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「中英」“习特会”在即，中美贸易“暗战”小动作不断

<figure class="article-span-photo"><img src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/uOGZF-NzeWlFz_b6x3CD-_OO0xrfu7MHL1GG1vr6k3E/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzIxL211bHRpbWVkaWEvMjFkYy1jaGluYS10cmFkZS1qY2ZwLzIxZGMtY2hpbmEtdHJhZGUtamNmcC1tYXN0ZXIxMDUwLmpwZw" width="1050" height="700" alt="特朗普总统与中国领导人习近平去年在韩国釜山会面。" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"><figcaption><span>特朗普总统与中国领导人习近平去年在韩国釜山会面。</span> <cite>Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times</cite></figcaption></figure><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>When the United States and China reached a trade truce during a meeting in South Korea a year ago, it helped restore some stability to an economic relationship that was threatening to spin out of control.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>一年前，美国和中国在韩国举行的会议上达成贸易休战，这有助于为两国面临失控危险的经济关系恢复一些稳定性。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The agreement forced President Trump to walk back punishing tariffs on Chinese exports, and made China promise to maintain exports of critical minerals that it had cut off in response to the president’s levies.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>这项协议迫使特朗普总统撤回了对中国出口商品的惩罚性关税，并促使中国承诺维持关键矿产的出口，此前中国为回应特朗普关税而切断了这些矿产的出口。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Negotiators appear to be preparing to extend that agreement as Xi Jinping, the leader of China, comes to Washington to meet with Mr. Trump later this week. On Sunday night, U.S. officials <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/20/business/us-china-ai-warning-system-national-security.html">said</a> that they would discuss setting up a dialogue on artificial intelligence and promoting trade in nonsensitive goods like energy and consumer products when Mr. Trump meets Mr. Xi this week.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>随着中国领导人习近平将于本周晚些时候来到华盛顿与特朗普会晤，谈判代表们似乎正准备延长该协议。周日晚上，美国官员<a href="https://cn.nytimes.com/world/20260921/us-china-ai-warning-system-national-security/">表示</a>，在特朗普与习近平于本周会晤时，他们将讨论建立人工智能对话机制，并促进能源和消费品等非敏感商品的贸易。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>But despite the plans for a warm state dinner and other pomp and circumstance at the White House, the truce between the United States and China has been uneasier than it might appear. It has not prevented either government from continuing to take action against one another in ways that have sometimes threatened to upset the agreement entirely. Both nations have blamed each other for violating promises made last October in Korea.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>但是，尽管白宫计划举行热烈的国宴和其他隆重仪式，美中之间的休战比表面上看起来更加令人不安。它并未阻止两国政府继续采取针对彼此的行动，这些行动有时险些彻底破坏该协议。两国都指责对方违反了去年10月在韩国做出的承诺。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>U.S. officials say that China’s exports of many minerals necessary for cars, semiconductors and power tools are still overly restricted, leaving some companies uncertain about their supplies. China’s purchases of farm goods <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/21/business/china-agriculture-trade-soybeans.html">lag behind promised levels</a>. And U.S. companies have also been deeply worried about a series of decrees that China’s State Council has issued since March, which expanded the Chinese government’s power over global companies that operate in China.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>美国官员表示，中国对汽车、半导体和电动工具所需的许多矿产的出口仍然受到过度限制，导致部分企业对供应状况感到担忧。中国对农产品的采购<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/21/business/china-agriculture-trade-soybeans.html">落后于承诺的水平</a>。此外，美国公司也对中国国务院自3月以来发布的一系列法令深感担忧，这些法令扩大了中国政府对在华运营的跨国公司的权力。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The rules restrict the unauthorized auditing of supply chains in China — something that is necessary for firms to comply with forced labor laws — and penalize firms for complying with foreign sanctions against Chinese firms. They also tighten state oversight for outbound investments and mineral exports, raising the question of how much influence Beijing will exert over global business.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>这些规定限制了对中国境内供应链的未经授权的审计——此类审计是企业遵守强迫劳动法所必需的，并处罚那些遵守针对中国企业实施的外国制裁的企业。这些规定还加强了对对外投资和矿产出口的国家监管，这引发了北京将对全球商业施加多大影响的疑问。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>American officials have also continued to bar more Chinese technology from the United States, from routers to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/30/business/china-robots-ban-fcc.html" title="Link: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/30/business/china-robots-ban-fcc.html">humanoid robots</a>. The United States has recently accused China of copying American A.I. models through what it has labeled “industrial distillation.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>美国官员也继续禁止更多中国技术进入美国，从路由器到<a href="https://cn.nytimes.com/business/20260731/china-robots-ban-fcc/" title="Link: https://cn.nytimes.com/business/20260731/china-robots-ban-fcc/">类人机器人</a>。美国最近指责中国通过其所谓的“工业级蒸馏”复制美国的人工智能模型。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>In June, the U.S. added a slew of major Chinese firms to a list of Chinese military companies. And in July, the Trump administration <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.dhs.gov/news/2026/07/31/dhs-announces-addition-43-companies-uflpa-entity-list">added dozens</a> of Chinese companies to a trade blacklist related to forced labor.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>今年6月，美国将一批大型中国企业列入中国军方企业名单。7月，特朗普政府又<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.dhs.gov/news/2026/07/31/dhs-announces-addition-43-companies-uflpa-entity-list" title="Link: https://www.dhs.gov/news/2026/07/31/dhs-announces-addition-43-companies-uflpa-entity-list">将数十家中国公司列入</a>与强迫劳动相关的贸易黑名单。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>In response, China sanctioned seven U.S. firms that help companies verify and map out their supply chains, including testing for cotton grown in Xinjiang, which the United States banned because of concerns about forced labor. The dueling regulations have put companies in a bind, since engaging in the supply chain checks required by U.S. law mean they could be penalized in China.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>作为回应，中国制裁了七家帮助企业验证和规划其供应链的美国公司，这些工作中包括对新疆棉花进行检测——美国出于对强迫劳动的担忧禁止了这种棉花。这些相互冲突的规定让企业陷入了进退两难的境地，因为如果按照美国法律的要求进行供应链核查，就可能在中国受到处罚。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The moves, some say, have been calibrated to fly under Mr. Trump’s radar and not upset the overall relationship. But they are still harmful to companies on both sides of the Pacific, and a reflection of the deep challenges in the bilateral relationship that go beyond any rapport between Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>有人认为，这些举措经过了精心计算，旨在不引起特朗普的注意，以免影响两国整体关系。但它们仍然对太平洋两岸的企业造成了损害，并反映了双边关系中存在的深层次挑战，这些挑战超越了特朗普与习近平之间的融洽关系所能解决的范畴。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“The overall relationship comes down from the top, and President Trump, Xi Jinping have a very good relationship,” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, who leads negotiations with China, said in an interview with FOX Business in July. “But, you know, that’s not an excuse for them to do things underneath the surface,” he said, referring to the Chinese.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“整体关系是自上而下的，特朗普总统和习近平有着非常好的关系，”负责对华谈判的财政部长贝森特7月接受福克斯商业频道采访时说。“但是，你知道，这不能成为他们在私下里搞小动作的借口，”他在提到中方时说。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Mr. Bessent said he sometimes described the relationship as “a water polo match” where leaders were hitting the ball back and forth. But under the water, the Chinese were doing “a lot of kicking,” he said, adding, “if we have to, we’ll kick back.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>贝森特说，他有时将这种关系形容为“水球比赛”，领导人们在水面上将球打来打去。但在水下，中国人却在做着“大量的踢腿动作”，他还说，“如果必要，我们也会踢回去。”</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>An editorial in August in the China Daily, a state-run publication, <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202608/02/WS6a6f3bf8a310986e2b4688f6.html">agreed</a> that it was a “perfect metaphor” but called it “an almost perfect inversion of reality,” saying that the United States was the one instigating the kicking.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>中国官方媒体《中国日报》在8月的社论中<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202608/02/WS6a6f3bf8a310986e2b4688f6.html">同意</a>这是一个“绝妙的比喻”，但称其“几乎完全颠倒了现实”，表示美国才是挑起踢腿的一方。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Ryan Hass, the director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank, said there was “still room for shin-kicking under the table,” but “there are limits to how hard the kicking can occur.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>华盛顿智库布鲁金斯学会约翰·L·桑顿中国中心主任何瑞恩(Ryan Hass)表示，“在桌子底下仍然有互相踢小腿的空间”，但是“踢的力度是有限度的”。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Mr. Hass, at a Brookings panel last week, said that the “gentlemen’s agreement” the leaders had reached in South Korea set parameters around highly sensitive issues like tech restrictions, tariffs and behavior toward Taiwan, but did not restrict the countries’ actions in other areas.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>何瑞恩在上周的一次布鲁金斯学会小组讨论会上表示，两国领导人在韩国达成的“君子协定”为技术限制、关税和对台行为等高度敏感问题设定了界限，但并未限制两国在其他领域的行动。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“For the last many months, what we’ve seen is kind of a testing and probing by both sides to understand what can be done competitively while still keeping that leader-level rapprochement on track,” Mira Rapp-Hooper, a visiting fellow at Brookings, said at the same event.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>布鲁金斯学会客座研究员米拉·拉普-胡珀在同一场活动中表示：“过去几个月里，我们看到双方都在进行某种试探和摸索，以了解在保持领导人层面关系缓和的同时在竞争层面可以采取哪些行动。”</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“I don’t think any of us can predict with any certainty how long an arrangement like this could go,” she said, calling it “an extremely unique way to handle a great power relationship.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“我认为我们谁都无法确切预测这样的安排能持续多久，”她说，并称这是“处理大国关系的一种极其独特的方式”。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Officials on both sides will be focused on positive announcements next week. The United States is pushing for China to fulfill promises made earlier this year to buy U.S. farm goods and Boeing airplanes.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>双方官员将把焦点放在下周发布积极声明上。美国正在敦促中国兑现今年早些时候做出的购买美国农产品和波音飞机的承诺。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Both countries appear interested in making progress to set up a new “board of trade” that could lower tariffs on $30 billion of goods on each side. And analysts are watching to see how much progress the meetings will make on issues like A.I. safety and the war in Iran, and whether they will address Taiwan or Chinese investment in the United States.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>两国似乎都希望在建立新的“贸易委员会”方面取得进展，该委员会可以降低双方各300亿美元商品的关税。分析人士正在密切关注，这些会议将在人工智能安全和伊朗战争等问题上取得多少进展，以及双方是否会讨论台湾或中国在美投资问题。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>But most analysts believe the biggest focus of the trip will be ensuring that basic stability between the countries continues. China has pushed for a longer extension of the current trade truce, which expires in November, but the U.S. has proposed it be extended for just six months to keep negotiations on a tighter leash, people familiar with the negotiations say.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>但大多数分析人士认为，此行的最大重点将是确保两国间的基本稳定得以持续。据熟悉谈判情况的人士透露，中方推动将于11月到期的当前贸易休战期进一步延长，但美国提议仅延长六个月，以便对谈判保持更严格的控制。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>In a briefing with reporters Friday, an administration official declined to say whether the truce would be extended, saying that it would be on the agenda for the meeting. The official also said that China’s performance in supplying the U.S. and global economy with rare earths had not been up to U.S. expectations and would be discussed, along with topics like A.I. safety and China’s role in the U.S. fentanyl crisis.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>在周五的记者会上，一位政府官员拒绝透露是否会延长贸易休战协议，并表示这将列入会议议程。该官员还表示，中国在向美国和全球经济供应稀土方面的表现没有达到美国的期望，这一问题也将被纳入讨论，还有人工智能安全以及中国在美国芬太尼危机中的角色等话题。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The meetings this week could simply lay the groundwork for an extension of the truce, with any announcement coming later. In <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.ft.com/content/d29d769e-039c-4d11-9152-e63ccd397b32?accessToken=zwAAAaDESfwGkdPSnXaeA5xNEdORUuY8zTl7Mg.MEUCICjFMPLqOnlaRkHcz5BGkDbInrsWiqng1Kx5fNlxMCvNAiEA-Wt_RZP8cu6De5v7Md1M6c5OdjpYkEE4r10T1XImyPc&amp;sharetype=gift&amp;token=af7fdd8c-e142-49a3-bc29-e8ec7e49112a&amp;syn-25a6b1a6=1">an interview</a> with the Financial Times on Sunday, U.S. officials said that the trade truce didn’t officially expire until Nov. 30, so it wasn’t critical it be extended immediately.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>本周的会谈可能只是为延长休战奠定基础，任何公告都将在晚些时候发布。在周日接受《金融时报》<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.ft.com/content/d29d769e-039c-4d11-9152-e63ccd397b32?accessToken=zwAAAaDESfwGkdPSnXaeA5xNEdORUuY8zTl7Mg.MEUCICjFMPLqOnlaRkHcz5BGkDbInrsWiqng1Kx5fNlxMCvNAiEA-Wt_RZP8cu6De5v7Md1M6c5OdjpYkEE4r10T1XImyPc&amp;sharetype=gift&amp;token=af7fdd8c-e142-49a3-bc29-e8ec7e49112a&amp;syn-25a6b1a6=1">采访</a>时，美国官员表示，贸易休战协议要到11月30日才正式到期，因此无需立即延长。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Sara Schuman, a former U.S. trade official and a managing director at Beacon Global Strategies, said the Chinese would like to see the truce extended for as long as possible, but the United States wants more frequent renegotiations that would allow it to press China on commitments that have not been fulfilled.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>前美国贸易官员、灯塔全球战略咨询公司董事总经理莎拉·舒曼表示，中方希望休战尽可能延长，但美国希望进行更频繁的重新谈判，以便就中国尚未履行的承诺向其施压。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“From the U.S. perspective, right now China is just barely squeaking through on its commitments on critical minerals and rare earths,” Ms. Schuman said. “My expectation is that there’s a direct correlation between what China offers on critical minerals in this meeting and whether or not the truce is extended, and for how long,” she added.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“从美国的角度来看，目前中国在关键矿产和稀土方面的承诺仅勉强达标，”舒曼说。“我预计，中国在本次会议上就关键矿产提出的方案将直接决定休战协议是否延长以及延长多久，”她还说。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Geoffrey Gertz, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, a Washington think tank, said there was a “real risk” in the coming months that one side would unintentionally upset the trade truce by crossing what the other party sees as a red line.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>华盛顿智库新美国安全中心高级研究员杰弗里·格茨表示，在未来几个月存在一种“真实风险”：一方可能无意中越过另一方视为红线的界限，从而破坏贸易休战。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“I think over time, some type of that miscalculation, misperception is pretty likely,” he said.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“我认为，随着时间的推移，出现某种此类误判或误解的可能性相当大，”他说。</p></div></div></div></div></div><footer class="author-info"><p><a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/by/ana-swanson?action=click&amp;pgtype=Article&amp;state=default&amp;variant=1_link&amp;block=storyline_reporter_bio_recirc">Ana Swanson</a>报道贸易和国际经济新闻，常驻华盛顿。她从事新闻工作已超过十年。</p><p>翻译：纽约时报中文网</p><div data-poster="" class=""><div data-poster="" class=""><a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/21/business/economy/trump-xi-china-trade.html">点击查看本文英文版。</a></div></div></footer>

2026/9/22
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「中英」人工智能议题中美说了算？联合国被边缘化

