking</h2><p>Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.</p><p>More ways to listen: <a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcast/what-is-the-united-nations-for/id1499634628?i=1000787825361" data-entity-type="external">Apple Podcasts</a> and <a href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/5s5fPnuolFGY6LcKrrcmCp" data-entity-type="external">Spotify</a>.</p><p>Explore our other <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/podcasts" data-entity-type="external">Chatham House podcasts</a>.</p>

2026/9/3
阅读更多

Reckoning or rhetoric: Is now the time for reparative justice on the global stage?

<span>Reckoning or rhetoric: Is now the time for reparative justice on the global stage?</span> 15 October 2026 — 18:00 TO 19:00 BST <span><span>Anonymous (not verified)</span></span> <span><time datetime="2026-09-03T15:17:14+01:00" title="Thursday, 3 September, 2026">3 September 2026</time> </span> Chatham House and Online <p>Hear from leading voices on what a landmark UN resolution means for the future of global reparations.</p> Hear from leading voices on what a landmark UN resolution means for the future of global reparations. <p>A landmark UN resolution recognising the transatlantic slave trade as the “gravest crime against humanity” has reset the terms of the global reparations debate. <a href="https://docs.un.org/en/A/80/L.48" data-entity-type="external" target="_blank">Resolution A/80/L.48</a>, backed by a unified front of African, Caribbean and global Black diaspora leaders, passed by a comfortable majority – though a significant bloc of abstentions, concentrated in the Western world, signalled how far the international community remains from agreement on substance or obligation. A subsequent high-level “Next Steps” conference has pushed discussions of reparative justice from principle toward implementation, even as that divide persists.</p><p>To commemorate Black History Month, Chatham House’s Equality, Diversity and Inclusion Working Group brings together speakers to examine where reparatory justice frameworks can move from acknowledgement to policy, and where the limits of political will and international consensus lie.</p><p>This event discusses:</p><ul><li>What would it mean to move beyond symbolic recognition toward material and structural forms of reparative justice?</li><li>What incentives might encourage Western actors to support reparative justice efforts?</li><li>How does deepening solidarity between Africa and the Caribbean change the leverage behind efforts to refine visions of justice, development and collective political power on the global stage?</li><li>What can domestic reparatory schemes – local, municipal or national – teach international efforts about design, delivery and durability?</li></ul><p><em>This panel discussion is followed by a drinks reception and exhibition launch.</em></p>

2026/9/3
阅读更多

推荐订阅

Center for Security Policy

Middle East Institute

China Brief Archives - Jamestown

Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative

Global Risk Insights