<figure class="article-span-photo"><img src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/3S47mNzRHR06CvXZTLMMZ0ueKyfIpTYPR3zPvGW_Dcw/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzIxL211bHRpbWVkaWEvMjFkYy11bi1haS1mZ2t2LzIxZGMtdW4tYWktZmdrdi1tYXN0ZXIxMDUwLmpwZw" width="1050" height="700" alt="上周，北京千寻智能公司总部数据训练中心里的员工。人工智能将成为本周联合国大会数场会议的主导议题。" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"><figcaption><span>上周，北京千寻智能公司总部数据训练中心里的员工。人工智能将成为本周联合国大会数场会议的主导议题。</span> <cite>Tingshu Wang/Reuters</cite></figcaption></figure><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>As the threats posed by artificial intelligence spark international alarm, the stakes of the Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s state visit to Washington this week have only grown bigger.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>随着人工智能带来的威胁引发国际恐慌，中国领导人习近平本周对华盛顿的国事访问显得非同小可。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Earning considerably less attention are the meetings focused on A.I. at the United Nations General Assembly in New York this week, as world leaders gather in the shadow of several <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/18/technology/google-gemini-ai.html">rogue A.I.</a> hacking episodes that have prompted <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/12/technology/doomsday-discussions-ai-companies.html">greater fears</a>.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p><span>相比之下，本周在纽约联合国大会上聚焦人工智能的会议受到的关注要少得多。此时，各国领导人正聚集在引发<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/12/technology/doomsday-discussions-ai-companies.html">更大担忧</a>的几起<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/18/technology/google-gemini-ai.html">失控人工智能</a>黑客事件的阴影下。</span></p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>A.I. will be a dominant theme for a fleet of U.N. meetings on Monday centered on international digital cooperation. The schedule includes discussions about the technology’s risks and opportunities, the potential for economic dislocation and possible international governance.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>人工智能将成为周一围绕国际数字合作展开的一系列联合国会议的主导议题。议程包括讨论该技术的风险与机遇、潜在的经济错位以及可能的国际治理方案。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Mr. Xi is expected to skip the General Assembly to instead convene in Washington with President Trump, who has repeatedly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/14/us/politics/trump-ai-regulation-anthropic-dario-amodei.html">dismissed A.I. safety concerns as a hoax</a>.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p><span>预计习近平将缺席联合国大会，转而在华盛顿与特朗普总统会面，特朗普已多次<a href="https://cn.nytimes.com/usa/20260915/trump-ai-regulation-anthropic-dario-amodei/" title="Link: https://cn.nytimes.com/usa/20260915/trump-ai-regulation-anthropic-dario-amodei/">将对人工智能安全的担忧斥为骗局</a>。</span></p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>There is no shortage of tension between the two countries, and A.I. is just one of several issues the two sides are expected to discuss. But few issues are as contentious right now — or as important to humanity, some say — as the race for A.I. dominance.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>两国之间紧张对峙频频，且人工智能只是预计双方将讨论的众多问题之一。但一些人表示，眼下很少有哪项议题能像争夺人工智能主导权这样具争议性，或对人类如此重要。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The United States has repeatedly accused Chinese A.I. firms of <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-251a">stealing the intellectual property</a> of American A.I. labs. China, too, continues to agitate against U.S. restrictions on advanced computer chips needed to power A.I. models.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p><span>美国已多次指责中国人工智能公司<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-251a">窃取</a>美国人工智能实验室的知识产权。中国也持续抗议美国限制驱动人工智能模型所需的高级计算机芯片。</span></p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Some onlookers, though expecting little, compared the urgency for a breakthrough on A.I. safety issues between the world’s two superpowers to the need for nuclear arms control agreements during the Cold War.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>尽管期望不高，但一些观察人士仍将两个超级大国在人工智能安全问题上取得突破的紧迫性与冷战期间缔结核军备控制协议的必要性相提并论。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The U.N. gathering and the White House meeting underscore how much A.I. has become a race solely between two rival powers, with the rest of the world largely pushed to the periphery, foreign policy experts said.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>外交政策专家表示，联合国大会和白宫会晤凸显出，人工智能在很大程度上已演变为仅在两个竞争大国之间展开的角逐，而世界其他地区基本被推向边缘。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“The U.N., to put it bluntly, has been sidelined in the A.I. conversation,” said Kyle Chan, a foreign policy fellow at the Brookings Institution who studies U.S.- China relations and focuses on technology issues.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>布鲁金斯学会研究美中关系并专注于科技问题的外交政策研究员陈凯欣(Kyle Chan)表示：“坦白说，联合国在人工智能对话中已被边缘化。”</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>A.I. is “a two-player game,” Mr. Chan added. “It’s kind of like nuclear weapons: If you do not have them or are not on the verge of having them, it’s hard to be relevant in shaping the discussion.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>人工智能是“两个玩家的游戏，”他还说。“这有点像核武器：如果你没有，或者不是即将拥有它们，就很难在塑造相关讨论时发挥实质性作用。”</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Reflecting that reality, the United States and China discussed on Sunday <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/20/business/us-china-ai-warning-system-national-security.html">creating a notification system</a> to allow for the countries to alert each other about A.I.-driven national security risks. The mechanism, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said, would be called “the U.S.-China A.I. dialogue.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>同样反映<span>这一现实的是，美中两国周日讨论了<a href="https://cn.nytimes.com/world/20260921/us-china-ai-warning-system-national-security/" title="Link: https://cn.nytimes.com/world/20260921/us-china-ai-warning-system-national-security/">建立一个通报系统</a>，以便两国互相通报由人工智能引发的国家安全风险。财政部长斯科特·贝森特表示，该机制将被命名为“美中人工智能对话”。</span></p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>It is not for lack of trying. António Guterres, the U.N. secretary general, pushed last week for international cooperation on A.I., highlighting it as one of three existential risks facing humanity alongside climate change and deepening global inequality.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>出现这种局面并非因为联合国未作尝试。联合国秘书长安东尼奥·古特雷斯上周大力推动人工智能领域的国际合作，强调它是与气候变化和不断加剧的全球不平等并列的三大人类生存风险之一。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>A.I., he said, presents other dangers, including amplifying misinformation, discrimination, privacy violations, cyberattacks and so-called superintelligence that could advance beyond human control.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>他指出，人工智能带来了其他危险，包括放大虚假信息、加剧歧视、侵犯隐私、引发网络攻击以及可能发展出脱离人类控制的所谓超级智能。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“We need a shared understanding of how to advance the safe, secure and responsible development of A.I., while identifying when increasingly powerful systems may require stronger safeguards,” Mr. Guterres said. “The world cannot afford a race to the bottom on A.I. safety.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“我们需要就如何安全、可靠且负责任地推进人工智能发展达成共识，同时明确越来越强大的系统何时需要更强有力的保障措施，”古特雷斯表示。“世界承受不起在人工智能安全上竞相探底的后果。”</p></div></div></div><figure class="article-inline-photo large"><div class="img-box"><img src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/XMb-uqy28i1eSx37nMBvdHhqyP2F2fq_znVK_8APqak/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzIxL211bHRpbWVkaWEvMjFkYy11bi1haS1od3pjLzIxZGMtdW4tYWktaHd6Yy1tYXN0ZXIxMDUwLmpwZw" alt="OpenAI的Stargate是美国最大的数据中心项目，位于得克萨斯州阿比林。一位公司发言人表示，该公司首席执行官萨姆·奥特曼将于周三在联合国安全理事会发表演讲。" data-src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/XMb-uqy28i1eSx37nMBvdHhqyP2F2fq_znVK_8APqak/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzIxL211bHRpbWVkaWEvMjFkYy11bi1haS1od3pjLzIxZGMtdW4tYWktaHd6Yy1tYXN0ZXIxMDUwLmpwZw" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></div><figcaption><span>OpenAI的Stargate是美国最大的数据中心项目，位于得克萨斯州阿比林。一位公司发言人表示，该公司首席执行官萨姆·奥特曼将于周三在联合国安全理事会发表演讲。</span> <cite>Scott Ball for The New York Times</cite></figcaption></figure><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Under Mr. Guterres, the United Nations has been trying to build international consensus around responsible A.I. development for years, including by forming an advisory body in 2023 to study the issue. And on Monday, the leaders of 22 countries adopted <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/21/A-Call-for-Control-of-Frontier-AI-Models-Final.pdf">a declaration</a> calling to strengthen “human direction, oversight and control” of A.I. systems. The United States and China did not join the declaration.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p><span>在古特雷斯的领导下，联合国多年来一直致力于围绕负责任的人工智能发展凝聚国际共识，包括在2023年成立一个咨询机构专门研究该问题。周一，22个国家的领导人通过了<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/21/A-Call-for-Control-of-Frontier-AI-Models-Final.pdf">一项宣言</a>，呼吁加强对人工智能系统的“人类指导、监督和控制”。美国和中国均未加入该宣言。</span></p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The two countries have only further cemented their leads ahead of everyone else since the U.N. began worrying about A.I., rushing to build out data centers and release cutting-edge A.I. models despite growing fears about <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/10/science/ai-humanity-risk.html">existential risks</a> associated with the technology.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>自联合国开始关注人工智能以来，美中两国相对其他国家的优势进一步扩大，竞相建设数据中心并发布尖端人工智能模型，<span>尽管外界对该技术相关的<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/10/science/ai-humanity-risk.html" title="Link: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/10/science/ai-humanity-risk.html">生存风险</a>日益担忧。</span></p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>In his remarks last week, Mr. Guterres acknowledged that “geopolitical divides” made policing A.I. difficult but said that voluntary pauses on the technology would not work if not everyone agreed to them — meaning, right now, the United States and China.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>在上周的讲话中，古特雷斯承认“地缘政治分歧”增加了监管人工智能的难度，但他表示，如果不能得到所有人的同意（这意味着目前必须包括美国和中国），暂停研发该技术的自愿呼吁将无法奏效。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>China had generally been seeking to increase its influence with the United Nations, but this summer launched the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization, which has its headquarters in Shanghai, in a bid to assert global dominance on international A.I. discussions. The United States has shown little interest in building international consensus on A.I. or other geopolitical matters.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>中国总体上一直在寻求扩大其在联合国的影响力，但在今年夏天推出了总部设在上海的世界人工智能合作组织，试图主导全球人工智能国际讨论。美国则对在人工智能或其他地缘政治问题上建立国际共识没有表现出多少兴趣。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The U.N. Security Council may hold more sway on A.I. than the General Assembly. The OpenAI chief executive Sam Altman will speak to the Security Council on Wednesday, a company spokeswoman said. But it is difficult to imagine the Security Council — on which the United States, China and Russia sit — forging a consensus, experts said.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>联合国安全理事会在人工智能议题上可能比联合国大会更具影响力。一位公司发言人表示，OpenAI首席执行官萨姆·奥特曼将于周三在安理会发表演讲。但专家指出，很难想象有美、中、俄三国坐镇的安理会能够达成共识。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Mr. Altman’s appearance at the United Nations is just a warm-up. A day later in Washington, he will join a far larger roster of A.I. and technology leaders for the U.S.-China state dinner, including Nvidia’s Jensen Huang, SpaceX’s Elon Musk and the Amazon founder Jeff Bezos.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>奥特曼在联合国的露面只是一场热身。一天后，他将在华盛顿与阵容更为庞大的人工智能和科技界领袖一同出席美中两国国宴，其中包括英伟达的黄仁勋、SpaceX的埃隆·马斯克以及亚马逊创始人杰夫·贝索斯。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Julian Ku, a professor of constitutional and international law at Hofstra University, said that the United Nations has always struggled to influence superpowers on the uses and limits of weapons they have that others do not, from nukes to high-powered hacking tools.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>霍夫斯特拉大学宪法和国际法教授古举伦(Julian Ku)表示，从核弹到高性能黑客工具，在影响超级大国如何使用和限制它们独有的武器方面，联合国历来举步维艰。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>In the context of nuclear weapons, that took the form of helping nonnuclear nations gain access to nuclear power while spreading nonproliferation agreements, Mr. Ku said. While the United Nations would like to steer the A.I. safety conversation, it will probably find more success working to ensure the rest of the world is not fully left behind on the benefits societies could reap from the technology, Mr. Ku added.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>古举伦指出，在核武器背景下，联合国的努力体现为帮助无核国家获得核能，同时推广不扩散协议。他补充说，尽管联合国希望主导人工智能安全对话，但它可能会发现，不如转而致力于确保世界其他地区不会完全错过从该技术中获得的益处，这样效果会更好。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“In a lot of ways, this is the story of the U.N. from the outset,” Mr. Ku said. “The U.N. can’t really shape the actions of those who have the power directly, but they do have the interests of everyone else who do not have that power.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“在许多方面，这就是联合国自诞生以来的写照，”古举伦说。“联合国无法直接左右那些权力者的行动，但它确实代表了不掌握这种权力的其他各方的利益。”</p></div></div></div></div></div><footer class="author-info"><p><a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/by/dustin-volz">Dustin Volz</a>为时报撰写网络安全和情报方面的文章，他常驻华盛顿。</p><p>翻译：纽约时报中文网</p><p><a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/21/us/politics/united-nations-artificial-intelligence-china-us.html">点击查看本文英文版。</a></p></footer>

2026/9/22
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「中英」中国曾承诺购买更多美国农产品，但并未兑现

<figure class="article-span-photo"><img src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/wwQ_FW596C8EdzVfkDnkwqs58pqDkU6wJ6xzsBwbX0o/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzE4L211bHRpbWVkaWEvMThCaXotQ2hpbmEtUGxlZGdlcy0wMS1ocHp3LzE4Qml6LUNoaW5hLVBsZWRnZXMtMDEtaHB6dy1tYXN0ZXIxMDUwLmpwZw" width="1050" height="700" alt="5月，中国同意在2028年前每年购买至少170亿美元的美国农产品。中国此前已另行承诺加大对美国大豆的采购。" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"><figcaption><span>5月，中国同意在2028年前每年购买至少170亿美元的美国农产品。中国此前已另行承诺加大对美国大豆的采购。</span> <cite>KC McGinnis for The New York Times</cite></figcaption></figure><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>When President Trump met with the Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing in May, the United States announced that China had agreed to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/15/world/asia/trump-china-xi-meeting-what-happened.html" title="Link: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/15/world/asia/trump-china-xi-meeting-what-happened.html">sharply increase</a> its purchases of American agricultural products.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>特朗普总统今年5月在北京与中国领导人习近平会晤时，美国宣布，中国已同意<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/15/world/asia/trump-china-xi-meeting-what-happened.html" title="Link: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/15/world/asia/trump-china-xi-meeting-what-happened.html">大幅增加</a>对美国农产品的采购。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The pledge, one of China’s major commitments after the high-profile meeting, appeared to offer relief to U.S. farmers battered by the trade war between the two countries.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>这一承诺是那次备受瞩目的会晤后中国作出的主要承诺之一，看起来有望让饱受两国贸易战冲击的美国农民松一口气。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Four months later, there is little sign of a broad Chinese buying spree.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>四个月过去了，却几乎看不到中国大举采购的迹象。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The White House announced in May that China would buy at least $17 billion a year of U.S. farm goods through 2028, with the target prorated for 2026. Soybeans were not included: China had already vowed separately to step up purchases from American farmers.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>白宫5月宣布，到2028年，中国每年将购买至少170亿美元的美国农产品，2026年的目标则按全年比例折算。大豆不包括在内：中国此前已经另行承诺增加从美国农民手中采购大豆。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Yet in the first seven months of 2026, China bought only $3.9 billion of U.S. agricultural products, excluding soybeans, according to the most recent Agriculture Department data. The amount was only slightly more than during the same period last year, when sales were at a six-year low as the two countries imposed tit-for-tat tariffs on each other.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>然而，根据美国农业部最新数据，2026年前七个月，中国仅购买了39亿美元的美国农产品（不包括大豆）。这一数字仅略高于去年同期，而当时两国相互加征报复性关税，相关销售额跌至六年来最低水平。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“They’re not keeping that promise and it hasn’t been talked about,” said Ishan Bhanu, the lead agricultural commodities analyst at Kpler, which tracks trade flows.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“他们没有兑现那个承诺，而且这件事也一直没人提，”贸易流向追踪机构Kpler的首席农产品分析师伊尚·巴努说。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The sluggish pace of China’s purchases could become a point of contention when Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi meet again at a summit this week. During his first term, Mr. Trump accused Beijing of “letting us down” by reneging on pledges to buy American agricultural products and called its failure to buy soybeans an “economically hostile” act.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>中国采购进展缓慢可能成为特朗普与习近平本周再次举行峰会时的一个争议点。在第一个总统任期内，特朗普曾指责北京背弃了购买美国农产品的承诺，“让我们失望”，并称中国不购买大豆是“经济上的敌对”行为。</p></div></div></div><figure class="article-inline-photo large"><div class="img-box"><img src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/HofHWHdxtJc_moPy220evrEZi9oBRpaeSvx6iaBMTnU/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzE4L211bHRpbWVkaWEvMThCaXotQ2hpbmEtUGxlZGdlcy0wMi1ocHp3LzE4Qml6LUNoaW5hLVBsZWRnZXMtMDItaHB6dy1tYXN0ZXIxMDUwLmpwZw" alt="随着特朗普总统与中国领导人习近平的会晤临近，中国加大了对美国大豆的采购。" data-src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/HofHWHdxtJc_moPy220evrEZi9oBRpaeSvx6iaBMTnU/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzE4L211bHRpbWVkaWEvMThCaXotQ2hpbmEtUGxlZGdlcy0wMi1ocHp3LzE4Qml6LUNoaW5hLVBsZWRnZXMtMDItaHB6dy1tYXN0ZXIxMDUwLmpwZw" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></div><figcaption><span>随着特朗普总统与中国领导人习近平的会晤临近，中国加大了对美国大豆的采购。</span> <cite>Tim Gruber for The New York Times</cite></figcaption></figure><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The figures reveal a sharp divide in the composition of Beijing’s trade with American farmers. It is on track to fulfill its soybean pledge, while demand for other U.S. farm products remains soft.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>数据显示，北京与美国农民之间的贸易构成存在明显分化。中国有望兑现大豆采购承诺，但对美国其他农产品的需求依然疲软。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>That uneven approach reflects China’s dual strategy in dealing with Mr. Trump, analysts say. Beijing wants to show that it is making a good-faith effort to improve relations with the president, who is eager to support farmers ahead of the upcoming midterm elections. But it also does not want to surrender its leverage or appear to be making unilateral concessions to the United States.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>分析人士说，这种不均衡的做法反映了中国应对特朗普的双重策略。北京想表明，它正在真诚努力改善与这位总统的关系，随着中期选举临近，特朗普急于为农民提供支持。但中国也不想放弃自己的筹码，或显得在单方面向美国让步。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“The U.S. may have a legitimate view that China is slow-walking the implementation of their May 14 commitments,” said Han Lin, the China country director for The Asia Group, a strategic advisory firm based in Washington.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“美国或许有合理理由认为，中国正在拖延履行5月14日作出的承诺，”总部位于华盛顿的战略咨询公司亚洲集团中国区负责人林汉说。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Mr. Lin said the approach stems from Beijing’s underlying distrust of Mr. Trump, even as Chinese officials view him as “certainly more manageable” than more hawkish officials in his administration.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>林汉说，这种做法源于北京对特朗普的深层不信任，尽管中国官员认为，与他政府中更为鹰派的官员相比，特朗普“无疑更容易打交道”。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“They understand a large aspect of getting to substantive discussions with the U.S. is paying attention to the performative aspects and making sure Trump looks good,” he said.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“他们明白，要与美国展开实质性讨论，很大程度上也得顾及表面上的功夫，确保特朗普脸上有光，”他说。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>China has never confirmed the $17 billion figure, saying only that it had “set indicative targets for expanding two-way agricultural trade.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>中国从未确认170亿美元这个数字，只称将“设定扩大农产品双向贸易目标”。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Kate Lair, assistant U.S. trade representative for public and media affairs, referred to a May fact sheet from the White House that said the commitment would be prorated for this year. China’s commerce ministry and foreign ministry did not respond to requests for comment.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>美国贸易代表办公室负责公共和媒体事务的助理贸易代表凯特·莱尔提到了白宫5月发布的一份情况说明，其中称今年的承诺额度将按全年比例折算。中国商务部和外交部没有回应置评请求。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>But even with the prorated target, Beijing’s current pace of buying means it will have to accelerate spending significantly over the rest of the year.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>但即便按比例折算，北京目前的采购速度也意味着它必须在今年剩余时间里大幅加快支出。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>For now, soybeans appear to be the only sector seeing a significant boost.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>目前看来，大豆是唯一采购量显著增加的领域。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>After Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi met last October, China bought 12.4 million tons of soybeans from the United States in 2025, according to Jim Sutter, the chief executive officer of the U.S. Soybean Export Council. So far this year, China has made additional purchases amounting to about half of the 25-million-ton, full-year commitment that Washington said was promised.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>美国大豆出口协会首席执行官吉姆·萨特说，特朗普和中国领导人去年10月会晤后，中国在2025年从美国购买了1240万吨大豆。今年迄今为止，中国又进行了更多采购，总量约为华盛顿所称中国承诺的全年2500万吨采购量的一半。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The purchases put the industry “sort of back on track,” Mr. Sutter said.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>萨特说，这些采购使该行业“某种程度上重回正轨”。</p></div></div></div><figure class="article-inline-photo large"><div class="img-box"><img src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/a8KMKwKF8MItLZaUpX2-MWb0fUIUgE96gxxfo0LgyWU/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzE4L211bHRpbWVkaWEvMThCaXotQ2hpbmEtUGxlZGdlcy0wNC1ocHp3LzE4Qml6LUNoaW5hLVBsZWRnZXMtMDQtaHB6dy1tYXN0ZXIxMDUwLmpwZw" alt="爱荷华州波尔克城一座农场粮仓内的玉米。今年1月至7月，美国对华玉米销售额降至约690万美元，而2022年为52亿美元，降幅巨大。" data-src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/a8KMKwKF8MItLZaUpX2-MWb0fUIUgE96gxxfo0LgyWU/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzE4L211bHRpbWVkaWEvMThCaXotQ2hpbmEtUGxlZGdlcy0wNC1ocHp3LzE4Qml6LUNoaW5hLVBsZWRnZXMtMDQtaHB6dy1tYXN0ZXIxMDUwLmpwZw" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></div><figcaption><span>爱荷华州波尔克城一座农场粮仓内的玉米。今年1月至7月，美国对华玉米销售额降至约690万美元，而2022年为52亿美元，降幅巨大。</span> <cite>Kathryn Gamble for The New York Times</cite></figcaption></figure><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Soybean prices are now trading near a three-year high, hovering around $13 a bushel, driven in part by Chinese demand.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>目前大豆价格徘徊在每蒲式耳13美元左右，接近三年来的高点，其中一个推动因素就是中国的需求。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>That is a far cry from Mr. Trump’s first term, when China imposed a 25 percent tariff on U.S. agricultural exports in retaliation for American tariffs on Chinese imports. China is the largest foreign buyer of U.S. soybeans and its purchases plunged.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>这与特朗普第一个任期时的情况大不相同。当时，中国为报复美国对中国进口商品加征关税，对美国农产品加征25%的关税。中国是美国大豆最大的海外买家，此后采购量骤降。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The consequences for American farmers were severe. Storage bins filled up, crops risked rotting and the Trump administration ultimately stepped in with a $23 billion <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-700r">bailout program for farmers</a>. The dispute also accelerated Beijing’s shift toward purchasing soybeans from Brazil, another major producer.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>这给美国农民造成了严重后果。储粮仓爆满，农作物面临腐烂风险，特朗普政府最终出手，推出了一项230亿美元的<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-700r">农民救助计划</a>。这场争端也加速了北京转向从另一个主要生产国巴西采购大豆。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>In recent weeks, as the meeting between the two leaders drew closer, China has sped up its purchases.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>最近几周，随着两位领导人会晤临近，中国加快了采购速度。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>In August, Sinograin, the state-owned enterprise that manages China’s grain reserves, began stepping up its orders of U.S. soybeans, according to Mr. Bhanu, the Kpler analyst. Usually, purchases happen earlier in the year, he said, suggesting that Beijing had initially been uncertain about whether to fulfill its commitments.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Kpler分析师巴努说，8月，管理中国粮食储备的国有企业中储粮开始增加美国大豆订单。他说，通常采购会在一年中更早的时候进行，这表明北京最初对于是否兑现承诺可能并未拿定主意。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Mr. Bhanu said that Sinograin’s role was also telling.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>巴努说，中储粮在其中发挥的作用也很能说明问题。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“It shows that it’s a geopolitical deal,” he said. Sinograin did not respond to a request for comment.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“这表明这是一笔地缘政治交易，”他说。中储粮没有回应置评请求。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>China has other reasons to buy American soybeans. Brazil’s soybean inventories have tightened significantly, potentially giving Beijing an incentive to seek an alternative supply source if the Brazilian crop disappoints.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>中国购买美国大豆还有其他原因。巴西的大豆库存已经明显趋紧，如果巴西大豆收成不及预期，可能促使北京寻找替代供应来源。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>But that commercial logic does not apply as clearly to other American agricultural products.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>但这种商业逻辑在其他美国农产品上就没有那么明显了。</p></div></div></div><figure class="article-inline-photo large"><div class="img-box"><img src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/TlQMgYGINmadxIWJ454PnpViQclJ6nbG7o9WuQh2xcI/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzE4L211bHRpbWVkaWEvMThCaXotQ2hpbmEtUGxlZGdlcy0wMy1ocHp3LzE4Qml6LUNoaW5hLVBsZWRnZXMtMDMtaHB6dy1tYXN0ZXIxMDUwLmpwZw" alt="得克萨斯州阿马里洛郊外的一片高粱地。美国对华高粱销售一直不温不火。" data-src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/TlQMgYGINmadxIWJ454PnpViQclJ6nbG7o9WuQh2xcI/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzE4L211bHRpbWVkaWEvMThCaXotQ2hpbmEtUGxlZGdlcy0wMy1ocHp3LzE4Qml6LUNoaW5hLVBsZWRnZXMtMDMtaHB6dy1tYXN0ZXIxMDUwLmpwZw" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></div><figcaption><span>得克萨斯州阿马里洛郊外的一片高粱地。美国对华高粱销售一直不温不火。</span> <cite>Nick Oxford for The New York Times</cite></figcaption></figure><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Sorghum, for example, was among the products Mr. Trump said last October that China would buy in “massive amounts.” Yet sales have been relatively tepid.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>例如，特朗普去年10月曾表示，中国将“大量”采购高粱。然而实际销售相对温吞。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Tim Lust, chief executive officer of the National Sorghum Producers, a group representing the American sorghum industry<strong>,</strong>&nbsp;said China had bought about 20 percent less sorghum from the United States than historical averages.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>代表美国高粱行业的全国高粱生产者协会首席执行官蒂姆·拉斯特说，中国从美国购买的高粱比历史平均水平少了约20%。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“All agriculture is struggling right now. From a profitability standpoint, it’s a tough situation,” Mr. Lust said. “It is important for us to get back to a managed trade situation and be able to know that we have consistency.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“现在整个农业都在挣扎。从盈利角度看，形势很艰难，”勒斯特说。“对我们来说，重要的是要恢复到一种受管控的贸易状态，能够确保我们拥有一种稳定性。”</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>For corn, the situation is bleak. Corn sales to China amounted to about $6.9 million from January to July this year, according to data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. That is a fraction of the sales in 2022, when China bought $5.2 billion of the crop.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>玉米的情况则十分惨淡。美国农业部数据显示，今年1月至7月，美国对华玉米销售额约为690万美元。这与2022年相比只是一个零头，当年中国购买了价值52亿美元的美国玉米。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Analysts say the sales of wheat, cotton, beef and pork also remain well below recent levels.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>分析人士说，小麦、棉花、牛肉和猪肉的对华销售也仍远低于近年的水平。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>China also faces structural obstacles to buying more American agricultural products. An additional 10 percent Chinese tariff on U.S. goods remains in place, while weakness in the Chinese economy has weighed on demand.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>中国要增加购买美国农产品还面临结构性障碍。中国对美国商品额外加征的10%关税仍然有效，而中国经济疲软也抑制了需求。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>From a purely commercial standpoint, buying significantly more U.S. agricultural goods “doesn’t really make sense for China,” said Fred Gale, an expert on China’s agricultural markets and a former economist at the U.S. Agriculture Department.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>中国农业市场专家、美国农业部前经济学家弗雷德·盖尔说，单纯从商业角度来看，大幅增加购买美国农产品“对中国来说其实并不划算”。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“For most Chinese private-sector buyers, it’s not really feasible to buy American products,” Mr. Gale said. “State-owned companies aren’t coming in to buy large amounts of grain or pork. It’s hard to see exactly what China has in mind, whether they actually intend to meet those objectives.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“对大多数中国民营部门的买家来说，购买美国产品实际上并不可行，”盖尔说。“国有企业也不会进场大量购买粮食或猪肉。很难看出中国到底怎么想，他们是否真的打算实现那些目标。”</p></div></div></div></div></div><footer class="author-info"><p>Li You对本文有报道贡献。</p><p>黄瑞黎(<a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/by/sui-lee-wee">Sui-Lee Wee</a>)是《纽约时报》东南亚分社社长，负责该地区11个国家的报道。</p><p>翻译：纽约时报中文网</p><p><a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/21/business/china-agriculture-trade-soybeans.html">点击查看本文英文版。</a></p><div data-poster="" class="commentsBlockLoaderRef"></div><div data-poster="" class=""><div data-poster="" class="css-1pwfetb"><div data-poster="" class="css-j7qwjs"></div></div></div></footer>

2026/9/22
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「中英」张又侠被开除党籍，将面临军事法庭审判

<figure class="article-span-photo"><img src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/alfixGdxyYMpKXJHRTuPW1vQ0xNXjYtxEPsDsrkMXEE/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzIxL211bHRpbWVkaWEvMjFpbnQtY2hpbmEtZ2VuZXJhbHMtY29ycnVwdGlvbi1xbHprLzIxaW50LWNoaW5hLWdlbmVyYWxzLWNvcnJ1cHRpb24tcWx6ay1tYXN0ZXIxMDUwLmpwZw" width="1050" height="700" alt="2025年，张又侠在北京人民大会堂。" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"><figcaption><span>2025年，张又侠在北京人民大会堂。</span> <cite>Tingshu Wang/Reuters</cite></figcaption></figure><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>China’s Communist Party leaders expelled the country’s former top general, Zhang Youxia, from the party on Monday, accusing him of crimes and misdeeds ranging from taking bribes to disloyalty to the party.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>周一，中国共产党领导人将该国前最高将领张又侠开除党籍，指控他犯下从受贿到对党不忠等一系列罪行和不当行为。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The announcement by the Politburo, a council of 21 top officials, said that the accusations against Mr. Zhang and his former subordinate, Liu Zhenli — who was also expelled from the party — would be handed to military prosecutors. That step makes the prosecution of the two fallen generals almost inevitable.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>由21名高级官员组成的政治局在公告中表示，对张又侠及其同样被开除党籍的前下属刘振立的指控将移交军事检察机关。此举意味着这两名落马将领几乎必然面临起诉。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Their expulsion “opens the way to a military trial which will undoubtedly impose a harsh sentence,” said Drew Thompson, a former Pentagon official <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://chinadrew.substack.com/p/the-demise-of-zhang-youxia-hits-different">who in 2012 helped host Gen. Zhang</a> on a visit to the United States.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>将他们开除党籍“为军事审判铺平了道路，毫无疑问他们将被判处重刑”，<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://chinadrew.substack.com/p/the-demise-of-zhang-youxia-hits-different" title="Link: https://chinadrew.substack.com/p/the-demise-of-zhang-youxia-hits-different">曾在2012年协助接待张又侠</a>访美的前五角大楼官员德鲁·汤普森说。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/24/world/asia/china-top-general-xi-military-purge.html?eafs_enabled=false">abrupt removal</a> of the generals from their commands in January was one of the biggest political shocks in China in years. It touched off speculation about why Mr. Zhang had fallen out with the country’s top leader, Xi Jinping, who had promoted him to become the top uniformed commander of the People’s Liberation Army and had kept him in office beyond the customary retirement age.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>今年1月，这些将领被<a href="https://cn.nytimes.com/china/20260126/china-top-general-xi-military-purge/">突然被免去指挥职务</a>，这是近年来中国最大的政治冲击之一。这令外界猜测张又侠与中国最高领导人习近平之间关系为何破裂。习近平曾提拔张又侠成为中国人民解放军最高级别的现役指挥官，并让他打破惯例，在超过退休年龄后继续留任。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Investigators found that Mr. Zhang and Mr. Liu had abused their positions to help others gain promotions, taken “exceptionally large” bribes, and failed to rein in the misconduct of relatives and subordinates, said the statement from the Politburo meeting, which was <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="http://www.81.cn/yw_208727/16488071.html">issued through the Xinhua</a> news agency.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p><a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="http://www.81.cn/yw_208727/16488071.html">通过新华社发布</a>的政治局会议声明称，调查人员发现，张又侠和刘振立滥用职权，帮助他人谋取职务晋升，收受“金额特别巨大”的贿赂，且未能约束亲属和下属的不当行为。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>But the statement also pointed to the political reasons for their downfall. It accused them of betraying the party and, by implication, Mr. Xi, and forming their own cabal. They had “fallen away from the party in heart and mind” and had “seriously violated political discipline and political norms, engaged in cliques, and were disloyal and dishonest toward the party,” it said.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>但该声明也指出了他们倒台的政治原因。声明指责他们背叛了党——言下之意也背叛了习近平，并拉帮结派。声明称他们“与党离心离德”，并且“严重违反政治纪律和政治规矩，搞团团伙伙，对党不忠诚不老实”。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The wording of the official accusations suggested that both men were accused of trying to amass influence and followers in the military, partly by promoting their own minions, said James Char, an assistant professor at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore who studies the Chinese military. Mr. Zhang had been all but certain to retire at the next Communist Party congress late next year.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>新加坡南洋理工大学研究中国军队的助理教授詹姆斯·夏尔表示，官方指控的措辞表明，两人都被指控试图在军队中培植影响力和追随者，部分手段是提拔自己的亲信。张又侠原本几乎肯定会在明年年底的下届中共党代会上退休。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“It’s clearly a suggestion that there was sort of faction forming going on behind the scenes,” he said in a telephone interview, “that they were trying to make sure that they could retain some level of influence even after retirement by having their protégés put in charge of important positions.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“这清楚地表明幕后存在某种结党营私的行为，”他在接受电话采访时说，“他们试图让自己的门生担任重要职务，确保即使在退休后也能保持一定程度的影响力。”</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The Politburo’s public statement did not provide details of the accusations leveled against the men. The wide-ranging allegations, however, indicated how deeply Mr. Xi had lost confidence in many members of the military command, right up to the top.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>政治局的公开声明并未提供针对两人指控的具体细节。然而，这些广泛的指控表明，习近平对军队指挥层的许多成员已极度失去信任，甚至直到最高层。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Mr. Xi and Mr. Zhang, 76, had once been allies, bonded by their shared upbringing as the sons of senior officials. Mr. Xi turned to the commander to help push through a difficult, and contentious, overhaul of the military.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>习近平与76岁的张又侠曾是盟友，两人因同为中共高干子弟的成长背景而结下交情。习近平曾倚重这位将领来协助推行一项艰难且充满争议的军队改革。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The simultaneous removal of the two generals early this year was the culmination of a series of purges across the People’s Liberation Army that has left dozens of command posts still officially empty.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>今年早些时候，这两名将军被同时免职，将涉及整个中国人民解放军的一系列清洗推向了高潮。该行动导致在官方记录中目前仍有数十个指挥岗位处于空缺状态。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Beginning with a spreading scandal in the P.L.A. Rocket Force in 2023, Mr. Xi appeared to conclude that his previous efforts to clean up the military had failed. By earlier this year, more than 100 senior officers, including some retired ones, had been put under investigation or had simply disappeared — presumably detained — <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/24/world/asia/china-military-purges-xi.html">according to an analysis</a> published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>从2023年中国人民解放军火箭军爆发不断蔓延的丑闻开始，习近平似乎得出结论，他之前清理军队的努力失败了。根据战略与国际问题研究中心发表的<a href="https://cn.nytimes.com/china/20260225/china-military-purges-xi/">分析</a>，到今年早些时候，已有100多名高级军官（包括一些退役军官）被调查或直接失踪——据推测已被拘留。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The Central Military Commission, through which the Communist Party controls the military, had seven members in 2022, including Mr. Xi as chairman and General Zhang as his most senior deputy. Today, there are only two members: Mr. Xi and Gen. Zhang Shengmin, the commander who has overseen the sweeping investigations and purges.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>共产党用来控制军队的中央军事委员会在2022年有七名委员，包括担任主席的习近平和担任其最高级别副手的张又侠。如今，该委员会只剩下两名成员：习近平和负责监督此次全面调查和清洗行动的张升民将军。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>So far, Mr. Xi has moved slowly to replace some purged commanders. Throughout this year, military officers have been undergoing indoctrination sessions intended to reinforce their discipline and loyalty to the party and Mr. Xi.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>到目前为止，习近平在物色被清洗将领的接替人选方面动作缓慢。贯穿今年全年，军官们一直在接受思想教育，旨在强化纪律性以及对党和习近平的忠诚。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Many foreign experts believe that the removals of the commanders, plus the accompanying disruption, have damaged the Chinese military’s readiness for major operations, including against Taiwan, the island-democracy that rejects Beijing’s claim of sovereignty over it.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>许多外国专家认为，指挥官的免职以及随之而来的动荡损害了中国军队执行重大行动的战备状态，包括针对台湾的行动——这个实行民主制度的岛屿拒绝北京对其主权的主张。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>But a page-length commentary in the Chinese military’s main newspaper this month argued that the drive for political loyalty and reliability would ultimately make the People’s Liberation Army better on the battlefield.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>但本月中国军队主要报纸上发表的一篇整版评论文章认为，追求政治上的忠诚和可靠最终将使中国人民解放军在战场上更加出色。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“Looking back at the stormy years of war, how was our military able to vanquish powerful enemies despite its poor equipment and harsh, perilous conditions?” said the <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="http://www.81.cn/xxqj_207719/xxjt/ll/16486268.html">commentary in the Liberation Army Daily</a>. “That was due not just to the courage to fight, but also thanks to unwavering loyalty to the party.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“回望烽火岁月，为什么我军能够在装备落后、条件艰苦的险境之中屡克强敌？不是单凭斗争的勇气，而是源于铁心向党的政治忠诚，”<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="http://www.81.cn/xxqj_207719/xxjt/ll/16486268.html">《解放军报》的这篇评论文章写道</a>。</p></div></div></div></div></div><footer class="author-info"><span><p>储百亮(<a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/by/chris-buckley">Chris Buckley</a>)是《纽约时报》首席中国记者，自台北报道中国和台湾问题，重点关注政治、社会变革以及安全和军事问题。</p><p>翻译：纽约时报中文网</p><div data-poster="" class=""><div data-poster="" class=""><a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/21/world/asia/china-generals-expelled-corruption.html">点击查看本文英文版。</a></div></div></span></footer>

2026/9/22
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「中英」脆弱的美中关系中最具破坏性的问题：对台军售

<figure class="article-span-photo"><img src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/cTd07m19SfbAKmoatA8rMTuxV2U6Jd5HfDJhjoA-iYk/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzIxL211bHRpbWVkaWEvMjFpbnQtdGFpd2FuLXVzLWNoaW5hLTAxLWN0d3AvMjFpbnQtdGFpd2FuLXVzLWNoaW5hLTAxLWN0d3AtbWFzdGVyMTA1MC5qcGc" width="1050" height="700" alt="今年5月，特朗普总统与中国国家主席习近平在北京会晤。特朗普在寻求与中国建立务实关系的同时暂缓了对台军售。" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"><figcaption><span>今年5月，特朗普总统与中国国家主席习近平在北京会晤。特朗普在寻求与中国建立务实关系的同时暂缓了对台军售。</span> <cite>Kenny Holston/The New York Times</cite></figcaption></figure><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>For China’s leader, Xi Jinping, one important goal of his meeting with President Trump this week may be persuading him to keep delaying $14 billion in proposed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>对于中国领导人习近平来说，本周与特朗普总统会晤的一个重要目标可能是说服他继续推迟拟议中对台湾的140亿美元军售。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>China has long claimed the self-governed island of Taiwan as its territory, and Taipei has relied on American military power to counter military threats from Beijing. When they last met, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/14/world/asia/china-xi-trump-taiwan-warning.html">Mr. Xi warned Mr. Trump</a> that mishandling tensions over Taiwan could be “extremely dangerous” for the United States and China, a reminder of the risk of crisis between two nuclear-armed powers.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>中国长期以来一直声称拥有台湾这个自治岛屿的主权，而台北则依靠美国的军事力量来应对来自北京的军事威胁。在两人上次会晤时，<a href="https://cn.nytimes.com/china/20260515/china-xi-trump-taiwan-warning/">习近平警告特朗普</a>，若对台湾问题上的紧张局势处理不当，可能对中美两国来说“十分危险”，这提醒人们注意这两个核武大国之间发生危机的风险。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“There’s only one issue that could cause relations between both sides to break down completely or erupt in conflict, and that is Taiwan,” said Xin Qiang, the director of the Center for Taiwan Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“只有一个问题可能导致双方关系彻底破裂或爆发冲突，那就是台湾问题，”上海复旦大学台湾研究中心主任信强说。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“Demanding a continued delay in any arms sales may be the most critical issue,” he said.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“要求继续推迟军售可能是最关键的问题，”他说。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Mr. Trump has described the arms sale plan as a source of leverage with China. After his May summit with Mr. Xi in Beijing, Mr. Trump said he had discussed the deal with the Chinese leader. “It’s a very good negotiating chip for us, frankly,” <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/16/world/asia/trump-taiwan-arms-bargaining-chip-china.html">he said then</a>.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>特朗普曾将该军售计划描述为对华施压的筹码。在5月于北京与习近平举行峰会后，特朗普表示，他已经与中国领导人讨论了这笔交易。“坦率地说，这对我们来说是一个非常好的谈判筹码，”<a href="https://cn.nytimes.com/world/20260518/trump-taiwan-arms-bargaining-chip-china/">他当时说</a>。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Mr. Trump has since <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/27/us/politics/trump-taiwan-arms-sale.html">held off approving</a> the package of missiles, anti-drone weaponry and air-defense systems. His administration has also muted public references to Taiwan: Officials, including Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, have conspicuously <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/30/world/asia/hegseth-asia-security-shangri-la.html">avoided mentioning Taiwan</a> in speeches.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>此后，特朗普一直<a href="https://cn.nytimes.com/world/20260302/trump-taiwan-arms-sale/">搁置批准</a>包括导弹、反无人机武器和防空系统在内的一揽子计划。他的政府也低调处理了公开提及台湾的言论：包括国防部长皮特·海格塞斯在内的官员在讲话中都明显<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/30/world/asia/hegseth-asia-security-shangri-la.html">避免提及台湾</a>。</p></div></div></div><figure class="article-inline-photo large"><div class="img-box"><img src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/7U9CA3_JjEkce8Cl2yaPynt3YV6fXGq1dHgqggQ6cNg/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzIxL211bHRpbWVkaWEvMjFpbnQtdGFpd2FuLXVzLWNoaW5hLTAyLWN0d3AvMjFpbnQtdGFpd2FuLXVzLWNoaW5hLTAyLWN0d3AtbWFzdGVyMTA1MC5qcGc" alt="国防部长皮特·海格塞斯5月在北京。海格塞斯在演讲中一直避免提及台湾。" data-src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/7U9CA3_JjEkce8Cl2yaPynt3YV6fXGq1dHgqggQ6cNg/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzIxL211bHRpbWVkaWEvMjFpbnQtdGFpd2FuLXVzLWNoaW5hLTAyLWN0d3AvMjFpbnQtdGFpd2FuLXVzLWNoaW5hLTAyLWN0d3AtbWFzdGVyMTA1MC5qcGc" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></div><figcaption><span>国防部长皮特·海格塞斯5月在北京。海格塞斯在演讲中一直避免提及台湾。</span> <cite>Kenny Holston/The New York Times</cite></figcaption></figure><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>For Beijing, Mr. Trump’s willingness to delay arms sales is already a gain. In Washington, Mr. Xi could hint at potential costs if Mr. Trump approves the sale, including more restrictions on Chinese rare earth exports. Mr. Xi could also signal that he might skip the Group of 20 summit in Miami in December, which Mr. Trump will preside over.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>对于北京来说，特朗普愿意推迟军售本身就已经是一个收获。在华盛顿，习近平可能会暗示如果特朗普批准军售将面临的潜在代价，包括中国对稀土出口施加更多限制。习近平还可能发出信号，表示他可能不会出席将于12月在迈阿密举行、由特朗普主持的二十国集团峰会。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Mr. Trump, for his part, may want China to increase pressure on Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, the critical waterway for global oil and gas supplies that Iran has effectively blocked since the war began in February.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>就特朗普而言，他可能希望中国加大对伊朗的压力，以促使伊朗重新开放霍尔木兹海峡。这条对于全球油气供应至关重要的水道自2月份战争爆发以来，实际上已被伊朗封锁。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“I think in Beijing we saw the opening move in what will be a sophisticated play to get the Trump administration to reduce support for Taiwan,” said <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.cfr.org/experts/david-sacks">David Sacks</a>, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who studies U.S. relations with Taiwan and China. “Xi will use his meetings with Trump in Washington to continue to implement this strategy.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“我认为，在北京，我们目睹了一场精心策划的博弈的开局，其目的是促使特朗普政府减少对台湾的支持，”研究美国与台湾及中国大陆关系的外交关系委员会研究员<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.cfr.org/experts/david-sacks">戴维·萨克斯</a>说。“习近平将利用在华盛顿与特朗普的会晤继续实施这一战略。”</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Taiwan Wonders Where It Stands With Trump</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p><b>台湾想知道自己在特朗普眼中的地位</b></p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Delayed arms sales are a political headache for Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te. He has promoted <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/08/world/asia/taiwan-trump-military-china-spending-25-billion.html">increased military spending</a> and purchases of American weapons, in part to meet the Trump administration’s own demands that partners invest more in their defense. Mr. Trump’s stalling could make it harder for Mr. Lai to defend his agenda.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>军售的推迟对台湾总统赖清德来说是一个政治上的头疼问题。他一直推动<a href="https://cn.nytimes.com/asia-pacific/20260511/taiwan-trump-military-china-spending-25-billion/">增加军费开支</a>和购买美国武器，部分是为了满足特朗普政府提出的合作伙伴需增加自身国防投资的要求。特朗普的拖延可能会使赖清德更难捍卫其施政议程。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Longer delays could drag on the island’s military goals, partly by pushing Taiwan further back in the line for orders of scarce military hardware, some experts said.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>一些专家表示，更长时间的拖延可能会拖累该岛的军事目标，部分原因是这会使台湾在稀缺军事装备的订购排队中进一步靠后。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“Ultimately, it’s a game of the Chinese trying to prolong this process as long as possible, with the idea being that if China can make gains faster than Taiwan can acquire capabilities, then the balance continues to tilt in Beijing’s favor,” said <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.brookings.edu/people/ryan-hass/">Ryan Hass</a>, a former director for China at the National Security Council and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“归根结底，这是中国人试图尽可能延长这一进程的博弈，其思路是，如果中国取得进展的速度比台湾获得武器能力的速度快，那么天平就会继续向有利于北京的方向倾斜，”前国家安全委员会中国事务主任、布鲁金斯学会高级研究员<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.brookings.edu/people/ryan-hass/">何瑞恩</a>(Ryan Hass)说。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Some experts said they expected Mr. Trump to keep holding off approval of any arms sales for Taiwan until at least late this year. Others said the green light for some weapons could come sooner. Both Republicans and Democrats in Congress are likely to raise pressure on the administration to approve the proposed arms sales after the summit, Mr. Sacks said.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>一些专家表示，他们预计特朗普至少要到今年晚些时候才会批准对台军售。也有人表示，部分武器的批准可能会来得更早。萨克斯表示，在峰会之后，国会的共和党人和民主党人都可能加大对政府的压力，要求其批准拟议的军售。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The arms issue has highlighted Taiwan’s struggles to keep Mr. Trump onside. Taiwan does not have formal diplomatic relations with the United States, and Mr. Trump’s highly personalized, freewheeling style makes it more difficult for Taiwan to understand and shape U.S. decision-making, experts say.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>军售问题凸显了台湾在争取特朗普支持时所面临的困境。专家表示，台湾与美国没有正式外交关系，而特朗普高度个人化、随心所欲的风格使得台湾更难理解和影响美国的决策。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“With an administration that is so top-down, I think that is hindering the Taiwanese ability to get a really good sense of what’s going on and the ability to help shape and influence that,” said Laura Rosenberger, a former Biden administration official who oversaw U.S. policies on China and Taiwan.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“面对这样一个自上而下的政府，我认为这阻碍了台湾真正了解情况的能力，也阻碍了他们帮助塑造和影响决策的能力，”曾负责监督美国对华和对台政策的拜登政府官员劳拉·罗森伯格说。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>In his first term, Mr. Trump signed off on about <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.forumarmstrade.org/ustaiwan.html">$18 billion of arms sales</a> to Taiwan, and hawkish members of his government focused on Beijing as a long-term threat. But in his second term, Mr. Trump has emphasized pragmatic ties with China, largely retreating from a trade war after Beijing strangled exports of rare earths that are crucial for smartphones and advanced technology.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>在第一任期内，特朗普批准了<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.forumarmstrade.org/ustaiwan.html">约180亿美元的对台军售</a>，其政府中的鹰派成员将北京视为长期威胁。但在他的第二任期内，特朗普一直强调与中国建立务实的关系，在北京限制了对智能手机和先进技术至关重要的稀土出口之后，他在很大程度上从贸易战中退却了。</p></div></div></div><figure class="article-inline-photo large"><div class="img-box"><img src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/uQw-LdFpjml3uUbVy0rBGKN8l0RhDkLPc-LkcGWOBbk/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzIxL211bHRpbWVkaWEvMjFpbnQtdGFpd2FuLXVzLWNoaW5hLTAzLWN0d3AvMjFpbnQtdGFpd2FuLXVzLWNoaW5hLTAzLWN0d3AtbWFzdGVyMTA1MC5qcGc" alt="去年，台湾总统赖清德在台湾台东县的一处军事基地与一架美国制造的战斗机合影。赖清德一直敦促台湾立法机构批准采购美国武器。" data-src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/uQw-LdFpjml3uUbVy0rBGKN8l0RhDkLPc-LkcGWOBbk/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzIxL211bHRpbWVkaWEvMjFpbnQtdGFpd2FuLXVzLWNoaW5hLTAzLWN0d3AvMjFpbnQtdGFpd2FuLXVzLWNoaW5hLTAzLWN0d3AtbWFzdGVyMTA1MC5qcGc" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></div><figcaption><span>去年，台湾总统赖清德在台湾台东县的一处军事基地与一架美国制造的战斗机合影。赖清德一直敦促台湾立法机构批准采购美国武器。</span> <cite>Chiang Ying-ying/Associated Press</cite></figcaption></figure><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Taiwan has sought to maintain influence by cultivating Mr. Trump’s inner circle, hiring lobbyists and arranging visits to the island for prominent supporters of the president.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>台湾一直试图通过拉拢特朗普的亲信、聘请游说者以及安排总统的知名支持者访问该岛等方式力图维持自身影响力。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>But some Taiwanese officials who have traveled to the United States have also been told by Trump administration officials to curtail their visits to research groups in Washington, said Mr. Hass at the Brookings Institution.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>但布鲁金斯学会的何瑞恩表示，一些前往美国的台湾官员也被特朗普政府的官员告知，要减少他们对华盛顿研究机构的访问。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“All of this just betrays a clear preference by President Trump to ensure Taiwan does not become an obstacle to his ambitions as it relates to China,” he said.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“所有这一切都暴露出特朗普总统的明显偏好，他希望确保台湾不会成为他实现与中国相关抱负的障碍，”他说。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Military and Trade Ties Are Steady</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p><b>军事和贸易关系保持稳定</b></p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Still, Taiwan’s security relationship with the United States remains robust. Officials and experts say working ties between government departments have remained steady, even deepened.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>尽管如此，台湾与美国的安全关系依然稳固。官员和专家表示，政府部门之间的工作联系保持着稳定，甚至有所深化。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>During Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang military exercises last month, American advisers were more visible than in past years. At a recent briefing with reporters, Taiwan’s defense minister, Wellington Koo, <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/taiwan-us-military-training-china-7795c2f3">spoke coyly</a> of growing numbers of “American English teachers,” a euphemism for the U.S. military advisers whose presence rankles Beijing.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>在上个月台湾举行的年度“汉光”军事演习期间，美国顾问比往年更加引人注目。在最近一次记者会上，台湾国防部部长顾立雄<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/taiwan-us-military-training-china-7795c2f3">含蓄地谈到</a>增多的“美语老师”——这是令北京感到恼火的美国军事顾问的委婉说法。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“Our friends in the U.S. government understand how important continued arms sales are for Taiwan’s defense,” Chen Ming-chi, a deputy minister in Taiwan’s foreign ministry who handles relations with the United States, said in an interview.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“在美国政府里的朋友明白继续对台军售对台湾国防有多重要，”负责处理对美关系的台湾外交部副部长陈明祺在接受采访时表示。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Taiwan’s importance as an American trading partner has also grown sharply; this year it surpassed China as the third biggest source of U.S. imports, behind Mexico and Canada, <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/topyr.html">according to U.S. figures</a>. The bulk of those imports are semiconductors and other high-tech equipment sustaining the artificial intelligence boom in the United States. Taiwanese officials hope this growth will ultimately help entrench American support.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>台湾作为美国贸易伙伴的重要性也急剧上升；<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/topyr.html">根据美国的数据</a>，今年台湾已经超过中国成为仅次于墨西哥和加拿大的美国第三大进口来源地。这些进口的大部分是维持美国人工智能繁荣的半导体和其他高科技设备。台湾官员希望这种增长最终有助于巩固美国的支持。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“We are probably the most cooperative partner in the whole world when it comes to tariffs and investment in the United States,” Mr. Chen said.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“我们大概是全世界最愿意配合美国关税和投资要求的伙伴，”陈明祺说。</p></div></div></div><figure class="article-inline-photo large"><div class="img-box"><img src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/r57sk1QDeaewipsJ2MH5BTjoaTXGrrr4vqcsZNkuWUs/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzIxL211bHRpbWVkaWEvMjFpbnQtdGFpd2FuLXVzLWNoaW5hLTA0LWN0d3AvMjFpbnQtdGFpd2FuLXVzLWNoaW5hLTA0LWN0d3AtbWFzdGVyMTA1MC5qcGc" alt="8月，台湾澎湖举行实弹演习时的坦克射击。在今年的“汉光”年度演习中，美国顾问的身影比往年更为醒目。" data-src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/r57sk1QDeaewipsJ2MH5BTjoaTXGrrr4vqcsZNkuWUs/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzIxL211bHRpbWVkaWEvMjFpbnQtdGFpd2FuLXVzLWNoaW5hLTA0LWN0d3AvMjFpbnQtdGFpd2FuLXVzLWNoaW5hLTA0LWN0d3AtbWFzdGVyMTA1MC5qcGc" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></div><figcaption><span>8月，台湾澎湖举行实弹演习时的坦克射击。在今年的“汉光”年度演习中，美国顾问的身影比往年更为醒目。</span> <cite>Ann Wang/Reuters</cite></figcaption></figure><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Mr. Trump often complains about Taiwan’s dominance in making advanced semiconductors, raising his long-held, and widely debunked, accusation that the island pilfered chip-making know-how from the United States. “They got stolen from us and they were brought to Taiwan,” <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-interview-michael-cohen-wabc-radio-august-20-2026/#89">Mr. Trump said last month</a> in a radio interview.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>特朗普经常抱怨台湾在制造先进半导体方面的主导地位，重提了他长期以来所持，且已被广泛驳斥的指控，即台湾窃取了美国的芯片制造技术。“他们从我们这里偷走了技术，并把它们带到了台湾，”<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-interview-michael-cohen-wabc-radio-august-20-2026/#89" title="Link: https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-interview-michael-cohen-wabc-radio-august-20-2026/#89">特朗普上个月在一次广播采访中说</a>。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>But displacing Taiwan as a chief source of advanced chips is unlikely, even as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, or TSMC, the main global chip maker, expands production in the United States, experts say. TSMC <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/16/business/tsmc-chips-investment-arizona.html">has said it will spend $265 billion</a> on its plants in Arizona. But Taiwan’s dense networks of suppliers and engineering talent remains difficult to replicate.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>但专家表示，尽管全球主要芯片制造商台积电正在美国扩大生产，但取代台湾作为先进芯片主要来源地的可能性不大。台积电曾表示<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/16/business/tsmc-chips-investment-arizona.html" title="Link: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/16/business/tsmc-chips-investment-arizona.html">将斥资2650亿美元</a>建设其在亚利桑那州的工厂。但台湾密集的供应商网络和工程人才仍然难以复制。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“Building structural interdependence with our most critical ally provides the ultimate assurance for our national security,” said <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://dset.tw/en/teams/jeremy-chih-cheng-chang/">Jeremy Chih-Cheng Chang</a>, the director of economic security studies at the Research Institute for Democracy, Society, and Emerging Technology in Taipei, which receives funding from the Taiwanese government.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“与我们最关键的盟友建立结构性的相互依存关系为我们的国家安全提供了最终保障，”由台湾政府资助的台北民主、社会与科技潜力研究中心经济安保组组长<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://dset.tw/en/teams/jeremy-chih-cheng-chang/" title="Link: https://dset.tw/en/teams/jeremy-chih-cheng-chang/">张智程</a>说。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“Presidents come and go," said Mr. Chang, “but Silicon Valley and Wall Street remain constant.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“总统来来去去，”张智程说，“但硅谷与华尔街永远都在。”</p></div></div></div></div></div><footer class="author-info"><span><p>储百亮(<a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/by/chris-buckley">Chris Buckley</a>)是《纽约时报》首席中国记者，自台北报道中国和台湾问题，重点关注政治、社会变革以及安全和军事问题。</p><div data-poster="" class=""><span><p><a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/by/amy-chang-chien">Amy Chang Chien</a>是《纽约时报》记者/研究员，常驻台北，报道台湾和中国新闻。</p><p>翻译：纽约时报中文网</p><div data-poster="" class=""><div data-poster="" class=""><a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/21/world/asia/china-trump-taiwan-arms-sales.html">点击查看本文英文版。</a></div></div></span></div></span></footer>

2026/9/22
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「中英」习近平如何看待“习特会”：占据政治优势、底气更足

<figure class="article-span-photo"><img src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/QPDl1U37kJGSIqJUVX8nDFGQ8O9yUiiy-Y_ex7jCQZM/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzIyL211bHRpbWVkaWEvMjJpbnQtY2hpbmEteGktMDEtcG1nbC8yMmludC1jaGluYS14aS0wMS1wbWdsLW1hc3RlcjEwNTAuanBn" width="1050" height="700" alt="今年5月，特朗普总统与中国领导人习近平在北京人民大会堂。" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"><figcaption><span>今年5月，特朗普总统与中国领导人习近平在北京人民大会堂。</span> <cite>Kenny Holston/The New York Times</cite></figcaption></figure><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>When China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, and President Trump meet in Washington this week, the two men will be operating on vastly different clocks.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>本周，中国最高领导人习近平和特朗普总统在华盛顿会面时，两人面对的政治时钟将大不相同。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The American president is constrained by the immediate demands of a midterm election in November and a grinding war. The Chinese leader is gearing up for a norm-shattering fourth term as head of the ruling Communist Party, that will keep him in power for another five years.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>美国总统受到11月中期选举迫在眉睫的政治压力以及一场旷日持久的战争的牵制。中国领导人则正准备开启他打破常规的第四个中共中央总书记任期，这将使他继续执政五年。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>For Mr. Xi, the disparity in political realities gives him an edge in maintaining the truce that the two countries reached last year. A renewed trade fight would hit American consumers right before the election — a risk Mr. Trump can ill afford. China’s economy is struggling too, but Mr. Xi answers to no electorate, giving him the patience to prolong the détente on his terms.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>对习近平来说，两人在政治现实中的差异让他在维持去年达成的休战局面时占据优势。如果贸易战再起，就会在选举前打击美国消费者，这是特朗普难以承受的风险。中国经济同样陷入困境，但习近平无需对选民负责，这让他有足够的耐心按照自己的节奏，将这段缓和局面尽可能延长。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“Each of Xi’s face-to-face encounters with Trump in his second term would only have reinforced Xi’s prior conviction that Trump is leading an America that is dangerous but declining,” said Jonathan Czin, a researcher at the Brookings Institution who previously worked at the C.I.A. analyzing Chinese politics.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“在特朗普第二个任期内，习近平每一次与他碰面可能都只会进一步强化习近平此前的判断，即特朗普领导下的美国虽然危险，却正在衰落，”曾在中央情报局从事中国政治分析工作、现为布鲁金斯学会研究员的秦江南(Jonathan Czin)说。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Mr. Xi, who will sit down for talks with Mr. Trump on Thursday, may be wagering that leaning into Mr. Trump’s preference for leader-to-leader diplomacy can insulate the relationship from flash points like the status of Taiwan, the self-governed island claimed by Beijing, and the competition to dominate artificial intelligence.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>习近平将在周四与特朗普举行会谈，他的盘算或许是：顺应特朗普偏好的“领导人对领导人”外交模式或许能让两国关系免受一些敏感议题的冲击，比如台湾的地位问题（北京宣称对这个自治岛屿拥有主权），以及双方在人工智能领域争夺主导地位的竞争。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Keeping Mr. Trump at bay would give Mr. Xi breathing room to work on rejuvenating his listless economy, which has been weakened by a property crisis, high youth unemployment and excess production. It would give him time to rebuild the upper echelons of his military leadership, which he has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/26/world/asia/china-xi-zhang-youxia-military.html">hollowed out in a drive against corruption and disloyalty</a>. And it would allow him to continue expanding his country’s industrial, technological and military strength for a future showdown with the United States.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>让特朗普暂时不来找麻烦将给中国领导人喘息空间，着手提提振因房地产危机、青年失业率高企和产能过剩而陷入疲软的经济。这也将给他时间重建军队高层，此前他在一场反腐败、反不忠行动中对军队高层进行了<a href="https://cn.nytimes.com/china/20260127/china-xi-zhang-youxia-military/">大清洗</a>。同时，这还能让他继续增强中国在工业、技术和军事上的实力，为未来与美国的对抗做准备。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Analysts say China benefits every time Mr. Trump’s attention drifts elsewhere. By quarreling with traditional American allies or sinking deeper into the war in Iran, Mr. Trump is weakening his country's global standing and pulling troops away from the Pacific.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>分析人士说，每当特朗普的注意力转向其他地方，中国都会从中受益。无论是与美国的传统盟友发生争执，还是在伊朗战争中越陷越深，特朗普都在削弱美国的全球地位，并将军力从太平洋地区撤离。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“Xi would love to tell Trump, ‘Go on, stay the course,’” said Suisheng Zhao, executive director of the China Center at the University of Denver. “For Xi, Trump represents a window of opportunity for China, so his priority is to buy more time.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“习近平巴不得对特朗普说，‘继续吧，照这个路子走下去，’”丹佛大学中国中心主任赵穗生说。“对习近平来说，特朗普给中国带来了一个机会窗口，所以他的首要任务就是争取更多时间。”</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p><b>An Emboldened Xi Heads to Washington</b></p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p><b>习近平更有底气地前往华盛顿</b></p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Since first <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/14/world/asia/xi-jinping-trump-mar-a-lago.html">meeting Mr. Trump at Mar-a-Lago</a> more than nine years ago — a gathering best remembered for being when Mr. Xi learned about U.S. missile strikes on Syria while dining on what Mr. Trump described as the “most beautiful chocolate cake” — Mr. Xi has had an extraordinary amount of time for a Chinese leader to size up his chief geopolitical rival.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>自九年多前在<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/14/world/asia/xi-jinping-trump-mar-a-lago.html?utm_source=gemini">马阿拉歌庄园首次与特朗普会面</a>以来——那次会晤最令人记忆犹新的一幕是，习近平在品尝特朗普口中“最美味的巧克力蛋糕”时得知了美国对叙利亚实施导弹打击的消息，习近平拥有了一段对中国领导人而言异乎寻常的漫长时间，可以观察和判断自己的主要地缘政治对手。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Early in Mr. Trump’s first term, Mr. Xi was somewhat accommodating toward the American president. In 2018, his government agreed to purchase <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/18/us/politics/trump-china-trade-talks.html">$200 billion</a> in additional U.S. goods and services to offset a trade imbalance (though Beijing never fully honored that deal.)</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>在特朗普第一个任期之初，习近平对这位美国总统在一定程度上采取了迁就姿态。2018年，中国政府同意额外购买<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/18/us/politics/trump-china-trade-talks.html?utm_source=gemini">2000亿美元</a>的美国商品与服务，以缓解贸易失衡（尽管北京从未完全兑现这一承诺）。</p></div></div></div><figure class="article-inline-photo large"><div class="img-box"><img src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/AtzAxc4IT5Os7Twn1ohBgtyJ_tWMr9uGwqfVnOjw9fw/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzIyL211bHRpbWVkaWEvMjJpbnQtY2hpbmEteGktMDItcG1nbC8yMmludC1jaGluYS14aS0wMi1wbWdsLW1hc3RlcjEwNTAuanBn" alt="2017年，特朗普与第一夫人梅拉尼娅·特朗普在佛罗里达州棕榈滩马阿拉歌接待了习近平及夫人彭丽媛。" data-src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/AtzAxc4IT5Os7Twn1ohBgtyJ_tWMr9uGwqfVnOjw9fw/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzIyL211bHRpbWVkaWEvMjJpbnQtY2hpbmEteGktMDItcG1nbC8yMmludC1jaGluYS14aS0wMi1wbWdsLW1hc3RlcjEwNTAuanBn" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></div><figcaption><span>2017年，特朗普与第一夫人梅拉尼娅·特朗普在佛罗里达州棕榈滩马阿拉歌接待了习近平及夫人彭丽媛。</span> <cite>Doug Mills/The New York Times</cite></figcaption></figure><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Last year, Mr. Xi flipped the dynamic between the two superpowers.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>去年，习近平扭转了两个超级大国之间的态势。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Faced with Mr. Trump’s Liberation Day tariffs, Mr. Xi was the only world leader who refused to back down, choosing instead to match his opponent with one sky-high tariff after another. Mr. Xi then reached for his ace card by throttling exports of Chinese critical minerals, or rare earths, which companies globally need for modern technologies. Backed into a corner, the Trump administration called for a truce.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>面对特朗普的“解放日”关税，习近平是唯一拒绝退让的世界领导人，转而选择一轮又一轮高额关税针锋相对。随后，习近平祭出了杀手锏，限制中国关键矿产（即稀土）的出口——全球企业制造现代科技产品都离不开这些资源。被逼到困境的特朗普政府于是呼吁休战。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>It was a payoff <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/10/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-trade-war.html">years in the making</a>: a rare instance in which Beijing not only withstood U.S. pressure but turned the tables and forced it to relent. Beijing, as a result, is emboldened today and sees itself more as an equal to Washington, <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/emerging-us-china-detente">analysts say</a>.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>这是<a href="https://cn.nytimes.com/china/20250512/xi-jinping-china-trade-war/">多年布局</a>终于得到的回报：北京不仅顶住了美国的压力，而且扭转了局面，迫使其让步，这是罕见的。<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/emerging-us-china-detente?utm_source=gemini">分析人士指出</a>，这让今天的北京底气更足，也愈发将自己视为与华盛顿平起平坐的一方。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The Trump administration “thought they could use massive unilateral pressure to force China to make concessions. And that did not occur. In fact, the opposite did,” said Scott Kennedy, a researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>特朗普政府“原以为可以通过巨大的单边施压迫使中国让步。但事情并没有这样发展。事实上，结果恰恰相反”，华盛顿战略与国际问题研究中心研究员甘思德(Scott Kennedy)说。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“I think now this is Xi Jinping’s world and we’re all living in it,” he added.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“我认为，如今这个世界已经是习近平的世界了，我们不过都生活在其中，”他补充道。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p><b>An Unstable Truce</b></p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p><b>并不稳固的休战</b></p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The superpowers should put limits on competition, Mr. Xi’s argument goes, to avoid what he has warned could be a catastrophic clash. To this end, he has pushed a formula he calls “constructive strategic stability.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>按照习近平的主张，两个超级大国应当为竞争设定边界，以避免他警告过可能发生的那种灾难性冲突。为此，他提出了一套称为“建设性战略稳定”的方案。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>In practice, what this means is that Beijing wants Washington to accept boundaries on where it can challenge China.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>落实到实际层面，这意味着北京希望华盛顿接受一定的边界，明确它在哪些地方不可以挑战中国。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>In July, for example, when the U.S. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/30/business/china-robots-ban-fcc.html">Federal Communications Commission</a> proposed a ban on Chinese-made humanoid robots, China’s Ministry of Commerce invoked the phrase, demanding that Washington roll back the restrictions to preserve “strategic stability.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>例如，今年7月，当美国<a href="https://cn.nytimes.com/business/20260731/china-robots-ban-fcc/">联邦通信委员会</a>提议禁止中国制造的人形机器人时，中国商务部就搬出了这一说法，要求华盛顿撤销限制，以维护“战略稳定”。</p></div></div></div><figure class="article-inline-photo large"><div class="img-box"><img src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/yraDNeOUKT8A6NoHQAFRX_hgBz5XqWQyhqLNktlVeM4/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzIyL211bHRpbWVkaWEvMjJpbnQtY2hpbmEteGktMDMtcG1nbC8yMmludC1jaGluYS14aS0wMy1wbWdsLW1hc3RlcjEwNTAuanBn" alt="2025年，中国杭州宇树科技公司的一场机器人拳击演示。" data-src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/yraDNeOUKT8A6NoHQAFRX_hgBz5XqWQyhqLNktlVeM4/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzIyL211bHRpbWVkaWEvMjJpbnQtY2hpbmEteGktMDMtcG1nbC8yMmludC1jaGluYS14aS0wMy1wbWdsLW1hc3RlcjEwNTAuanBn" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></div><figcaption><span>2025年，中国杭州宇树科技公司的一场机器人拳击演示。</span> <cite>Chang W. Lee/The New York Times</cite></figcaption></figure><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>American analysts view the slogan not as a serious effort at ironing out differences but as an attempt to get Washington to recognize China’s clout and back off. China could apply it to any new U.S. restrictions on chip exports or arms sales to Taiwan.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>美国分析人士认为，这一口号并非真正试图弥合分歧，而是要让华盛顿承认中国的实力并作出退让。对于美国今后出台的任何芯片出口限制或对台军售，中国都可能套用这一说法。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“The truce is not constructive because little diplomatic infrastructure is being built,” Mr. Czin of the Brookings Institution said. “It is tactical rather than strategic. And therefore it is inherently unstable.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“这种休战并不具有建设性，因为双方几乎没有建立起什么外交机制，”布鲁金斯学会的秦江南说。“它是战术性的，而非战略性的。因此，它在本质上并不稳定。”</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p><b>Summitry is the Strategy</b></p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p><b>峰会外交是一种策略</b></p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Mr. Xi appears to have calculated that the best way to manage the United States is to engage Mr. Trump in high-profile summits rich in optics but thin in substance.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>习近平似乎已经认定，应对美国的最佳方式就是与特朗普举行一场场备受瞩目的峰会——场面十足，实质内容却不多。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The planned meeting on Thursday will be their third face-to-face in less than a year, a pace that could continue with talks in November at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Shenzhen, China, and at the Group of 20 summit in Miami in December.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>计划于周四举行的会晤将是他们在不到一年内第三次面对面会晤。这一节奏可能还会延续：11月在深圳举行的亚太经合组织峰会，以及12月在迈阿密举行的二十国集团峰会，他们都可能再度会晤。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“Head-of-state diplomacy is the cornerstone of China-U.S. relations,” China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, told Secretary of State Marco Rubio in a call on Thursday.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“元首外交是中美关系的定盘星，”中国最高外交官王毅周四与美国国务卿鲁比奥通话时表示。</p></div></div></div><figure class="article-inline-photo large"><div class="img-box"><img src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/uAy0HxJpk1r7BCy0Gf2a6PqyrQ9b7FnjLGQwQ8t6H1U/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzIyL211bHRpbWVkaWEvMjJpbnQtY2hpbmEteGktMDQtcG1nbC8yMmludC1jaGluYS14aS0wNC1wbWdsLW1hc3RlcjEwNTAuanBn" alt="特朗普上一次与习近平会见是今年5月在北京。本周的会晤将是两人在不到一年内第三次面对面会谈。" data-src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/uAy0HxJpk1r7BCy0Gf2a6PqyrQ9b7FnjLGQwQ8t6H1U/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzIyL211bHRpbWVkaWEvMjJpbnQtY2hpbmEteGktMDQtcG1nbC8yMmludC1jaGluYS14aS0wNC1wbWdsLW1hc3RlcjEwNTAuanBn" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></div><figcaption><span>特朗普上一次与习近平会见是今年5月在北京。本周的会晤将是两人在不到一年内第三次面对面会谈。</span> <cite>Kenny Holston/The New York Times</cite></figcaption></figure><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>But beyond extending the trade truce, the meetings have produced few breakthroughs. China may agree to more agricultural purchases this week, but expectations are low on issues like A.I. safety or China’s trade imbalances.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>但除了延长贸易休战之外，这些会晤几乎没有产生什么突破。中国本周可能同意增加农产品采购，但在人工智能安全或中美贸易失衡等问题上，外界的预期普遍不高。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>That is by design, analysts say. Enticing Mr. Trump with the pageantry of summits he seems to relish lowers the risk that he may do something to derail relations — like greenlight a package of arms to Taiwan.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>分析人士指出，这正是精心设计的结果。用特朗普似乎乐此不疲的峰会排场来吸引他，可以降低他做出某些可能破坏两国关系举动的风险，比如批准一揽子对台军售方案。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Tellingly, Mr. Trump has avoided criticizing China in the lead-up to the talks, even downplaying <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.wsj.com/world/u-s-links-chinese-satellite-imagery-to-iranian-strike-that-killed-three-troops-ca0b4be3">a Wall Street Journal report</a> that China had supplied Iran with satellite images of a U.S. base in Jordan where three American troops were killed in an Iranian strike.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>颇能说明问题的是，在会谈举行前夕，特朗普一直避免批评中国，甚至淡化处理了<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.wsj.com/world/u-s-links-chinese-satellite-imagery-to-iranian-strike-that-killed-three-troops-ca0b4be3?utm_source=gemini">《华尔街日报》的一篇报道</a>，该报道称，中国曾向伊朗提供美军在约旦一处基地的卫星图像，而三名美军士兵在伊朗对该基地的袭击中丧生。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The summitry will also serve a domestic purpose for Mr. Xi by burnishing his image at home as a global statesman, during a moment of economic anxiety for many Chinese. It is important for Mr. Xi to demonstrate that he can manage Beijing’s most critical bilateral relationship, analysts say.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>这场峰会外交对习近平而言同样具有对内意义：在许多中国民众正为经济前景感到焦虑不安之际，这有助于他在国内塑造自己作为全球政治家的形象。分析人士指出，对习近平来说，展现自己有能力处理北京最重要的双边关系至关重要。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Mr. Trump is expected to greet Mr. Xi personally on the tarmac at Joint Base Andrews in Maryland when his plane lands on Wednesday. The White House will host Mr. Xi and Peng Liyuan, the first lady, for a state dinner, the first such banquet since King Charles III and Queen Camilla visited in April.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>预计特朗普将于周三在马里兰州安德鲁斯联合基地停机坪亲自迎接习近平。白宫将为习近平和第一夫人彭丽媛举行国宴，这是自今年4月国王查尔斯三世和卡米拉王后到访以来举办的首场国宴。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“Xi wants to be seen by the Chinese public as a highly respected, influential and consequential world leader — and nothing can top being wined and dined at the White House,” said Minxin Pei, a professor at Claremont McKenna College who studies Chinese leadership politics.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“习近平希望，在中国民众眼中，自己是一位备受尊敬、极具影响力、举足轻重的世界领导人，而没有什么比在白宫受到盛情款待更能体现这一点了，”研究中国领导层政治的克莱蒙特·麦肯纳学院教授裴敏欣说。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“Xi cannot afford to be distracted by a huge confrontation with the United States,” Mr. Pei said.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“习近平承受不起与美国爆发大规模对抗从而分散精力的代价，”裴敏欣说道。</p></div></div></div></div></div><footer class="author-info"><p>Berry Wang对本文有研究贡献。</p><p><a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/by/david-pierson">David Pierson</a>报道中国外交政策和中国与世界的经济与文化交互。他从事新闻工作已超过20年。</p><p>翻译：纽约时报中文网</p><p><a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/21/world/asia/xi-trump-meeting-china-summit.html">点击查看本文英文版。</a></p></footer>

2026/9/21
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「中英」美国再一次误判中国的毁灭性代价

<figure class="article-span-photo small-span-photo"><img src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/lwuHeHb5VdKihXCYPTUmJQOvxaA9ryLGRofMtlae3Zs/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzIyL211bHRpbWVkaWEvMjIxa2FwbGFuLWdqYnovMjIxa2FwbGFuLWdqYnotanVtYm8uanBn" width="819" height="1024" alt referrerpolicy="no-referrer"><figcaption><span></span> <cite>Photo illustration by Naila Ruechel for The New York Times</cite></figcaption></figure><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Before Iran, before Iraq, before Afghanistan there is no country that America has gotten as wrong as China. If this is mystifying, it is only because historical memories are short. America struggled through the previous fiascos. Getting it wrong again would be catastrophic. This is why it is crucial that President Trump strike the right balance in his summit this week with China’s leader, Xi Jinping.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>在误判伊朗、伊拉克和阿富汗之前，没有哪个国家像中国这样，让美国产生如此严重的误判。如果这令人费解，那仅仅是因为人们的历史记忆太短暂。美国跌跌撞撞地熬过了一次次重大失策。若再次犯错，将是灾难性的。正因为如此，本周在与中国领导人习近平的峰会上，特朗普总统对分寸的拿捏至关重要。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>During World War II, the United States backed China’s Chiang Kai-shek against the Japanese fascists who had invaded in the 1930s. The Roosevelt administration assumed that China under Chiang’s Nationalists would constitute one of the Big Four powers after World War II, along with the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union. When the Chinese Communists under Mao Zedong swept to victory in the 1946-1949 civil war, Washington was shocked that a movement it had barely acknowledged had toppled the beloved Chiang. It was also enraged that the Soviet Union and China were now both in Communist hands. Someone had to be held to account.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>第二次世界大战期间，美国支持中国的蒋介石对抗20世纪30年代入侵的日本法西斯。罗斯福政府设想，由蒋介石的国民党领导的中国将在二战后与美国、英国和苏联并列成为“四大国”之一。当毛泽东领导下的中国共产党在1946至1949年的内战中取得全面胜利时，华盛顿大惊失色——一个它几乎未曾正眼相看的运动竟然推翻了备受推崇的蒋介石。同时，华盛顿也对中苏两国双双落入共产党之手感到愤怒。必须有人为此承担责任。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Thus was born the “who lost China?”<i> </i>debate, a critical element of the Red Scare of the 1950s. The State Department officials held to account were precisely the ones who during World War II had been warning, to no avail, that the Communists were likely to militarily triumph. Rather than being celebrated for their clairvoyance, these officials were denounced as traitors whose weak support for the Nationalists had led to Chiang’s fall. The idea that the State Department could have prevented a Communist takeover across a landscape of 550 million people — 37 times the population of South Vietnam during our war there — gravely misjudged the limits of American power.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“谁弄丢了中国？”的争论由此诞生，并成为20世纪50年代“红色恐慌”的关键组成部分。被追究责任的国务院官员恰恰是那些在二战期间一直警告（尽管徒劳无功）共产党可能在军事上获胜的人。这些官员未能因其先见之明而受到赞赏，反而被斥为叛徒，指责他们对国民党支持不力导致了蒋介石的倒台。这种认为国务院本可以在一片5.5亿人口的广袤土地上阻止共产党夺取政权的想法是对美国实力的严重误判。5.5亿人是越南战争期间南越人口的37倍。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The Foreign Service officers themselves weren’t innocent. Though accurate about Mao’s chances, they misunderstood the nature of his rule. They conceived of Mao’s Communists as benign compared with Chiang’s Nationalists. Based in the Nationalist wartime capital of Chongqing, they knew intimately Chiang’s authoritarian tendencies. They made only short visits to the Communist base camp in Yan’an, visits that were stage-managed by Mao and his propagandist Zhou Enlai. Impressed by the order and discipline of Yan’an, they were blind to Mao’s totalitarianism, which would eventually result in the murder and starvation of as many as 70 million Chinese.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>外交人员本身也并非毫无过错。虽然准确判断了毛泽东获胜的几率，但他们误解了其统治的本质。他们认为，相比蒋介石的国民党，毛泽东的共产党并无威胁。由于驻扎在国民党的战时首都重庆，他们对蒋介石的独裁倾向了如指掌。而他们对共产党的延安大本营仅仅进行了短暂访问，这些访问还是由毛泽东及其宣传家周恩来精心安排的。延安的秩序与纪律给他们留下了深刻印象，却让他们对毛泽东的极权主义视而不见，而这种极权主义最终导致了多达7000万中国人遭受杀戮与饥荒。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The 1950s purge of State Department specialists actually lasted into the 1960s. The Vietnam War was encouraged by Europeanists and generalists because the China hands who would have warned against the dangers of guerrilla war in Asia, and who would have noted that Vietnam had never been a puppet of Communist China, were no longer in key positions in government. There is a direct historical link, through China, from the Red Scare of the early 1950s to the fiasco in Vietnam in the middle and late 1960s.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>20世纪50年代对国务院专家的清洗实际上一直延续到了60年代。越南战争受到了欧洲事务专家和通才们的鼓动，因为“中国通”们已不再担任政府要职，他们本会警告在亚洲陷入游击战的危险，并会指出越南从来不是共产主义中国傀儡。从20世纪50年代初的红色恐慌到60年代中后期的越南惨败，其间存在着一条因中国而相连的直接历史脉络。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The diplomatic opening to China accomplished by President Richard Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, in 1972 finally ended the Who Lost China<i> </i>debate. China was no longer lost and had instead become a geopolitical chess piece to be played against the Soviet Union. Nixon’s and Kissinger’s conception held until 1989, when the combination of China’s brutal crackdown at Tiananmen Square and the end of the Cold War meant that China was now both reviled, and, with the demise of Communism in Europe, less of an asset.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>理查德·尼克松总统及其国家安全顾问亨利·基辛格在1972年实现的对华外交破冰终结了“谁弄丢了中国”的争论。中国不再是被“弄丢的”，而是变成了地缘政治棋盘上用来制衡苏联的一枚棋子。尼克松和基辛格的这一构想一直维持到1989年，当时中国在天安门广场的残酷镇压与冷战结束的双重因素意味着，中国不仅遭到唾弃，而且随着欧洲共产主义的终结，其作为一项资产的价值也大打折扣。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>It was China’s economic and technological flourishing, particularly in the 1990s, that required the United States to treat the country as a great power. So dynamic were Jiang Zemin and his deputy Zhu Rongji that both Democrats and Republicans assumed that if China were admitted to the World Trade Organization, the country would be on a path toward a capitalistic and liberal society. President Bill Clinton held this view — and he was far from alone.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>而使美国必须将中国作为大国来对待的是中国的经济与技术繁荣，尤其是在20世纪90年代。江泽民和他的副手朱镕基展现出了极大魄力，以至于民主党和共和党都认为，如果允许中国加入世界贸易组织(WTO)，它将走上一条通往资本主义和自由社会的道路。比尔·克林顿总统持有这种观点——但绝非只有他一人。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>That was Washington’s third misjudgment. The Washington establishment — the wind at its back following the triumphalist end to the Cold War — assumed China would follow Europe’s path toward freedom. Alas, China was not Europe. Admitted to the W.T.O., China would eventually turn back toward full-bore authoritarianism under Xi Jinping.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>这是华盛顿的第三次误判。乘着冷战胜利之势，华盛顿建制派理所当然地认为中国会效仿欧洲走向自由之路。遗憾的是，中国不是欧洲。被接纳加入世贸组织后，中国最终在习近平治下重新转向了全面的威权主义。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Each of these mistakes has particular causes. They are also connected by China’s size, complexity and outright cultural difference. Only recently, thanks to pathbreaking scholarship by the Hoover Institution academic Frank Dikötter, have we learned the full story of just how much Stalin was aiding Mao during the civil war, making a Nationalist victory even more remote. Analysis of China, unlike that of the Middle East, is not distorted by intense partisanship, but even for an emotionally detached expert class, China is genuinely hard for the United States to fathom.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>这些错误中的每一个都有其具体原因。它们也因中国的规模、复杂性以及彻底的文化差异而交织在一起。直到最近，依靠胡佛研究所学者冯客(Frank Dikötter)开创性的学术研究，我们才充分了解到斯大林在内战期间为毛泽东提供了多少援助，这使得国民党获胜的希望更加渺茫。与对中东的分析不同，对中国的分析并未被强烈的党派偏见所扭曲，但即使对于一个情感抽离的专家阶层来说，中国对美国而言也确实难以看透。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>What stabilizes the bilateral relationship has been the deliberately vague understanding concerning Taiwan that emerged from Nixon’s visit, known as the Shanghai Communiqué. That formula signaled that there was only one China and its capital is Beijing, but that neither party would attempt violently to change the status quo on Taiwan.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>双方关系的稳定一直靠的是尼克松访华后达成的一项关于台湾的刻意模糊的谅解，即《上海公报》。该方案明确世界上只有一个中国，其首都在北京，但任何一方都不会试图通过暴力改变台湾的现状。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>For the first time since 1972, the Shanghai Communiqué may be in particularly serious danger. There have been slip-ups, as when President Joe Biden declared he would defend Taiwan, thus abandoning the Nixon formula of ambiguity. But generally presidents exercised rhetorical restraint.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>自1972年以来，《上海公报》可能首次处于极其严重的危险之中。尽管曾经出现过失误，比如乔·拜登总统曾宣布他将保卫台湾，从而放弃了尼克松的模糊方案。但总体而言，历任总统在言辞上都保持了克制。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>That is no longer the case in the Trump administration, with the president’s stated position on Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific forever volatile. As for China, it is no longer governed by a mandarinate of enlightened Communist leaders, but by Mr. Xi, a Leninist totalitarian with openly aggressive designs on Taiwan. The guideposts are wobbling. Despite the happy talk at summits, we are back to the Who Lost China era<i>, </i>when fundamental mistakes are possible, this time with incalculable consequences. In addition, because neither China nor the United States seems interested in cooperating to regulate A.I., competition over the technology is poised to further destabilize the relationship.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>特朗普政府时期情况已不再如此，总统在台湾和亚太问题上的公开立场总是变幻莫测。至于中国，它不再由开明的共产主义领导人组成的官僚阶层统治，而是由习近平这个对台湾抱有公开侵略意图的列宁主义极权统治者来统治。规则的路标正在动摇。尽管峰会上充满了乐观言辞，我们却又回到了“谁弄丢了中国”的时代，在这个时代可能犯下根本性错误，而这一次将带来无法估量的后果。此外，由于中美两国似乎都无意合作监管人工智能，围绕该技术的竞争势必将进一步破坏两国关系的稳定。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The ultimate geopolitical catastrophe would be a military conflict over Taiwan and the South China Sea. Avoiding such a conflict is not merely a matter of reducing military tensions. As the Yale Sinologist Odd Arne Westad points out, it was Germany’s assumption that Britain might not come to the aid of its allies in 1914 that helped set off World War I. If China assumes the United States might not come to the aid of Taiwan, that might likewise increase the chances of war.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>终极的地缘政治灾难将是围绕台湾和南海爆发军事冲突。避免这种冲突不仅仅是缓解军事紧张局势的问题。正如耶鲁大学汉学家文安立(Odd Arne Westad)所指出的，正是德国在1914年认为英国可能不会援助其盟友的假设助推了第一次世界大战的爆发。如果中国假设美国可能不会援助台湾，那同样可能增加战争的几率。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Wars in Ukraine, Gaza and Iran have led to severe differences of opinion among both the public and the elites, but have not fundamentally changed our lives. A high-end military conflict in the Western Pacific fought between the world’s largest economies would disrupt the most vital supply chains and change our world profoundly. The comparison with World War I is not an exaggeration.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>乌克兰、加沙和伊朗的战争导致公众与精英之间产生了严重分歧，但并未从根本上改变我们的生活。如果世界两大经济体在西太平洋爆发高烈度军事冲突，将破坏最至关重要的供应链，并深刻地改变我们的世界。将其与第一次世界大战相提并论毫不夸张。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Who Lost China<i> </i>was born of an obsession and a misunderstanding. In the late 1940s, the obsession was with Communism, which replaced German Nazism and Japanese fascism as America’s principal enemy the moment World War II ended. Then, the United States thought it had the power to save Chiang’s weakened regime in a war fought over thousands of miles of territory.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“谁弄丢了中国”的争论源于一种痴迷和误解。在20世纪40年代末，这种痴迷是针对共产主义的，从二战结束那一刻起，共产主义便取代了德国纳粹主义和日本法西斯主义成为美国的主要敌人。当时，美国认为自己有能力在一场跨越数千公里领土的战争中拯救蒋介石被削弱的政权。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The obsession today is again with Communism, in the shape of China overtaking the United States as the world’s greatest military, economic and artificial intelligence power. The misunderstanding is that a softer, less resolute approach to defending Taiwan and our other Asian allies can somehow prevent a war. In reality, such an approach might embolden China to attack the island, leaving the United States in a hair-trigger crisis over the fate of the entire Pacific.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>今天的痴迷再次针对共产主义，表现为担忧中国超越美国，成为世界上最强大的军事、经济和人工智能强国。<span>一种误解认为，在保卫台湾和其他亚洲盟友方面采取较为温和、不那么强硬的策略就能避免战争。</span>在现实中，这种做法可能会助长中国攻击台湾的信心，使美国陷入一场一触即发的、关乎整个太平洋命运的危机。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The most important element in preventing a great war is policy discipline. Boring but true, this leads to steady, predictable signaling. America should not want to confuse China, just as China should not want to confuse us. World War I was in part caused by a misreading of intentions. Mr. Trump, by his vacillation — including using military aid to Taiwan as a bargaining chip with China and toying with the abandonment of Asia to a Chinese sphere of influence — irresponsibly encourages the kind of confusion that can lead to war.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>预防大国战争最重要的因素是政策纪律性。这听起来枯燥却是事实，它能带来稳定且可预测的信号传递。美国不应试图去迷惑中国，正如中国也不应试图去迷惑我们一样。第一次世界大战的部分原因就是对意图的误判。特朗普通过他的摇摆不定——包括将对台湾的军事援助作为与中国讨价还价的筹码，以及戏谑般地考虑将亚洲让给中国的势力范围——不负责任地助长了那种可能引发战争的困惑。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The historian Barbara Tuchman followed her classic book about the outbreak of World War I in 1966 with “The Proud Tower<i>,” </i>about the glittering, cosmopolitan world of 19th-century Europe, and how its texture and brilliance and naïveté were lost because of the Great War. The theme Tuchman chose for her book was taken from an 1845 Edgar Allan Poe poem: “While from a proud tower in the town/Death looks gigantically down.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>历史学家芭芭拉·塔奇曼在1966年出版了关于一战爆发的经典著作后，又创作了《高塔》(The Proud Tower)。这本书讲述了19世纪那个光辉灿烂、心系天下的欧洲，以及它的肌理、辉煌和天真是如何因那场“大战”而丧失的。塔奇曼为她的书选择的主题取自埃德加·爱伦·坡1845年的一首诗：“而在城中的一座高塔之上，死神正巍然地朝下眺望。”</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>No geopolitical conflict in the world today has the capacity, if miscalculated, of bringing ruin upon us all like the one between the United States and China. China tore through our domestic politics three-quarters of a century ago. It could be worse this time.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>当今世界上，没有任何地缘政治冲突像美中之间的冲突这样，一旦出现误判，将给我们所有人带来毁灭。四分之三个世纪前，中国撕裂了我们的国内政治。这一次情况可能会更糟。</p></div></div></div></div></div><footer class="author-info"><p>Robert D. Kaplan是《中国耳语者：塑造美国对其主要地缘政治对手看法的声音》(“China Whisperers: The Voices That Have Shaped America’s Views of Its Chief Geopolitical Rival”)一书的作者，也是德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校的杰出高级讲师。</p><p>翻译：纽约时报中文网</p><p><a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/21/opinion/america-china-war.html">点击查看本文英文版。</a></p></footer>

2026/9/21
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「中英」习近平以强势姿态访美，特朗普该与他讨论什么？

<figure class="article-span-photo small-span-photo"><img src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/fsnFLkkEKOuV9viIzUoafTdu95QnL3Xip9wbyFFRljo/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzE5L29waW5pb24vMTlrcmlzdG9mLzE5a3Jpc3RvZi1qdW1iby12My5qcGc" width="820" height="1024" alt referrerpolicy="no-referrer"><figcaption><span></span> <cite>Photo illustration by The New York Times</cite></figcaption></figure><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>President Xi Jinping of China is throwing his weight around as he prepares to arrive in Washington.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>中国国家主席习近平在准备抵达华盛顿之际，正在展示其影响力。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>When Chinese and American leaders gathered for summits in the past, it was the American president who held the cards. Not so this time. What’s sobering about Xi’s visit to the United States in the coming days — and a reflection of the way President Trump has diminished America — is that this may be the first China-U.S. summit in which China appears in the lead role.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>过去中美领导人举行峰会时，掌握主动权的往往是美国总统。但这次情况不同。引人注目的是，习近平在未来几天对美国的访问可能成为首次由中国主导的中美峰会，这也反映了美国的地位如何在特朗普总统治下被削弱。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“In the past, American leaders generally drove the relationship, but now Xi is in the driver’s seat,” Julian Gewirtz, a China scholar at Columbia University who served in the Biden White House, told me. “Trump sees Xi as a peer and China as a superpower and is generally quite deferential to him.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“过去通常是美国领导人主导这种关系，但现在习近平掌握了主动权，”曾在拜登政府白宫任职的哥伦比亚大学中国问题学者朱利安·格维尔茨告诉我。“特朗普将习近平视为同等的人物，将中国视为超级大国，且通常对他相当顺从。”</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>For his part, Xi has demonstrated his strength by almost thumbing his nose at the United States.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>就习近平而言，他通过对美国近乎轻蔑的态度展示了自己的实力。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Trump <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/may/16/trump-not-optimistic-jimmy-lai-release-xi-jinping">said</a> he asked Xi in May, at their last meeting, to free Jimmy Lai, a media mogul who is among the most courageous advocates for democracy. Xi spurned the request. Instead, a Hong Kong court this month <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.wsj.com/opinion/xi-jinping-donald-trump-summit-democracy-advocates-hong-kong-a003bb15">sentenced</a> three other dissidents to harsh prison sentences, and one of the most famous of Hong Kong’s democracy campaigners, Joshua Wong, 29, is facing <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2zmzg0408o">up to a life sentence</a> for supposed crimes.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p><span>特朗普<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/may/16/trump-not-optimistic-jimmy-lai-release-xi-jinping">表示</a>，在今年5月两人最后一次会面时，他曾要求习近平释放传媒大亨</span>、最勇敢的民主倡导者之一黎智英。习近平拒绝了。相反，一家香港法院本月将另外<span>三名持不同政见者<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.wsj.com/opinion/xi-jinping-donald-trump-summit-democracy-advocates-hong-kong-a003bb15">判处</a>重刑，而香港最著名的民主活动人士之一、29岁的黄之锋正因</span>一些所谓的<span>罪名面临<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2zmzg0408o">最高终身监禁</a></span>的刑罚。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>China, whose per capita income of more than $14,000 came within a whisker in July of achieving “high-income” status at the World Bank, also appears to be <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/17/world/asia/north-korea-exploitation-kim.html">brazenly violating sanctions</a> on North Korea this year. It buys Iranian oil and reportedly <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.uscc.gov/research/enabling-iran-timeline-chinas-role-during-and-after-operation-epic-fury">supports Iran’s war effort</a>. And despite having officially suspended strict export controls on rare-earth elements, it has <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/06/22/china-takes-aim-us-rare-earth-companies-with-new-export-controls/">continued</a> to <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.csis.org/events/china-continues-exploit-rare-earth-chokepoints">exert control</a> over them in ways that create problems for Western companies.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>中国今年7月人均收入超过1.4万美元，距离世界银行的“高收入”标准仅一步之遥，然而同样是这个国家，今年似乎也在<a href="https://cn.nytimes.com/opinion/20260917/us-china-ai-safety-talks/">公然违反</a>针对朝鲜的制裁。中国购买伊朗石油，并据报道<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.uscc.gov/research/enabling-iran-timeline-chinas-role-during-and-after-operation-epic-fury">支持伊朗的战争行动</a>。此外，尽管已正式暂停对稀土元素的严格出口管制，中国仍<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/06/22/china-takes-aim-us-rare-earth-companies-with-new-export-controls/">继续</a>以给西方企业制造麻烦的方式对其<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.csis.org/events/china-continues-exploit-rare-earth-chokepoints" title="Link: https://www.csis.org/events/china-continues-exploit-rare-earth-chokepoints">施加控制</a>。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Asked about reports that Chinese organizations supplied intelligence that Iran used in an attack in July that killed three American soldiers, Trump was strikingly reticent. He seemed to <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trump-dismisses-report-china-entities-helped-iran-before-attack-that-killed-us-2026-09-14/">downplay any suggestion</a> that China had done something wrong.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p><span>有报道称，中国机构提供的某些情报被伊朗用于7月份的一场袭击，该袭击导致三名美国士兵丧生。当被问及此事时，特朗普显得异常沉默。他似乎在<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trump-dismisses-report-china-entities-helped-iran-before-attack-that-killed-us-2026-09-14/">淡化任何关于</a>中国存在过错的暗示。</span></p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Xi has leverage in the relationship partly because the <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.globalsources.com/sourcing-digest/china-s-upcoming-rare-earth-export-controls-could-reshape-global-supply-chains/">suspension of those export controls expires</a> in November. If no deal is reached with Trump, then Beijing could <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.fastmarkets.com/insights/chinas-looming-november-export-controls-test-rare-earth-refining-recycling-ambitions/">further tighten</a> access to rare earths that are vital for manufacturing everything from cars to submarines.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p><span>习近平在双边关系中拥有筹码，部分原因是<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.globalsources.com/sourcing-digest/china-s-upcoming-rare-earth-export-controls-could-reshape-global-supply-chains/">这些出口管制的暂停</a>将于11月到期。如果未能与特朗普达成协议，北京可能会<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.fastmarkets.com/insights/chinas-looming-november-export-controls-test-rare-earth-refining-recycling-ambitions/" title="Link: https://www.fastmarkets.com/insights/chinas-looming-november-export-controls-test-rare-earth-refining-recycling-ambitions/">进一步收紧</a>稀土供应，而稀土对于制造从汽车到潜艇的所有产品都至关重要。</span></p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The United States is weakened in part because Trump started a trade war with China last year, which he then effectively lost when China weaponized its control over rare earths. In addition, America’s war with Iran has depleted weapons stockpiles, reducing our ability to defend Taiwan or project power in the Pacific or the Middle East. We have antagonized allies and backtracked on democracy and freedom, and according to U.N. investigators, we may have <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-mission-finds-grounds-believe-us-committed-war-crimes-iran-tehran-crimes-2026-09-17/">committed war crimes</a> in Iran — and all of this has tarnished our global image and reduced our influence and soft power worldwide.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>美国的实力有所削弱，部分原因是特朗普去年挑起了对华贸易战，但随后在中国将稀土控制武器化时，他实际上输掉了这场战争。此外，与伊朗的战争耗尽了美国的<span>武器库存，降低了我们保卫台湾或在太平洋及中东地区投射力量的能力。我们惹恼了盟友，在民主和自由问题上出现倒退，而且根据联合国调查人员的说法，我们可能在伊朗<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-mission-finds-grounds-believe-us-committed-war-crimes-iran-tehran-crimes-2026-09-17/">犯下了战争罪</a>——这一切都玷污了我们的全球形象，削弱了我们在全球的影响力和软实力。</span></p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Trump is seen in much of the world as reckless and unpredictable, while Xi has tried to project an image of stability and maturity, soothing global oil markets that had been inflamed by Trump’s war on Iran. A new poll from the Rockefeller Foundation <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Seeking-Security-and-Opportunity-in-a-Stormy-World-34-Country-Survey-Report-Final.pdf">finds</a> that Canadians, Indonesians, Brazilians, Turks, Mexicans and others all see the United States as more of a “major threat” than either Russia or China.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p><span>在世界大部分地区，特朗普被视为行事鲁莽且不可预测，而习近平则试图展现出稳定成熟的形象，安抚了因特朗普对伊战争而动荡不安的全球石油市场。洛克菲勒基金会的一项最新民意调查<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Seeking-Security-and-Opportunity-in-a-Stormy-World-34-Country-Survey-Report-Final.pdf">发现</a>，加拿大人、印度尼西亚人、巴西人、土耳其人、墨西哥人等</span>等均认为美国构成的“主要威胁”超过了俄罗斯或中国。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“The U.S. is in retreat,” Phillips P. O’Brien, an American historian, <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://phillipspobrien.substack.com/p/midweek-update-28-the-end-of-the">wrote</a> this month. “It is watching bases of great strategic importance get destroyed and cannot protect them, it is abandoning allies that heretofore it considered of the highest priority, and it is making it clear that it cannot look after its own interests in some of the most important places of the world.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“美国正在后退<span>，”美国历史学家菲利普斯·P·奥布莱恩本月<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://phillipspobrien.substack.com/p/midweek-update-28-the-end-of-the">写道</a>。“它眼睁睁看着具有重大战略意义的基地被摧毁却无力保护，它正在抛弃</span>一直以来被其视为最优先的盟友，而且它正在表明，自己无法在世界上一些最重要的地方维护自身利益。”</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>O’Brien adds that “this is clearly the end of the American age” — but I’m not so sure about that. The United States still has strengths, not least its tech sector, while China, Europe and Japan all have significant weaknesses of their own, including demographic and economic challenges. Despite its propaganda, China remains an oppressive regime with no clear successor after Xi, while there is some prospect that American democracy will show its resilience in November’s elections.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>奥布莱恩还说“这显然是美国时代的终结”——但我对此并不完全确信。美国依然拥有优势，尤其是其科技领域，而中国、欧洲和日本也都面临着自身显著的弱点，包括人口和经济挑战。尽管有其宣传，中国仍是一个在习近平之后缺乏明确继任者的专制政权，而美国的民主则有望在11月的选举中展现其韧性。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>If it is humbling to have Xi arrive in a position of strength, at least there may be an opportunity ahead. Both Xi and Trump seem to want to lower the temperature and stabilize the relationship, which would be a good thing.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>如果习近平以强势姿态到访令人感到难堪，那么至少前方可能还存在着机遇。习近平和特朗普似乎都有意为局势降温并稳定双边关系，这将是一件好事。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>I hope that might also leave an opening for a sliver of progress on artificial intelligence, one of the most important topics the two leaders will discuss. It’s difficult to see how the world can make much progress on improving A.I. governance if America and China resist cooperation on safety.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>我希望这也能为人工智能领域的一丝进展创造契机，这是两位领导人将要讨论的最重要议题之一。如果美中两国拒绝在安全问题上开展合作，很难想象世界能在改善人工智能治理方面取得多大进展。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>A major deal on safety is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/16/opinion/us-china-ai-safety-talks.html">very unlikely</a>, for Trump has called A.I. concerns “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/14/technology/trump-ai-safety-jensen-huang.html">a hoax</a>,” while Xi apparently thinks the problem is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/14/world/asia/china-ai-security-risks-anthropic.html">potential American abuse</a> of the technology to target the Chinese regime, rather than A.I. itself. In China, A.I. is <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-09-17/china-and-america-ai-arms-race-proceeds-despite-warnings/107160610">portrayed</a> as a threat not to human existence but to Communist Party rule.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p><span>双方达成一项关于安全的重大协议<a href="https://cn.nytimes.com/asia-pacific/20260918/north-korea-exploitation-kim/">可能性微乎其微</a>，因为特朗普已将对人工智能的担忧称为“<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/14/technology/trump-ai-safety-jensen-huang.html">一场骗局</a>”，而习近平显然认为问题在于美国可能<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/14/world/asia/china-ai-security-risks-anthropic.html">滥用</a>该技术来针对中国政权，而非人工智能本身。在中国，人工智能被<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-09-17/china-and-america-ai-arms-race-proceeds-despite-warnings/107160610">描绘</a>为对共产党的统治构成威胁，而非对人类生存构成威胁。</span></p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Still, perhaps there is space for a modest cooperative step forward. Rajiv Shah, the president of the Rockefeller Foundation, which is working on A.I. issues, told me that there may be an opportunity for progress on A.I. safety as it relates to specific, narrow domains such as reducing the risk of terrorist attacks using bioweapons.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>尽管如此，或许双方仍有空间迈出适度的合作步伐。致力于研究人工智能相关议题的洛克菲勒基金会主席拉吉夫·沙阿告诉我，在涉及特定狭窄领域的人工智能安全问题上，可能存在取得进展的机会，例如降低利用生物武器发动恐怖袭击的风险。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>That’s a real concern as synthetic biology and A.I. together create new perils: Imagine terrorists assembling a deadly virus, or engineering an animal ailment like cowpox or <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.science.org/content/article/how-canadian-researchers-reconstituted-extinct-poxvirus-100000-using-mail-order-dna">horse pox</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/27/opinion/ai-advances-risks.html">to be deadly and virulent</a> like smallpox. It should be possible for China and America, working through both governments and unofficial channels, to collaborate on protocols to reduce risks like that.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p><span>这是一个切实的担忧，因为合成生物学与人工智能的结合带来了新的危险：想象一下恐怖分子合成一种致命病毒，或者将牛痘或<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.science.org/content/article/how-canadian-researchers-reconstituted-extinct-poxvirus-100000-using-mail-order-dna">马痘</a>等动物疾病改造成像天花一样<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/27/opinion/ai-advances-risks.html" title="Link: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/27/opinion/ai-advances-risks.html">致命且极具传染性</a>。中美两国应当可以通过政府和非官方渠道在降低此类风险的协议上展开合作。</span></p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>That would at least be a major sign that A.I. safety cooperation is possible. “Doing one thing, even if it feels like it’s not solving the whole problem, at least creates a repeatable playbook,” Shah said.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>这至少将成为人工智能安全合作具备可行性的一个重大标志。“做成一件事，即使感觉它无法解决所有问题，至少也创造了一个可复制的模式，”沙阿说。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>China and the United States should also create some kind of hotline to discuss and defuse A.I.-related incidents that threaten to create military or diplomatic crises. After all, what if Open A.I. agents had <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/03/technology/openai-hugging-face-hacking.html">hacked not Hugging Face</a> but rather units of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army? Or generated deepfake video of Xi renouncing claims over Taiwan?</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p><span>中美两国还应建立某种热线，以讨论并化解可能引发军事或外交危机的人工智能相关事件。毕竟，如果OpenAI智能体<a href="https://cn.nytimes.com/technology/20260904/openai-hugging-face-hacking/">黑入的不是Hugging Face</a>，而是中国人民解放军的部队呢？又或者生成了习近平宣布放弃台湾主权主张的深度伪造视频呢？</span></p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Right now, at a time when America has blown up the geopolitical order that we ourselves created after World War II, modest steps may be the best we can hope for.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>眼下，在美国破坏了自己在二战后建立的地缘政治秩序之际，采取适度步骤或许是我们所能期盼的最好结果。</p></div></div></div></div></div><footer class="author-info"><span><p>纪思道(Nicholas Kristof) 2001起成为时报专栏作家，曾两次获得普利策奖。他最新出版的回忆录名为《追逐希望：一名记者的报道生涯》(“<a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/720814/chasing-hope-by-nicholas-d-kristof/">Chasing Hope: A Reporter’s Life</a>”)。欢迎在X上关注他：<a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/NickKristof">@NickKristof</a>。</p><p>翻译：纽约时报中文网</p><div data-poster="" class=""><div data-poster="" class=""><a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/19/opinion/trump-china-ai.html">点击查看本文英文版。</a></div></div></span></footer>

2026/9/21
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「中英」白宫内部关于人工智能威胁的复杂辩论

<figure class="article-span-photo"><img src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/q5AM0gDahijKQn0GL1fSwIrgM0JPudc6HjnWRe2KFbs/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzE3L211bHRpbWVkaWEvMTdkYy10cnVtcC1haS1nZnB3LzE3ZGMtdHJ1bXAtYWktZ2Zwdy1tYXN0ZXIxMDUwLmpwZw" width="1050" height="700" alt="去年，特朗普总统在白宫与戴维·萨克斯和马克·扎克伯格共进晚餐。" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"><figcaption><span>去年，特朗普总统在白宫与戴维·萨克斯和马克·扎克伯格共进晚餐。</span> <cite>Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times</cite></figcaption></figure><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>President Trump made clear in the past week that he views fears that A.I. could lead to mass extinction as a “HOAX,” and that he sees opponents of data centers as people who “want to end up being backwards and poor.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>特朗普总统在过去一周明确表示，他认为有关人工智能可能导致大规模人类灭绝的担忧是“骗局”，并将反对建设数据中心的人视为“想要最终变得落后贫穷”的人。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>People who have discussed the subject with Mr. Trump in private say his outbursts are rooted in worries that if the artificial intelligence boom fueling the American economy slows down, the market could crash and recession could quickly follow.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>私下里曾与特朗普讨论过这个话题的人说，他这些言论的根源在于担心，如果推动美国经济的人工智能热潮放缓，市场可能会崩盘，经济衰退可能会很快接踵而至。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>His anti-regulatory, anti-slowdown outbursts have been encouraged by a slice of Silicon Valley’s most influential voices. Chief among them has been David Sacks, the venture capitalist who interceded to weaken an executive order in May that would have required safety reviews of new A.I. models. Mark Zuckerberg of Meta and Jensen Huang of Nvidia have also spoken to the president. All have advised Mr. Trump that the bigger risk is being overtaken by Chinese competitors.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>硅谷部分最具影响力的声音一直在助长他这些反对监管、反放缓的言论。其中首要的是风险投资家戴维·萨克斯，他曾出面斡旋，削弱了5月一项原本要求对新人工智能模型进行安全审查的行政命令。Meta的马克·扎克伯格和英伟达的黄仁勋也曾与总统交谈。他们都向特朗普建议，更大的风险是被中国竞争对手超越。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>But inside the administration, the debate is far more complex, and there are other voices in Mr. Trump’s ear, urging caution.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>但在政府内部，讨论要复杂得多，特朗普耳边还有其他声音在敦促他保持谨慎。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The more cautious tone inside the White House reflects a growing concern that despite the strategic challenge posed by China, a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/03/technology/openai-hugging-face-hacking.html">summer</a> of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/10/us/politics/anthropic-ai-biological-weapons.html">A.I.</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/12/technology/doomsday-discussions-ai-companies.html">surprises</a> has raised the prospect of risks that were often dismissed a year ago as the wild talk of “doomers.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>白宫内部更加谨慎的基调反映出一种日益增长的担忧：尽管中国构成了战略挑战，但今年<a href="https://cn.nytimes.com/technology/20260904/openai-hugging-face-hacking/">夏天</a>以来<a href="https://cn.nytimes.com/technology/20260911/anthropic-ai-biological-weapons/">人工智能</a>带来的一系列<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/12/technology/doomsday-discussions-ai-companies.html">意外事件</a>增加了风险发生的可能性，而就在一年前，这些风险还经常被当作“末日论者”的疯言疯语而被置之不理。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Now, even the biggest A.I. boosters in the administration concede that A.I.-fueled hacks into infrastructure, biological threats, attacks on nuclear command-and-control systems, job losses and global financial instability seem more possible than they did before A.I. agents <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/17/science/ai-alignment-misalignment.html">went rogue</a>.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>现在，即使是政府内部最为热衷于人工智能的人也承认，与人工智能智能体<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/17/science/ai-alignment-misalignment.html">失控</a>之前相比，由人工智能驱动的针对基础设施的黑客攻击、生物威胁、针对核指挥和控制系统的攻击、失业以及全球金融动荡现在看来都更有可能发生。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The issue of A.I. safety is expected to come to a head this weekend as Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent meets in New York with his Chinese counterpart to set the agenda for Mr. Trump’s visit in Washington with President Xi Jinping of China, which starts on Wednesday. Mr. Bessent is trying to negotiate some kind of agreement between Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi that would suggest the two countries are working together on mutual A.I. safety concerns.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>预计人工智能安全问题将在周末成为焦点，届时财政部长贝森特将在纽约会见中国同级官员，为特朗普在华盛顿与中国国家主席习近平从周三开始的会晤设定议程。贝森特正试图在特朗普和习近平之间谈判达成某种协议，表明两国正在就共同的人工智能安全担忧开展合作。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>But already, officials say, some of the most expansive ideas being discussed among A.I. safety experts, including an agreement on safety standards and reviews of forthcoming Chinese and American A.I. models before their public release, are unlikely to be part of any initial accord.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>但官员们表示，人工智能安全专家正在讨论的一些最宏大的构想——包括就安全标准达成协议，以及在中美两国即将推出的人工智能模型公开发布前对其进行审查——目前看来已不太可能被纳入任何初步协议。</p></div></div></div><figure class="article-inline-photo"><div class="img-box"><img src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/OwOZNz7QjCjjwAl4m2rBesmpkA7vDR3ltO3N_Wz_A5I/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzE3L211bHRpbWVkaWEvMTdkYy10cnVtcC1haS1ndHdjLzE3ZGMtdHJ1bXAtYWktZ3R3Yy1qdW1iby5qcGc" alt="本周，财政部长斯科特·贝森特在国会大厦。今年，多家银行的高管曾向贝森特警示人工智能对全球金融体系构成的风险。" data-src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/OwOZNz7QjCjjwAl4m2rBesmpkA7vDR3ltO3N_Wz_A5I/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzE3L211bHRpbWVkaWEvMTdkYy10cnVtcC1haS1ndHdjLzE3ZGMtdHJ1bXAtYWktZ3R3Yy1qdW1iby5qcGc" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></div><figcaption><span>本周，财政部长斯科特·贝森特在国会大厦。今年，多家银行的高管曾向贝森特警示人工智能对全球金融体系构成的风险。</span> <cite>Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times</cite></figcaption></figure><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>One diplomat involved in the effort said he believed “the best we can hope for” is the creation of some kind of U.S.-China working group that might build on a Biden-era agreement with China to bar the use of artificial intelligence in decisions about the employment of nuclear weapons. But that does not begin to get at the complexity of the problem of unpredictable A.I.-driven agents, which took the industry and the government by surprise this summer.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>一位参与此项工作的外交官表示，他认为“我们所能期盼的最好结果”是成立某种形式的美中工作组，该工作组可能会建立在拜登时代与中国达成的一项协议的基础之上，该协议禁止在核武器使用决策中运用人工智能。但这根本无法触及不可预测的人工智能智能体这一问题的复杂性，今年夏天，这个问题让业界和政府都措手不及。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Nor does it get to the fundamental issues surrounding imposing safeguards on frontier models. The United States could go its own way and impose mandatory reviews of the safety of new, American-generated models, but Mr. Trump and his aides believe that would effectively drive the global market to Chinese largely open-source alternatives. And because those open-source models can be modified by users — who could remove the “guardrails” meant to limit their powers — a safety review may mean little.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>这项协议也没有触及对前沿模型实施安全保障措施的根本问题。美国可以单独行动，强制对美国生成的新模型进行安全审查，但特朗普及其助手认为，这将在实际上把全球市场推向主要基于开源技术的中国替代品。而且，由于这些开源模型可以被用户自行修改——用户可以移除旨在限制其能力的“护栏”——安全审查可能意义不大。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Mr. Trump wants to meet with the A.I. executives next week, according to company representatives. (A White House official said on Thursday that nothing was on the schedule as of now.)</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>据企业代表称，特朗普希望下周会见人工智能高管。（一位白宫官员周四表示，目前日程上尚无相关安排。）</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>If that session happens, it would presumably include some of the A.I. executives who, in recent days, have been calling for the kind of slowdown in the release of new models that Mr. Trump says he opposes.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>如果这次会议如期举行，一些人工智能高管很可能参加，他们近日来一直在呼吁放缓新模型的发布，而特朗普表示他反对这种做法。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Few expect Dario Amodei, a founder of Anthropic, to be among the invitees: His company’s products have been <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/27/us/politics/anthropic-military-ai.html">banned by the Pentagon</a>, and he appeared to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/14/us/politics/trump-ai-regulation-anthropic-dario-amodei.html">anger Mr. Trump</a> by proposing last weekend a detailed plan for the industry to pace itself and bring in independent safety inspectors. Mr. Trump dismissed him, and denounced an unnamed class of “Conspiracy Theorists, Treasonists, Traitors and Leakers” who were politicizing the debate over A.I. and undercutting American leadership.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>几乎没有人预计Anthropic的创始人达里奥·阿莫迪会在受邀之列：他公司的产品已<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/27/us/politics/anthropic-military-ai.html">被五角大楼禁用</a>，而且他在上周末提出了一项详细计划，要求该行业控制发展步伐，并引入独立的安全检查员，这似乎<a href="https://cn.nytimes.com/usa/20260915/trump-ai-regulation-anthropic-dario-amodei/">激怒了特朗普</a>。特朗普对他不屑一顾，并且不点名地谴责了一批“阴谋论者、叛国者、卖国贼和泄密者”，称他们将人工智能的辩论政治化，并削弱美国的领导地位。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>But another Anthropic founder, Tom Brown, who raises less ire in the White House, talks to officials regularly. In recent days, Mr. Trump has also talked with Sam Altman of OpenAI and Elon Musk of SpaceX, both of whom endorsed Mr. Amodei’s plan to slow down, test new models for vulnerabilities and let in outside inspectors, at least in general terms.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>但Anthropic的另一位创始人汤姆·布朗在白宫引起的愤怒较少，他经常与官员沟通。最近几天，特朗普还与OpenAI的萨姆·奥特曼和SpaceX的埃隆·马斯克进行了交谈，这两人至少大体上都支持阿莫迪的计划：放缓步伐、测试新模型的漏洞并允许外部检查员介入。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Mr. Bessent and the White House chief of staff, Susie Wiles, have been increasingly concerned over the past several months that A.I. could cause massive disruptions across industries, including hacks into major financial institutions that could destabilize the world economy.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>过去几个月里，贝森特和白宫幕僚长苏西·怀尔斯越来越担心，人工智能可能会在各行各业造成大规模破坏，包括对主要金融机构的黑客攻击，这可能会破坏世界经济的稳定。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Ms. Wiles this year began organizing an informal group to think about how to deal with the risk created by new, more powerful models. Mr. Bessent is chief among the members of that informal group, an administration official said, but other experts are called in depending on the topic.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>怀尔斯今年开始组织一个非正式小组，思考如何应对更强大的新模型带来的风险。一位政府官员说，贝森特是这个非正式小组的主要成员之一，但根据讨论主题的不同，也会邀请其他专家参与。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The White House pointed to Ms. Wiles’s <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://x.com/SusieWiles47/status/2052192419718783246?s=20">social media post on May 6</a> as the foundational statement of how Mr. Trump balances the risks and opportunities of the new technology. “This administration has one goal: ensure the best and safest tech is deployed rapidly to defeat any and all threats,” she wrote at the time. She said that “the White House will continue to lead an America First effort that empowers America’s great innovators, not bureaucracy, to drive safe deployment of powerful technologies while keeping America safe.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>白宫指出，怀尔斯<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://x.com/SusieWiles47/status/2052192419718783246?s=20">在5月6日发布的社交媒体帖子</a>是特朗普关于如何平衡这项新技术的风险与机遇的基础性表态。“本届政府只有一个目标：确保快速部署最好、最安全的技术，以击败任何及所有威胁，”她当时写道。她表示，“白宫将继续领导一项‘美国优先’的努力，赋能美国的伟大创新者——而非官僚机构——推动强大技术的安全部署，同时保障美国的安全。”</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Asked about Mr. Trump’s accusation that A.I. risk is overblown, Elizabeth Huston, a White House spokeswoman, said that “President Trump is saying that Democrats using A.I. concern as a way to score points is a hoax, just like their claims that climate change would kill everyone in six years.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>当被问及特朗普指责人工智能风险被夸大一事时，白宫发言人伊丽莎白·休斯顿表示：“特朗普总统的意思是，民主党人利用对人工智能的担忧来捞取政治资本，这是一种骗局，就像他们声称气候变化将在六年内杀死所有人一样。”</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>She added that Mr. Trump had reversed the “failed approach” of the Biden administration, which she said had “stifled innovation, hurt consumers and nearly cost America its competitive edge over China.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>她还说，特朗普扭转了拜登政府的“失败做法”，她表示那种做法“扼杀了创新，伤害了消费者，几乎让美国丧失了对中国的竞争优势”。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>But at a moment when A.I. has emerged as arguably the most important long-term issue for the country’s economic health and national security, in the Trump White House there is no single person in charge of coordinating A.I. policy. Marco Rubio, in his role as national security adviser, is rarely discussed as a player on these issues. The White House eliminated the post of deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technologies created during the Biden administration.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>但在人工智能已成为对国家经济健康和国家安全最重要的长期问题之际，特朗普的白宫却没有专人负责协调人工智能政策。国家安全顾问鲁比奥很少被视为这些议题的决策者。白宫取消了拜登政府时期设立的负责网络和新兴技术的副国家安全顾问职位。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>And the national cyber director, a position created by Congress, has only indirect authority over artificial intelligence issues. The current director is Sean Cairncross, a former senior official at the Republican National Committee, who was light on cyber and A.I. experience before taking the post.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>由国会设立的国家网络总监一职对人工智能问题则只有间接权力。现任总监是共和党全国委员会前高级官员肖恩·凯恩克罗斯，他在上任前缺乏网络和人工智能方面的经验。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>And there has been a purging of some technical expertise, including at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, part of the Department of Homeland Security. (The acting director of CISA said last week that the agency was hiring about 250 new employees after shedding around a thousand jobs — roughly a third of its work force — since Mr. Trump returned to the White House.)</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>此外，一些技术专家已被裁撤，包括国土安全部下属的网络安全和基础设施安全局。（该局代理局长上周表示，自特朗普重返白宫以来，该机构裁减了大约一千个职位——约占其员工总数的三分之一——目前正在招聘约250名新员工。）</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>As a result, A.I. has become the administration’s latest hot potato, with various officials dipping in and out of influence depending on the topic, or the day of the week.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>结果，人工智能成了该政府最新的一块烫手山芋：各位官员时而加入，时而退出，取决于讨论的是什么议题，甚至取决于当天是星期几。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Mr. Trump seems driven chiefly by the sense that A.I. is the way to economic growth and nothing can be allowed to stand in its way.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>特朗普似乎主要是受这样一种感觉的驱使：人工智能是实现经济增长的途径，绝不允许任何事物阻挡它的发展。</p></div></div></div><figure class="article-inline-photo large"><div class="img-box"><img src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/5C1WaSmuA8QEt1csDy1cEeWR1Z93YAPtDYgE4s2Nc68/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzE3L211bHRpbWVkaWEvMTdkYy10cnVtcC1haS1hbW9kZWktYmZxai8xN2RjLXRydW1wLWFpLWFtb2RlaS1iZnFqLW1hc3RlcjEwNTAuanBn" alt="Anthropic公司首席执行官达里奥·阿莫迪上周在旧金山发表演讲。该公司的产品已被五角大楼禁用，他提出的关于对人工智能实施行业限制的计划也遭到总统反对。" data-src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/5C1WaSmuA8QEt1csDy1cEeWR1Z93YAPtDYgE4s2Nc68/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzE3L211bHRpbWVkaWEvMTdkYy10cnVtcC1haS1hbW9kZWktYmZxai8xN2RjLXRydW1wLWFpLWFtb2RlaS1iZnFqLW1hc3RlcjEwNTAuanBn" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></div><figcaption><span>Anthropic公司首席执行官达里奥·阿莫迪上周在旧金山发表演讲。该公司的产品已被五角大楼禁用，他提出的关于对人工智能实施行业限制的计划也遭到总统反对。</span> <cite>Manuel Orbegozo for The New York Times</cite></figcaption></figure><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>He had latched onto this idea during the late campaign season. In a private meeting with OpenAI executives in June 2024, Mr. Trump discussed with them the idea of creating a version of “Operation Warp Speed” — his all-of-government enterprise to fast-track Covid vaccines — for the building of data centers.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>在竞选季后期，他就抓住了这个想法。在2024年6月与OpenAI高管的一次私人会议上，特朗普与他们讨论了创建一个类似“曲速行动”（ 他为加速新冠疫苗研发而启动的政府全员行动）的计划，用于建设数据中心。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Ever since, he has been determined to fuel A.I. growth at nearly any political cost, to keep alive what he has referred to as “the golden goose.” Mr. Trump, a real estate developer, is eager to keep building, dismissing the concerns of states and towns that want to slow or halt construction.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>从那时起，他就决心几乎不计任何政治代价来推动人工智能的发展，以保住他所说的“金鹅”。身为房地产开发商的特朗普热衷于持续推进建设，不理会希望放缓或停止建设的州和城镇的担忧。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“The robots will not be taking over,” Mr. Trump insisted when he called into a large conference where Mr. Sacks and Mr. Huang were onstage this week. “The A.I. will not be taking over the rest of the world.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>“机器人不会接管一切，”本周，当萨克斯和黄仁勋在一场大型会议上登台发言时，特朗普通过电话连线坚称。“人工智能不会接管世界其他地方。”</p></div></div></div></div></div><footer class="author-info"><p>Maggie Haberman对本文有报道贡献。</p><p><a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/by/david-e-sanger">David E. Sanger</a>报道特朗普政府和一系列国家安全问题。他在时报任职超过40年，著有四本关于美国国家安全挑战的书。</p><div data-poster="" class=""><div data-poster="" class="css-1i6tsou"><div data-poster="" class="css-hsn83p eqi4ubu0"><div data-poster="" class=""></div></div></div></div><p><a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/by/jonathan-swan">Jonathan Swan</a>是《纽约时报》白宫记者，报道特朗普总统。</p><p><a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/by/cecilia-kang">Cecilia Kang</a>是《纽约时报》驻华盛顿的科技和监管政策记者。她从事科技报道已有20余年。</p><div data-poster="" class=""><p><a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/by/dustin-volz">Dustin Volz</a>为时报报道网络安全和情报领域，常驻华盛顿。</p></div><p>翻译：纽约时报中文网</p><div data-poster="" class=""><div data-poster="" class=""><a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/18/us/politics/trump-ai-safety-anthropic-openai-china.html">点击查看本文英文版。</a></div></div></footer>

2026/9/20
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「中英」时报出版人：175年、1500万篇报道讲述的美国故事

<figure class="article-span-photo small-span-photo"><img src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/AJcuzpGNlK3mm6mezKpJ2oerpB4vKg68QCt6wUva3Xk/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzE4L211bHRpbWVkaWEvMDBwcm9qZWN0cy1BR0Vzc2F5LTAzLzAwcHJvamVjdHMtQUdFc3NheS0wMy1qdW1iby5qcGc" width="743" height="1024" alt referrerpolicy="no-referrer"><figcaption><span></span> <cite>Lola Dupre</cite></figcaption></figure><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Above my desk hangs an engraving of an island. It depicts a still-young city in a still-young nation. Its cobblestone streets are lined with squat buildings, none taller than a church spire. No bridges or tunnels in sight, schooners and paddle-steam ferries crowd a shoreline bustling with working piers. This is New York City in 1851.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>我的办公桌上方挂着一幅版画，描绘的是一座岛屿。画中呈现的是一个仍然年轻的国家里一座仍然年轻的城市。鹅卵石街道两旁是一座座低矮的建筑，没有一座高过教堂的尖顶。放眼望去，既无桥梁也无隧道，纵帆船与明轮蒸汽渡轮挤满岸边，码头上一片繁忙。这是1851年的纽约。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>On Sept. 18 of that year, at the south end of the island, on Nassau Street, the newspaper we know today as The New York Times published its first issue. Put together in unfinished lofts by candlelight, it consisted of four dense, colorless pages of text. It sold for a penny.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>那年9月18日，在该岛最南端的拿骚街上，一份日后我们称之为《纽约时报》的报纸发行了它的创刊号。它是在尚未完工的阁楼里借着烛光排印而成，总共四个版，密密麻麻、灰扑扑的全是字。售价一便士。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>On Friday, The New York Times turns 175. Over the past several months, I’ve found myself drawn to that engraving on my office wall. How unlikely it is that a newspaper born before indoor electricity — let alone cars, radio, telephones, planes and computers — is still here. And how fortunate The Times is to have witnessed and chronicled and interrogated so much history in all those years.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>周五，《纽约时报》迎来175岁生日。过去几个月，我发现自己总被办公室墙上那幅版画吸引。这份报纸诞生于室内尚未通电的时代——更遑论汽车、广播、电话、飞机和电脑——竟能延续至今，这是多么难得的事。而《纽约时报》能在这漫长岁月中见证、记录并探究如此多的历史，又是多么幸运。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>At The Times, we believe the job of a newspaper is to seek the truth, to help people understand the world and to hold the powerful to account. This means equipping people with the information they need to make decisions. It means bonding our diverse communities with a fuller understanding of the lives, hopes and concerns of our neighbors. It means asking tough questions of government and business leaders on the public’s behalf. It means doing all this with an ironclad commitment to fairness, accuracy and independence — delivering the news, as our longstanding credo puts it, “impartially, without fear or favor.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>在《纽约时报》，我们相信报纸的使命在于追寻真相，帮助人们理解这个世界，并让掌权者承担责任。这意味着为人们提供做出决定所需的信息；意味着让多元社群更充分地理解邻里的生活、期望与关切，从而连接彼此；意味着代表公众向政府和商界领袖提出尖锐问题；意味着以对公平、准确和独立的坚定承诺来做这一切——正如我们那句由来已久的信条所言，报道新闻要“不偏不倚、无所畏惧、不徇私情”。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>It’s fitting therefore that the 175th anniversary of The Times arrives as we celebrate a bigger milestone: America’s 250th. Truth, understanding and accountability are essential to a strong nation and a healthy democracy.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>因此，当我们迎来一个更为重大的里程碑——美国建国250周年之际，《纽约时报》也迎来创刊175周年，这再合适不过了。真相、理解与问责，正是一个强大国家和一个健康民主体制不可或缺的基石。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p><strong>Through 61,011 editions</strong> and some 15 million articles, the pages of The Times tell the story of America’s remarkable growth from an upstart nation of 24 million people to a global superpower of nearly 350 million. The pages announce the arrival of new technologies and track the upheavals that followed. They chronicle battles for equal rights and the expansion of who is recognized as an American. They reveal the damage inflicted by wars, economic busts and moments of tragedy — and document the triumphs, economic booms and can-do resilience of a country that usually emerges stronger.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p><b>透过61011期报纸</b>和约1500万篇报道，《纽约时报》的版面讲述了美国从一个人口2400万的新兴国家成长为拥有近3.5亿人口的全球超级大国的非凡历程。这些版面宣告新技术的到来，并追踪随之而来的剧变。它们记录了争取平等权利的斗争，以及“谁被视为美国人”这一范围的不断扩大。它们揭示了战争、经济萧条和悲剧时刻造成的破坏，也记录这个国家所迎来的胜利、经济繁荣与百折不挠的进取精神——而这个国家往往也会因此变得更加强大。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Taken together, they’re the first draft of American history. A new volume is added daily, a report so robust and wide-ranging that, on average, it could fill a 1,000-page book. The primary authors of this work are the reporters we’ve sent out to witness the world and to share what they have seen — not just establishing the facts but also wrapping them in context and explaining why they matter.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>综合起来看，这些文字就是美国历史的初稿。每天都会新增一卷，内容如此丰富详实、包罗万象，平均而言足以填满一本1000页的书。这部作品的主要执笔者正是我们派往世界各地、见证世界并分享所见所闻的记者——他们不仅仅确认事实本身，更是将事实置于背景中，并解释这些事实为何重要。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>We were there when the first shots of the Civil War rang out at Fort Sumter — our correspondent was promptly arrested as a Union spy — and then through the years of battles that followed, some of which President Abraham Lincoln’s war secretary read about in our pages before the generals could send word of them.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>南北战争的第一枪在萨姆特堡打响时，我们就在现场——我们的通讯员随即被当作联邦间谍逮捕。此后数年，战事连绵，而我们始终在场。有些时候，相比比将军们送来的战情通报，林肯总统的战争部长甚至是先读到了我们的报道。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>In the Roaring Twenties, our Wall Street reporting warned of recklessness in the markets, upsetting powerful financiers. After the country toppled into the Great Depression, a leading banker declared, “Our American community would have been better off today if it could have heeded that voice.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>在“咆哮的二十年代”，《纽约时报》对华尔街的报道曾对金融市场上的冒险行为发出警告，惹恼了有权有势的金融家。美国陷入大萧条后，一位银行业巨头感叹道：“如果当初美国社会能够听进去那个声音，我们今天的处境会好得多。”</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Our correspondents braved the battlefields of World War II; some lost their lives and others were taken prisoner in Germany, Italy and Japan. The Times, in turn, used its scarce government-rationed paper supplies to ensure all these reports reached the American public, turning away advertisements in the process.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>第二次世界大战期间，我们的记者们勇赴战场；一些人为此献出了生命，还有一些人在德国、意大利和日本沦为战俘。与此同时，《纽约时报》用政府配给的紧缺纸张确保这些战地报道能够传递给美国公众，为此甚至不惜放弃广告。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>In one of the darkest moments of the civil rights movement, one of our reporters was in Memphis at the Lorraine Motel when an assassin shot Martin Luther King Jr. “Write. Write, write down everything you see,” he told himself as he took in the scene. “Get it all down.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>在民权运动最黑暗的时刻之一，我们的一位记者当时正在孟菲斯的洛林汽车旅馆，亲眼目睹刺客枪杀了马丁·路德·金。“写下来。写，把所有你看到的都写下来，”他一边观察现场，一边对自己说。“全都记下来。”</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>And 25 years ago this month, when others fled the collapse of the twin towers, our reporters charged toward the burning rubble. Over the next two decades, our journalists lived in Afghanistan and Iraq full time to tell the stories of the wars that followed. We continue to report from both countries today. If we don’t document the lessons and consequences of America’s longest wars, how will the country learn from them?</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>25年前的这个月，当双子塔轰然倒塌、旁人纷纷逃离之际，我们的记者却径直冲向那片燃烧的废墟。此后20年间，我们的记者长期驻扎在阿富汗与伊拉克，报道随后发生的战争。时至今日，我们仍在这两个国家坚持报道。倘若我们不去记录美国历史上这些最漫长的战争所留下的教训与后果，这个国家又该如何从中汲取教训？</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Although our commitment to the highest journalistic standards is unsurpassed, we’ve also made mistakes, both big and small, along the way. When we err, we strive to be transparent with our audience about what went wrong and push ourselves to do better.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>尽管我们对最高新闻标准的坚守无人能及，但一路走来，我们也犯过或大或小的错误。每当出错，我们都致力于坦诚面对读者，说明问题出在哪里，并鞭策自己做得更好。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>This is what it means to be the country’s paper of record: a great and imperfect newspaper steadfastly chronicling a great and imperfect nation.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>这就是作为这个国家历史记录者的意义所在：一份伟大却并不完美的报纸，始终如一地记录着一个伟大却并不完美的国家。</p></div></div></div><figure class="article-inline-photo"><div class="img-box"><img src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/xqfEC11qBThskzFEvh1WmuzlW8udHzC27Ox9tp4pV2E/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzE1L211bHRpbWVkaWEvMDBwcm9qZWN0cy1BR0Vzc2F5LzAwcHJvamVjdHMtQUdFc3NheS1qdW1iby5qcGc" alt data-src="https://imgproxy.citrusreader.com/xqfEC11qBThskzFEvh1WmuzlW8udHzC27Ox9tp4pV2E/raw:1/aHR0cHM6Ly9zdGF0aWMwMS5ueXQuY29tL2ltYWdlcy8yMDI2LzA5LzE1L211bHRpbWVkaWEvMDBwcm9qZWN0cy1BR0Vzc2F5LzAwcHJvamVjdHMtQUdFc3NheS1qdW1iby5qcGc" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></div><figcaption><span></span> <cite>Lola Dupre</cite></figcaption></figure><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The Times, and the model of independent reporting we have championed, would not have endured were it not for the abiding commitment of the United States to free inquiry and free expression. America’s bold experiment with democracy, likewise, would have stumbled long ago were it not for news organizations exercising their rights under the First Amendment. Self-governance requires citizens to have access to reliable sources of information to make informed choices and know when their leaders aren’t acting in their best interests. This is why the press is the only profession explicitly protected in the Constitution. It is, as the founders believed, “one of the great bulwarks of liberty.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>如果没有美国对自由探究和自由表达的坚定支持，《纽约时报》以及我们所倡导的独立报道模式不可能延续至今。而如果没有新闻机构行使第一修正案赋予的权利，美国民主的大胆实验也早已步履蹒跚。自治要求公民能够获得可靠的信息来源，从而做出知情选择，并知道他们的领导人何时没有以他们的最佳利益行事。这就是为什么新闻业是宪法中唯一被明确保护的职业。正如开国元勋们所相信的那样，它是“自由的伟大堡垒之一”。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Today, the future of America’s free press is uncertain. As the advertising-based business model that long supported original reporting has collapsed, the country has lost nearly 3,500 newspapers and a vast majority of local journalism jobs in just two decades. This erosion appears poised to continue as the journalism produced at great cost by news organizations is stolen and repurposed at unprecedented scale by the tech giants behind artificial intelligence. And in this financially weakened state, the press is simultaneously confronting, and sometimes buckling in the face of, the most direct political attacks on its rights and legitimacy in more than a century. All this has left fewer reporters backed by the institutional resources and institutional courage needed to do this difficult work — to witness events that might otherwise go unseen, to uncover abuses of power that have never been easier to obscure.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>今天，美国自由新闻的未来充满不确定性。随着长期支撑原创报道的广告商业模式崩塌，美国在短短二十年内失去了近3500家报纸和绝大多数地方新闻工作岗位。这种侵蚀看来还将继续，因为新闻机构以巨大成本生产的新闻正被人工智能背后的科技巨头以前所未有的规模窃取和重新利用。在财务状况恶化同时，新闻界又要面临几百年来对其权利和合法性最直接的政治攻击，时常在压力下屈膝。这一切意味着，能在机构资源和勇气的支持下从事这项艰难工作的记者将越来越少，这项工作意味着去见证那些原本可能被忽视的事件，去揭露那些从未如此容易被掩盖的滥用权力行为。</p></div></div></div></div></div><div class="article-partial"><div class="article-body-item col-lg-5"><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Over 175 years, The Times has become well practiced in working in the face of intense pressure. My colleagues have been kidnapped, arrested and shot at in the course of their work. One survived a land mine detonating underfoot, and another survived a helicopter crash. Some have been surveilled and expelled by foreign nations. Others have been protested, investigated and dragged into court.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>经过175年的磨练，《纽约时报》已经非常擅长在巨大压力下工作。我的同事们在工作中曾被绑架、逮捕和枪击。有人踩中地雷后活了下来，还有人在直升机坠毁事故中幸存。一些人曾被外国监视和驱逐。还有人面临抗议、调查并被拖上法庭。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>In the 1870s, New York’s William “Boss” Tweed, whose political machine controlled just about every corner of city and state government, worked to block a Times exposé that would trigger his downfall. His associates started with threats and eventually offered a bribe worth well over $100 million today, which The Times’s publisher quickly rejected. Almost a century later, when fists, billy clubs and bullets didn’t discourage our reporters from covering the civil rights movement, segregationists weaponized the courts by filing a wave of lawsuits intended to bankrupt The Times.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>19世纪70年代，纽约的“老板”威廉·特威德的政治机器几乎控制着市和州政府的每一个角落，他曾试图阻止《纽约时报》一篇将引发他倒台的揭露报道。他的同伙先是威胁，最终提出一笔按今天价值远超1亿美元的贿赂，《纽约时报》的出版人迅速拒绝。近一个世纪后，当拳头、警棍和子弹未能阻止我们的记者报道民权运动时，种族隔离主义者将法院武器化，提起一波旨在让《纽约时报》破产的诉讼。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Presidents of both parties have done their best to pressure the press and discourage reporting they haven’t liked. John F. Kennedy spied on one of our reporters. Richard Nixon tried to block the publication of the Pentagon Papers. George W. Bush and Barack Obama both used the courts to try to force Times reporters to reveal confidential sources. No president in modern history has been more hostile than Donald Trump to a press he’s dubbed “the enemy of the people.” He accuses reporters of treason, a crime punishable by death. He personally sues news organizations when their coverage displeases him. He directs his administration to use the levers of government power to investigate, subpoena and prosecute journalists for doing their jobs. But in a reminder of the press’s lasting importance, Mr. Trump, like his predecessors, still reads The Times. He still relies on us, still takes questions from us and still quotes us when convenient. Indeed, during a visit to The Times, he told my colleagues and me that he thinks of us as “a great, great American jewel, a world jewel.”</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>两党总统都竭力施压新闻界，打击他们不喜欢的报道。约翰·F·肯尼迪监视过我们的一名记者。理查德·尼克松试图阻止五角大楼文件的发表。乔治·W·布什和贝拉克·奥巴马都曾利用法院试图迫使《纽约时报》记者透露机密消息来源。在现代历史上，没有哪位总统比唐纳德·特朗普更敌视新闻界，他称新闻界为“人民的敌人”。他指控记者叛国，而这是可判处死刑的罪行。当新闻报道令他不悦时，他亲自起诉新闻机构。他指示其政府利用权力杠杆调查、传唤和起诉履行职责的记者。但提醒人们新闻界持久重要性的是，特朗普和他的前任一样，仍然在读《纽约时报》。他仍然依赖我们，仍然接受我们的提问，仍然在有利于他的时候引用我们。事实上，在到访《纽约时报》时，他告诉我和我的同事们，他认为我们是“一颗非常、非常伟大的美利坚宝石，一颗世界宝石”。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p><strong>The mounting pressure</strong> on the free press makes this an especially opportune time to remind ourselves that our country depends on trustworthy sources of information, context and accountability as much as it ever has. Indeed perhaps more so, as the remaining news outlets committed to original, independent reporting in the public interest are overtaken by the surge of social media influencers, partisan propagandists and A.I. bots peddling fear, outrage and misinformation.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p><b>自由新闻面临</b>的压力日益增大，这使得我们更应提醒自己：我们的国家一如既往地依赖可信的信息来源、背景和问责。事实上，也许如今更加如此，因为那些仍致力于为公共利益进行原创、独立报道的新闻机构正被社交媒体网红、党派宣传者和AI机器人推销恐惧、愤怒和虚假信息的浪潮所淹没。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>Reporters are very often how we know what we know. They have not just chronicled our country’s first 250 years; they’ve also empowered the public and kept its officials honest. The current period of democratic erosion around the world offers a clear warning that when a free press is undermined, other freedoms will soon fall as well. If this sounds overstated, I challenge anyone to find a country where people are free but the press isn’t.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>我们之所以知道某些事，往往正是受惠于记者。他们不仅记录了我国建国以来的250年；他们还赋权公众，并让官员保持诚实。当前全球民主受侵蚀的时期明确警告我们：当自由新闻被削弱时，其他自由很快也会倒下。如果这听起来言过其实，请找出一个人民自由但新闻不自由的国家。</p></div></div></div><div class="row article-dual-body-item"><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>The confluence of America’s and The Times’s anniversaries is a welcome reminder of this enduring connection. It contains an implicit promise of continuity: Our nation has been through a lot and will find a way through whatever comes next. But these anniversaries also remind us that our history must be recorded to be learned from. Is our moment really unprecedented? How did similar events unfold the last time? What worked? What didn’t? What comes next? As always, the lessons of our shared past and hopes for our shared future can be found in the pages of The New York Times.</p></div></div><div class="col-lg-6"><div class="article-paragraph"><p>美国和《纽约时报》的周年纪念在此时交汇是对这一持久联系的令人欣慰的提醒。它包含一种延续性的隐含承诺：我们的国家经历了很多，也会找到办法度过接下来的一切。但这些周年纪念也提醒我们，我们的历史必须被记录下来，才能从中学习。我们真的是在经历前所未有的时刻吗？类似事件上一次是如何展开的？哪些起了好的效果？哪些不好？接下来会发生什么？一如既往，我们共同的教训和对未来的希望都能在《纽约时报》的版面上找到。</p></div></div></div></div></div><footer class="author-info"><p>A.G. Sulzberger是《纽约时报》出版人兼《纽约时报》公司董事长。他是奥克斯-苏兹伯格家族自收购时报以来第六位领导这份报纸的家族成员。</p><p>翻译：纽约时报中文网</p><p><a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/18/opinion/nyt-175-anniversary-sulzberger.html">点击查看本文英文版。</a></p></footer>

2026/9/20
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